


Border Security Workshop Exercise Scenario

Scenario 1: Terrorist Threat

3 Countries, 2 Participant Teams
Desert Terrain Environment

Figure 1: Topographic Layout



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1.0 Scenario Overview

The scenario consists of three countries, all of which share borders. Participants should break into two teams. One team will play **Country 1**, while the other will play **Country 2**. **Country X** is static. Any actions or events originating from **Country X** will be modeled by the facilitators.

Country 1 and **Country 2** are on friendly diplomatic terms, and are highly cooperative in their border security policy and operations. **Country X**'s relations with **Country 1** and **Country 2** are neutral, neither particularly friendly nor particularly unfriendly. There is not a high degree of border security cooperation between **Country X** and either **Country 1** or **Country 2**, and **Country X** does not take its border security nearly as seriously as the other two countries.

The scenario models a terrorist threat to both **Countries 1 and 2**, originating from **Country X**. **Countries 1 and 2** share an interest in detecting and neutralizing this threat, and should cooperate to the fullest extent possible.

2.0 Country Geopolitical Overviews

2.1 Country 1 Geopolitical Overview

Country 1 shares borders with **Country 2** and **Country X**, including a formal port of entry (POE) on both borders (refer to map Figure 1). **Country 1** and **Country 2** share friendly diplomatic ties, and cooperate in border security, including maintaining regular communications, and occasionally carry out collaborative operations. Movement between the two countries, particularly in tourism and trade, is fairly easy, though it is closely monitored and documented at the common POE. **Country 1** and **Country X** maintain neutral relations, neither particularly friendly nor particularly hostile. There is not a high degree of cooperation between the two countries in border security matters. There is cross-border trade movement between the two countries at the POE.

2.2 Country 2 Geopolitical Overview

Country 2 shares borders with **Country 1** and **Country X**, including a formal port of entry (POE) on the border with **Country 1**, and an open (though obstructed, regulated, and guarded) “green” border (no POEs) with **Country X** (refer to map Figure 1). **Country 2** and **Country 1** share friendly diplomatic ties, and cooperate in border security, including maintaining regular communications, and occasionally carry out collaborative operations. Movement between the two countries, particularly in tourism and trade, is fairly easy, though it is closely monitored and documented at the common POE. **Country 2** and **Country X** maintain neutral relations, neither particularly friendly nor particularly hostile. There is not a high degree of cooperation between the two countries in border security matters, nor is there significant cross-border movement in people and/or goods.

2.3 Country X Geopolitical Overview

Country X shares borders with **Country 1** and **Country 2**. The border with **Country 1** includes a POE, while the “green” border with **Country 2** is open (though obstructed, regulated, and guarded). **Country X** maintains neutral relations with **Country 1** and **Country 2**, neither particularly friendly nor particularly hostile. There is significant cross-border trade movement between **Country X** and **Country 1**, at their common POE. There is no significant cross-border movement between **Country X** and **Country 2**. Terrorist elements hostile to **Country 1** and **Country 2** are known to operate within **Country X**’s borders.

3.0 Border Characterization

As part of their cooperative efforts, Country 1 and Country 2 utilize a common terminology for the breakdown of their sectors. The common border between Country 1 and Country 2 is known as **Border Sector Alpha**. The common border between Country 1 and Country X is known as **Border Sector Charlie**. The common border between Country 2 and Country X is known as **Border Sector Tango**. These borders are characterized as follows.

3.1 Border Sector Alpha

Border sector Alpha is the least problematic of the three borders. As mentioned, Country 1 and Country 2 share friendly relations, and engage in extensive cross-border trade, as well as tourist activity. There is a single formal POE connecting the two countries (see map Figure 1), through which most of this traffic passes. Each country maintains POE facilities on its respective side of the border, regulating incoming and outgoing traffic. The open “green” borders on either side of the POE are delineated by one concrete marker every kilometer. There are no fences or obstructions preventing the movement of cross-border traffic, but the open borders are regularly patrolled by border security personnel from both countries.

- **Border Length:** 50 km
- **Number of POEs:** 1
- **Border Delineation:** Non-disputed; concrete markers every 1 km
- **Local Terrain:** Relatively flat and featureless desert; sparse, low-lying vegetation
- **Climate:** Arid desert; dry; occasional dust storms; rain during brief monsoon season

3.2 Border Sector Charlie

As mentioned, **Country 1** and **Country X** share neutral relations. The two countries engage in significant cross-border trade. There is a single POE connecting the two countries (see map Figure 1). Only **Country 1** maintains POE facilities on its respective side of the border, regulating incoming and outgoing traffic; **Country X** maintains no such facilities. The open “green” borders on either side of the POE are delineated by a 4 meter tall chain-link fence along the full length of the border, topped with barbed-wire. Observation towers, on **Country 1**’s respective side of the border, are spread out one for every 5 kilometers.

- **Border Length:** 50 km
- **Number of POEs:** 1
- **Border Delineation:** Non-disputed; chain link, barbed-wire fence along full length; observation towers (Country 1 side of border) every 5 km
- **Local Terrain:** Relatively flat and featureless desert; sparse, low-lying vegetation
- **Climate:** Arid desert; dry; occasional dust storms; rain during brief monsoon season

3.3 Border Sector Tango

As mentioned, **Country 2** and **Country X** share neutral relations. There is no significant cross-border traffic. The full length of Border Sector Tango is open “green” border. It is delineated, on **Country 2**’s respective side, by a packed sand berm, 4 meters tall and running the full length of the border. Observation towers, on **Country 2**’s respective side of the border, are spread out one for every 5 km.


- **Border Length:** 50 km
- **Number of POEs:** 0
- **Border Delineation:** Non-disputed; 4 meter sand berm (Country 2 side of border) running the full length of the border; observation towers (Country 2 side of border) every 5 km
- **Local Terrain:** Relatively flat and featureless desert; sparse, low-lying vegetation
- **Climate:** Arid desert; dry; occasional dust storms; rain during brief monsoon season

4.0 Country Border Security Organizational Structures

4.1 Country 1 Border Security Organizational Structure

Country 1 maintains a designated Border Security Organization (BSO) as a branch of its military, answering to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). It also maintains a civilian customs organization, answering to the Ministry of Interior (MOI), in close cooperation with the BSO. Country 1's BSO organizational structure and top-down chain of command is illustrated in Figure 2, below.


Figure 1: Country 1 Border Security Organizational Structure



4.2 Country 2 Border Security Organizational Structure

Country 2 maintains a designated Border Security Organization (BSO) as a branch of its military, answering to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). It also maintains a civilian customs organization, answering to the Ministry of Interior (MOI), in close cooperation with the BSO. Country 2's BSO organizational structure and top-down chain of command is illustrated in Figure 3, below.

Figure 3: Country 3 Border Security Organizational Structure



4.3 Country X Border Security Organizational Structure

Country X does not maintain a formal border security organization, or a formal customs organization. To the extent that any border security operations are actually carried out, **Country X** assigns these duties to its police forces, or in times of conflict, to its military. More concrete details regarding **Country X**'s specific organizational structures are not relevant to this exercise.

5.0 Country Border Security Technical Capabilities and Infrastructure

5.1 Country 1

Country 1 has access to a variety of domestic and foreign supplied technologies. POE, open border, and personnel capabilities break down as follows.

POE Technologies and Infrastructure

(Sector Alpha and Sector Charlie, except where noted)

- POE Infrastructure
 - Reliable electricity
 - Reliable phone/comm lines
 - Reliable internet connection
- Person Inspection
 - Manual physical inspection
 - Metal detector portal
 - Metal detector wands
 - Explosives detection portal (**Sector Charlie** only)
- Vehicle Inspection
 - Manual physical inspection
 - Under-chassis inspection mirrors
 - Explosives residue sampling equipment (swipes)
 - X-ray vehicle portal (**Sector Charlie** only)
- Cargo/baggage Inspection
 - Manual physical inspection
 - Explosives residue sampling equipment (swipes)
 - Drug residue sampling equipment (swipes)
 - X-ray baggage inspection
 - X-ray cargo inspection (**Sector Charlie** only)

Open Border Technologies and Infrastructure

(Sector Alpha and Sector Charlie, except where noted)

- Barriers and Obstructions
 - Chain link fence, topped with barbed wire (4 meters, **Sector Charlie** only)
- Fixed Emplacements
 - Guard towers every 5 km, equipped with flood lights, spotting scopes, semi-reliable electricity, radio comm links, and fully-equipped survival shelter (**Sector Charlie** only)
- Remote Sensors
 - Battery-powered daylight cameras, remote operable from guard towers, 12 available in each sector
 - Battery-powered infrared cameras, remote operable from guard towers, 8 available in each sector
 - Vehicle-mounted ground radars, 6 available

Personnel Technologies and Infrastructure

- Armament

- Assault rifles
- Sidearms
- Sufficient ammunition
- Optics/handheld sensors
 - Binoculars and spotting scopes

Other

- Vehicles
 - 4x4 Trucks, 12 available each sector
 - ATVs (quads), 12 available each sector
- Aircraft
 - Light helicopters (4 personnel lift maximum), 4 available
 - Short-range surveillance UAV, day/night infrared sensor capability, 2 available

5.2 Country 2

Country 2 has access to a variety of domestic and foreign supplied technologies. POE, open border, and personnel capabilities break down as follows.

POE Technologies and Infrastructure

(Sector Alpha and Sector Charlie, except where noted)

- POE Infrastructure
 - Reliable electricity
 - Reliable phone/comm lines
 - Reliable internet connection
- Person Inspection
 - Manual physical inspection
 - Metal detector portal
 - Metal detector wands
- Vehicle Inspection
 - Manual physical inspection
 - Under-chassis inspection mirrors
 - Explosives residue sampling equipment (swipes)
- Cargo/baggage Inspection
 - Manual physical inspection
 - Explosives residue sampling equipment (swipes)
 - Drug residue sampling equipment (swipes)
 - X-ray baggage inspection

Open Border Technologies and Infrastructure

(Sector Alpha and Sector Charlie, except where noted)

- Barriers and Obstructions
 - Sand berm, (4 meters, Sector Tango only)
- Fixed Emplacements

- Guard towers every 5 km, equipped with flood lights, spotting scopes, semi-reliable electricity, radio comm links, and fully-equipped survival shelter (**Sector Tango** only)
- Remote Sensors
 - Battery-powered daylight cameras, remote operable from guard towers, 12 available in each sector
 - Battery-powered infrared cameras, remote operable from guard towers, 10 available in each sector
 - Vehicle-mounted ground radars, 4 available

Personnel Technologies and Infrastructure

- Armament
 - Assault rifles
 - Sidearms
 - Sufficient ammunition
- Optics/handheld sensors
 - Binoculars and spotting scopes

Other

- Vehicles
 - 4x4 Trucks, 14 available each sector
 - ATVs (quads), 10 available each sector
- Aircraft
 - Light helicopters (4 personnel lift maximum), 6 available
 - Short-range surveillance UAV, day/night infrared sensor capability, 3 available

5.3 Country X

As previously noted, **Country X** does not possess a dedicated border security organization, and border security functions (when receiving any attention, which is rare) are handled by either the civilian police or military forces. **Country X**'s border security technical capabilities and infrastructure are minimal, and details are not necessary for this exercise.

6.0 Challenge/Threat Characterization


6.1 Challenge/Threat Overview

This exercise simulates a terrorist threat originating within **Country X**. **Country X** is home to an extremist organization, known as the Country X Insurgent Front (XIF). The XIF, in addition to creating trouble at home, maintains territorial claims within **Country 1** and **Country 2**. It has designated the governments of both countries as its enemies, and is believed to be actively planning attacks against government, military, and civilian targets.

6.2 Challenge/Threat Leadership Organization

The XIF is led by a small central leadership cadre (see Figure 4 below), believed to comprise a central leader and 6 deputies. Each deputy oversees a variable number of smaller operative cells. Each cell consists of a cell leader and approximately 8 operatives. In order to maintain operational security, each cell is fairly autonomous, and maintains minimal communication with the central leadership.

Figure 4: XIF Threat Organization Chart



6.3 Challenge/Threat Resources

Manpower

It is not known exactly how many trained operatives the XIF has at its disposal. In addition to the 7 individuals that make up the central leadership cadre, it is estimated that the organization has some 300 active members. This number includes mostly **Country X** citizens, but an unknown number are of foreign origin, and a handful are believed to be defectors from **Country X**'s security forces.

Training

Personnel training levels vary widely. The leadership cadre, as well as most cell leaders, have received extensive training in insurgent activities, including firearms usage, sabotage, bomb construction, small-unit fire and maneuver tactics, and political indoctrination. Training of individual cell operatives is the responsibility of the cell leader. Some personnel have received foreign training, while others (as noted above) are defectors from **Country X**'s security forces, and have been trained accordingly.

Equipment and Infrastructure

The XIF's equipment varies from one operative cell to another, but generally includes:

- Armament
 - Light weapons (variable by cell – may include assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, RPGs, light mortars, etc...)
 - Improvised Explosive Devices – IEDs (variable by cell – may include car bombs, roadside bombs, and suicide bombers)
- Communications
 - Human courier
 - Cell phones
 - Radio
 - Internet
- Transport
 - Local transportation (buses, taxis, streetcars, etc...)
 - Stolen vehicles – cars, trucks, 4x4s, etc... (variable by cell)