



Office of Counterterrorism  
and Counterproliferation

**Nuclear  
Incident  
Policy and  
Cooperation**

# Major Public Event Overview



# Objective

This module is designed to a) provide an overview of nuclear security planning and operations at a Major Public Event and b) present a case study as an example of planning and operations at a Major Public Event.

# Goals

- Increase knowledge and familiarization on nuclear security planning for Major Public Events
- Provide an understanding of pre-event, main event and emergency response operations
- Discuss the planning and venue challenges
- Provide a Case Study for nuclear security at a Major Public Event and discuss the lessons learned

# Special Events

## Background - U.S. Perspective

**In U.S., the FBI in early 1980's began to look at events and critical infrastructure as terrorism concerns began to grow**


Security at the 1932 Olympic Games in Los Angeles was police motorcycle officers directing traffic near the stadium and an officer on horseback who patrolled the athletes' housing area

Atlanta 1996 – Olympic Park



The attack in Atlanta by an individual working alone demonstrated another kind of threat.

Munich 1972 – Olympic Village



The terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics changed forever the way countries viewed security at the Olympic Security.

### Definition of a Special Event (i.e., Major Public Event)

- Significant domestic or international events, occurrences, activities or meetings that represent an attractive target for terrorists
- Criteria include – size, threat, significance, duration, location, attendance, medical coverage, dignitaries and regional capabilities


# Malevolent Threats or Acts

- **Improvise Nuclear Device (IND)**
  - Nuclear yield producing device
- **Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD)**
  - Aimed at causing mass panic and environmental contamination
- **Radiological Exposure Device (RED)**
  - A deliberate act to irradiate people at or near a fixed point source
- **Sabotage Attack Upon a Nuclear Facility**
  - Aimed at causing an uncontrolled release of radioactive material
- **Lost or Stolen Legitimate Radioactive Materials**
  - Perception of malevolent use



# Mission

***To provide a National Strategy for planning,  
preparedness and execution of a Nuclear  
Security Plan in support of a Major Public Event***



# **Preparing for Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Materials**

**Requires the establishment of a system, at the National Level, to ensure that:**

- A Nuclear Security Plan is developed to prevent, detect, interdict and respond to nuclear and radiological incidents and accidents
- First Responders are trained and have proper instruments to identify the presence of radiation and adjudicate alarms
- Radiation Specialists are readily available to promptly respond and advise First Responders
- Emergency Management Systems are in place to allow Unified Command and Control

# Nuclear Security Planning

- **Pre-Event Planning**
  - Authorizations
  - Organization/Structure
  - Emergency Management System
  - Interagency/International Partners
  - Threat Assessment
- **Procedural Assistance**
  - Nuclear Security Plan
  - Concept of Operations
  - Standard Operating Procedures
- **Technical Assistance**
  - Training for Subject Matter Experts
  - Train-the-Trainer Courses
  - Specialized Training Courses
  - Reach-back Capabilities
- **Resources**
  - Staffing
  - Detection Equipment
  - Logistics



# Focus Areas of a Concept of Operations

- **Pre-event**

- Threat assessment
- Response planning
- Radiological baseline mapping
- Hotspot identification

Prevention



- **Main event**

- Venue entrance portal screening
- Roadway choke point monitoring
- Mobile and maritime surveillance
- Investigation and adjudication

Detection



- **Emergency Response**


- Prompt emergency response
- Identification, investigation and adjudication
- Source recovery
- Risk assessment and mitigation

Response

# Venue Security Challenge

***Multiple perimeters or zones requiring surveillance***

- Main Venue
- Training Areas
- VIP Areas
- Access Gates
- Media Areas
- Road Access
- Parking Areas
- Special Event Areas




# Radiation Detection Equipment

## Radiation Search



## Radioisotope Identification



## Source Recovery



# Examples of DOE Support to Major Public Events

## International Major Public Events

Olympics – Vancouver, Canada – 2010

Olympics – Beijing, China – 2008

Olympics – Turin, Italy – 2006

Olympics – Athens, Greece – 2004

Olympics – Sydney, Australia – 2000

World Cup – Japan, Korea, South Africa

Pan Am Games – Dominican Republic, Brazil

*Average 1 event/year*



## Domestic Major Public Events

Presidential Inaugurations – since 1998

G8 Summit – since 2004

U.N. General Assembly – since 2002

Super Bowl – since 2002

Olympics – since 1984

*Average 30 events/year*



# Major Public Event

## Case Study – Super Bowl



# DOE's Roles and Responsibilities

## FBI relies on DOE Expertise and Equipment

- Radiological baseline sweeps
- Checkpoints/chokepoints for vehicle screening
- Representation in the Joint Operations Center (JOC)
- Radiological Response Teams pre-positioned with FBI
- DOE Radiological Subject Matter Experts (SME)
- Coordination of Preventative Radiological/Nuclear Detection



## Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) Teams

- DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)
- Civil Support Teams (CST)
- State Radiation Control
- State Department of Transportation (DOT)
- FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU)
- FBI Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT)
- Local Fire/Hazmat/Rescue
- Mobile Detection Deployment Unit (MDDU)
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)



# **Nuclear Security Operations**

## **Preventative Rad/Nuc Detection (PRND) Response**

Primary goal is to detect, identify and adjudicate radiation alarms which indicate a potential radiological or nuclear threat. If a radiation source is encountered, provide radiological monitoring during initial consequence management phase and advise on protective actions and mitigating effects.

## **Venue Radiological Sweeps**

Conduct radiological sweeps of all areas within the hard perimeter prior to security lockdown to locate and identify pre-existing radiological sources or hotspots in preparation for an expeditious search process based on the introduction of an unknown radiological source.

## **Mobile Radiation Survey**

Conduct baseline and routine radiological surveys of commercial and residential areas adjacent to stadium and near other specified venues of interest.

# **Nuclear Security Operations**

## **Air Contamination Monitoring**

Conduct radiological contamination air monitoring in coordination with Local Fire/Rescue at strategic locations around the perimeter of the stadium and along the perimeter of the hard zone.

## **Media Screening**

Conduct radiological screening of all media equipment and personnel entering the Media Gate.


## **Mail and Cargo Screening**

Conduct radiological screening of all mail and cargo delivered to specified venues.

## **Hazmat Operations**

Hazmat operations are multi-disciplinary teams with representatives from Local Explosive Ordnance Disposal, FBI Special Agent Bomb Technicians, Local Fire/Hazmat, Civil Support Teams and DOE.

# Challenging Venues




# Challenging Venues



**NFL Officials Hotel**



**NFC Team Hotel**



**AFC Team Hotel**

# Radiological Sweeps

*Radiological baseline sweeps were conducted  
at all high profile venues*

Venue	Event
Dolphin Stadium	Interior/Exterior Secure Perimeter
NFL Tailgate	Stadium Parking Lot and Vendor Areas
Broward County EOC	Joint Operations Center
Broward County Convention Center	NFL Media Center
Dolphin Stadium	Media Day
Miami Dolphins Training Facility	AFC Team Practice Site
University Of Miami Hecht Athletic Center	NFC Team Practice Site
Ft Lauderdale Beach	Super Bowl Saturday Night Concert
Harbor Beach Marriott Resort	AFC Team Hotel
Intercontinental Hotel Miami	NFC Team Hotel
South Beach	Pepsi Music Super Bowl Concert
Vizcaya Museum and Gardens	Media Party

# Lessons Learned

**At the conclusion of a Major Public Event, it is important to capture Lessons Learned and identify best practices from:**

- First Responder Teams
- Emergency Managers
- Subject Matter Experts
- Law Enforcement/Stadium Security
- Contributing Organizations
- Interagency Partners

***What worked well and what needs improvement***

# MPE Lessons Identified

- **Start planning, preparedness and coordination as soon as possible, at least 12-18 months before event**
  - Identify the players, their roles and training requirements
- **Plan for joint training and exercise activities at a similar venue**
  - Exercises are a good way to gain experience and verify procedures, including interagency procedures
  - Implementation of Train the Trainer concepts for the non-technical supporting elements
- **Alarm adjudication procedures need to be understood by all**
  - False alarms are very likely to occur and are typically caused by medical treatments
  - Focus should be kept on the main goal

# MPE Lessons Identified

- **Equipment maintenance and technical support team**
  - Beneficial for multi-venue locations and large response teams
- **Technical Reach-back Capability**
  - Provides field team with time and confidence to work the incident
- **Checklist for field support and security teams**
  - Develop easy to read procedural checklist for field teams
- **Communication and Coordination Plan**
  - Schedule response activities, team rotations and equipment movement
  - Develop concise reporting protocols
  - Determine “threshold of reporting” for radiation alarms

# MPE International Assistance

**DOE/NNSA can provide advice and assistance for Major Public Event planning, preparedness, and emergency response.**

**Support to International Partners includes:**

- **Assessment and Advice**
- **Major Public Event Support**
- **Radiation Plume Models**
- **Source Recovery**
- **Train-the-Trainer Courses**
- **Medical Consultation**
- **Public Health Protection**
- **Radiological Triage**
- **Emergency Management Systems**
- **Maritime Response**
- **Consequence Management**
- **Exercise Development**

**For additional information please contact the DOE/NNSA Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation through the DOE/NNSA Emergency Operation Center at + 1 202-586-8100**

# **Methods for Requesting International Assistance from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)**

## **1. Assistance can be requested by calling:**

- The DOE/NNSA 24-hour Watch Office: + 1 202 586 8100, or
- The U.S. Department of State (USDOS) 24-hour Operations Center: + 1 202 647 1512, or
- The IAEA Incident and Emergency Center (IEC) 24-hour service: + 43 1 26 32 000.

## **2. The requesting State must be from the country's IAEA identified Competent Authority and must provide the following information:**

- Name and call back phone number of the designated (Organization) country Competent Authority
- Caller's name and call back phone number
- Assistance being requested (e.g., Radiological Triage, IXP Plume Models, Medical or other assistance)
- Brief description on the response incident/event

## **3. Assistance response times vary depending on the type of assistance being requested. Guidance on response times is provided below:**

- Within one hour of receiving the request, DOE will provide analysis from our reach-back capabilities to the requester. International Reach-back capabilities include: Radiological Triage, IXP Plume Models, Medical or other Home Team advice
- Within one hour of receiving the request, DOE will provide the requester with information on response capabilities to meet requester's mission requirements and deployment times



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## Questions/Discussion

