




Overview of Transportation & Facility Safety and Security Work Performed for the NRC

**November 13, 2006
Albuquerque, New Mexico**


**David R. Miller / Douglas J. Ammerman
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico**






History of Major NRC Transportation Studies

- NUREG-0170, 1977 - Transportation of Radioactive Materials by Air and Other Modes
- NUREG/CR-6672, 2000 - Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Assessments
- NUREG/CR-6672 was prompted by:
 - Spent fuel shipments will increase
 - Routes and transport cask differ from those previously studied
 - Better risk assessment and cask response analysis tools available
- Issues Report
 - Translated public comments on the review of NUREG/CR-6672








Package Performance Study


- **Description**

- Advance safety assessments of spent fuel transport through finite element analyses, testing, and risk analyses
- Demonstrate the ability to properly capture cask response to severe thermal and mechanical environments through analyses
- Validate existing regulatory framework

- **Accomplishments**

- The draft Test Protocols document was submitted to the NRC in January 2002
- The first internal Expert Review Panel meeting was held April 2002
- The revised Test Protocols document were published as NUREG-1768 on February 2003







Vulnerability Assessments for Transportation and Storage of SNF & other RAM


- Estimate SNF package response to airplane impacts and large blast events in response to 9/11
- Analyses of real casks conducted using benchmarked codes
- Potential source term and consequences estimated
- Develop source term guidance for potential sabotage events
 - Spent fuel transport and storage packages
 - Non-SF packages
 - Expert panel provided independent review
- SNL and NRC worked together to define threat scenarios






Vulnerability Assessments: Field of Casks

- Aircraft could attack from a variety of directions and angles of descent
- Cask-to-cask interaction is very chaotic
- Evaluated transfer of momentum and impact by the hardest structural components of the aircraft




Vulnerability Assessments: Analysis Methodology

- Global analyses evaluated overall crash response
 - Transient force on cask
 - Cask velocity & displacement
 - CTH was used for these calculations
- Local analyses evaluated cask and canister detailed response
 - Cask integrity to impacts from aircraft & components
 - Penetration from hard components
 - Cask-to-cask impacts
 - Canister response
 - Analyses conducted using FEM







Vulnerability Assessments: Aircraft Impacting Typical Cask



Animation


Vulnerability Assessments: Example Hard Component Analyses

Animations



Vulnerability Assessments: Blast Analyses

- Loading and standoff specified by NRC
- Standoff representative of a realistic delivery scenario






Guidance Documents & Vulnerability and Threat Assessments

- **Non-Spent Fuel Radioactive Materials Source Term Guidance Document**
 - 6 packages, 180+ scenarios, August 2004
- **Spent Fuel Source Term Guidance Document**
 - 7 packages, 150+ scenarios, November 2004
- **16 scenarios were included in these evaluations**


➤ **Documents provide basis for estimating public health consequences**





UF₆ Package Analysis, Dry Storage PRA & VA of Irradiator Facilities

- **Performance Study of NRC Approved UF₆ Packages**
 - Evaluate the performance of 3 NRC-approved UF₆ packages to conditions of potential accidents
 - Results: Probability of a real accident exceeding regulatory conditions is very low
 - SAND Report published on January 2003
- **SNL Peer Review of NRC Dry Cask Storage PRA Report**
 - Technical peer review of a dry cask storage PRA using ASME PRA guidance
- **Conduct Vulnerability Assessments of 3 U.S. Irradiator Facilities**
 - Physical Protection Vulnerabilities Assessment and Guidance Development for 10CFR36 Licensees, September 2003
 - Develop guidance needed to implement any new physical protection requirements
 - Scope: Consider only explosives and not required to consider a thermal driver in the analyses



Sabotage - Aerosol Testing

- **SCENARIO:** plausible sabotage attack on nuclear transport casks by HEDD
- **GOALS:** Quantify source-term data and conduct aerosol analyses on CeO_2 , DUO_2 , and SNF to determine:
 - Measure respirable fractions
 - Calculate enrichment factors
 - Determine spent fuel ratio
- Supported jointly by DOE & NRC
- Collaboration with an International Working Group
- **Four Phase Test Program:**
 - Phase 1: CSC characterizations, glass targets (2001-2002)
 - Phase 2: CeO_2 ceramic pellet rodlets, ~ 30 tests (2002-2005)
 - Phase 3: DUO_2 pellets/rodlets, 6 tests (2006-2007)
 - Phase 4: SNF rodlets, 8 tests (2007-2008)
- **FY07 - modeling studies & safeguards support**



DUO₂ Aerosol – Explosive Test Chamber




Sabotage - Aerosol Testing (cont.)

- Reliable source-term data and supporting analyses will determine the release of respirable aerosol particles
 - YMP EIS conservatively assumed 5% respirable fraction
- Guide and validate the technical basis for transport & storage regulations (10 CFR Parts 71, 72, and 73)
- Support security/safeguards procedures & mitigation strategies
- Provide basis for evaluating appropriate levels of physical protection for SNF shipments & site operations
- Significant results to date:
 - CeO₂ respirable fraction = 1.4% +/- 0.6%
 - DUO₂ respirable fraction = 1.3% +/- 0.4%

➡ **Results predicting reduced consequences**



➡ post-test DUO₂ rodlet






Independent Analysis for Licensing of PFS



Sandia F-4 Crash Test & F-16 Simulation






PFS: PRONTO SPH Aircraft Impact



SPH Model




**SPH Model
(Fuel Tanks and Engine)**






PFS: Fire and Heat Transfer Analyses



Fire




Heat Transfer





Thermo-Mechanical







Transportation Safety & Risk Assessment

- Analyses to be Performed:
 - Accident probability
 - Extra-regulatory impacts onto an unyielding target
 - Extra-regulatory engulfing fires
 - Source term generation
 - Radioactive material dispersion (if there is any release)
 - Consequence
 - Risk Assessment



GA-4





A Web-based Educational Tool Demonstrating the Severity of Regulatory Testing for Spent Nuclear Cask Safety

Nuclear Regulatory Commission – Protecting You and Our Environment
<http://www.csu821.sandia.gov/organization/div6000/ctr6100/610> Google

Protecting YOU & OUR ENVIRONMENT

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TEST CONDITIONS

- IMPACT
- PUNCTURE
- FIRE
- IMMERSION
- How a cask is certified
- How safe are casks

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WEB INTERFACE

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Protecting YOU & OUR ENVIRONMENT

HOME REGULATIONS IMPACT PUNCTURE FIRE IMMERSION CERTIFICATION SAFETY
 Protecting You & Our Environment > Regulatory Tests < Acceptance Criteria

"During and after the regulatory tests, the cask must contain the nuclear material, limit doses to acceptable levels, and prevent nuclear reaction." [10CFR71.73]

Hypothetical Accident Conditions (tests 1 through 5 are performed sequentially)

TEST 1. DROP **TEST 2. CRUSH** **TEST 3. PUNCTURE** **TEST 4. THERMAL** **TEST 5. IMMERSION**

Free Drop test: dropping a package from 30 feet (9 meters) onto an unyielding target in the most damaging orientation. The unyielding target forces all of the deformation to be in the package, none in the target. The speed on impact is 44 feet (13.4 meters) per second or 30 miles per hour.

Crush test: dropping a 1100 pound steel plate from 30 feet (9 meters) onto a package, in the most damaging orientation. This test is only required for packages weighing less than 1100 pounds (a loaded SNF cask weighs 250,000 pounds). The speed on impact is 44 feet (13.4 meters) per second or 30 miles per hour.

Puncture test: dropping a package from 40 inches onto a welded, 6 inch diameter, **steel spike**, in the most damaging orientation. The speed on impact is 14.4 feet (4.5 meters) per second or 10 miles per hour.

Thermal test: placing a package 40 inches above under a pool of burning hydrocarbon fuel (testing is usually performed with jet fuel) for 30 minutes with an average flame temperature of at least 800-degrees C (1475-degrees F).

Immersion test: placing a package under 50 feet of water for 8 hours. Spent nuclear fuel casks are also immersed under 3 feet (1 meter) of water for 8 hours sequentially after tests 1 through 4.



In addition to the **10CFR71.73** tests, spent fuel casks must also meet the immersion requirements of **10CFR71.61**. Placing a cask under 660 feet (200 meters) of water for 1 hour.

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SEVERE TESTING

COMPUTER ANALYSIS



REGULATORY TESTING





Potential Future Work

- **Fuel behavior in the transport environment**
 - Mechanical response to impact loadings
 - Behavior in transitional high thermal, oxidizing environments
- **Technical support for 10CFR73 rule-making**
 - Support technical base development for rule-making associated Cat I&II shipments
 - Support technical base development for rule-making associated with IAEA Code of Conduct shipments
- **Full-scale testing of a rail cask to demonstrate safety, validity of scaling laws, and adequacy of the regulations**