



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management



Addressing Public Confidence in the Case for Yucca Mountain Safety

Presented to:

American Nuclear Society International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference

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Outline

- **Background and status of Yucca Mountain repository program**
- **Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA)**
- **Postclosure Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA)**
- **Communicating the basis for confidence in the TSPA**



Background and Status of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program

- **Nations with nuclear power programs pursue the geologic disposal option**
- **Yucca Mountain location**
- **Nuclear power history in the US**
- **Selecting the Yucca Mountain site**
- **Licensing is the next step**



The United States is One of Many Countries Pursuing Geologic Repositories



United States

Yucca Mt site approved 2002; site characterization complete; license application to NRC in June 2008; repository operation TBD



Belgium

URL at Mol (Boom clay); 2002 SAFIR-2 site feasibility report favorable; repository by 2035



Canada

“Adaptive Phased Management” approach agreed Nov. 2005; siting to use public input; repository operations by 2035



China

Beishan granitic site near Gansu in Gobi Desert under study since 2001; site characterization thru 2010 URL and disposal demos thru 2025



Finland

Olkiluoto granite site ratified 2001; “Onkalo” URL confirmatory tests since 2004; repository construction permit by 2012, operations by 2020




France

Bure clay site feasibility published 2005; June 2006 Act calls for 2025 repository



Germany

Moratorium on Gorleben site; 2002 siting criteria being debated; could lead to two new sites by 2010 – possibly Konrad iron mine



Japan

URLs at Horonobe & Mizunami; NUMO voluntary siting shortlist by 2007; site selection by 2025




Spain

Central SNF storage by 2010; generic repository design; no siting work before 2010



Sweden

Osthammar & Oskarshamn crystalline site studies since 2002; LA by 2008; SNF canister facility permit application LA submitted Nov. 2006; operations test at Aspo URL



Switzerland

URLs at Grimsel (granite) & Mt. Terri (clay); Opalinus clay site feasibility approved June 2006; siting procedures soon




United Kingdom

CoRWM's final recommendation for repository disposal accepted October 2006; interim storage for now; siting process under development




U.S. Nuclear Waste Policy and Yucca Mountain




U.S. Nuclear Waste Policy and Yucca Mountain


Yucca Mountain Site Selection




Repository program steps



Yucca Mountain, Nevada



Proposed Repository at Yucca Mountain



00226DR_Yucca Mt. Cutaway 8e.ai



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Safety Evaluations and the License Application

- Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA)
- Postclosure Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA)



License Application Content

- General Information (GI)

- General Description
- Proposed Schedules for Construction, Receipt and Emplacement of Waste
- Physical Protection Plan
- Material Control and Accounting Program
- Site Characterization

- Safety Analysis Report (SAR)

- Repository Safety Before Permanent Closure
- Repository Safety After Permanent Closure
- Research and Development Program to Resolve Safety Questions
- Performance Confirmation Program
- Administrative and Programmatic Requirements


Increasing
Level of Detail

Elements of the Safety Case

- **Postclosure Safety Case**
 - **Total system performance assessment (TSPA)**
 - **Comprehensive analyses and defense-in-depth**
 - **Evaluation of uncertainty**
 - **Analysis of potentially disruptive events**
 - **Insights from natural analogues**
 - **Performance confirmation**
- **Preclosure Safety Case**
 - **Preclosure safety analysis - event sequences categorized by frequency (PCSA)**
 - **Safety margin and defense in-depth**
 - **Analysis of Category 1 & 2 event sequences**
 - **Industry precedent and experience**
 - **Licensing specifications and surveillance**



Preclosure Safety Analysis Domain



Preclosure vs. Postclosure Safety Analyses

- **Preclosure Safety Analysis (PCSA) Uses Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Technology**
 - PCSA uses industry-standard and largely proven methods
 - The operational phase of the repository will be closely monitored, giving feedback on the PCSA as the repository is loaded, based on experience
- **This feedback from monitoring separates the PCSA from the postclosure TSPA**
 - Only very limited monitoring can be done to address a million-year projection of potential safety
- **Therefore, providing arguments for postclosure safety to a non-specialist audience is likely more challenging for the postclosure safety evaluations than the preclosure (operational) safety evaluations**



Postclosure Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA)

- TSPA is a method for providing quantitative estimates of future system performance, considering uncertainties
 - Defined by NRC and EPA regulations
- Key aspects include
 - Weight consequences by probability (i.e., regulate on risk)
 - Account for uncertainties (regulate on mean risk, display uncertainty)
- Basic approach
 - Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis of scenarios




TSPA Model Architecture

- **TSPA Models address scenario classes**
 - **Nominal Scenario Class**
 - **Early Failure Scenario Class**
 - ◆ Early failure of a statistically determined number of dripshields or waste packages
 - **Igneous Scenario Class**
 - ◆ Volcanic eruption and/or igneous intrusion
 - **Seismic Scenario Class**
- **Each scenario class has a separate TSPA model**
- **Each model component has information flow logic diagrams**
- **Each model component has an integrated set of inputs and outputs**
- **Each model abstraction has a conceptual basis**




Features, Events and Processes (FEPs) Evaluation




TSPA-LA Scenarios

Four scenario classes divided into seven modeling cases


- Nominal Scenario Class
 - Nominal Modeling Case
- Early Failure Scenario Class
 - Waste Package Modeling Case
 - Drip Shield Modeling Case




- Igneous Scenario Class
 - Intrusion Modeling Case
 - Eruption Modeling Case



- Seismic Scenario Class
 - Ground Motion Modeling Case
 - Fault Displacement Modeling Case




TSPA Software Architecture




Contributions of Evaluated Scenarios to Million-Year System Performance


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

Example TSPA 2008 Dose-History Results 300 Realizations -- All Scenarios



The Safety of a Repository at Yucca Mountain



**THE SAFETY OF A
REPOSITORY AT
YUCCA MOUNTAIN**



Available on the internet at:

http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ym_repository/license/docs/Safety_of_a_repository.pdf



Communicating the Basis for Postclosure Safety

- It is difficult to obtain a complete understanding of the PCSA and TSPA without a background in various engineering and science disciplines
- However, it is important for persons without such specialized backgrounds to also understand how DOE has concluded that it is safe to dispose spent nuclear fuel in the Yucca Mountain repository
- DOE has prepared a brochure entitled “The Safety of a Repository at Yucca Mountain,” written in plain language with illustrations of various aspects of the repository to aid in this understanding



Confidence and uncertainty in TSPA results

- There is a inherent uncertainty in predictions of how complex systems perform over extremely long periods of time
- DOE is required to evaluate uncertainty and the NRC will assess DOE's performance assessment against a “reasonable expectation” of safety standard
- Accounting for uncertainty does not detract from having confidence in the overall expectation of safety for the repository system
 - Evaluation of uncertainty gives an indication of what the more likely range of outcomes may be
 - A mean or median value presented in the context of overall uncertainty gives a more comprehensive view of likely repository safety than a single calculated value with no insight into its likelihood



Conclusion

- In its License Application submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 3, 2008
 - The DOE believes that its licensing documents provide a sufficient basis for finding the proposed system to be safe to allow the repository project to move into its next phase: construction
 - The licensing process, with its thorough technical review and hearings, will permit the regulatory authority to judge the DOE case for Yucca Mountain repository safety
- The TSPA and PCSA are complex and not easily understood by persons without a specialized technical background
 - DOE's plain-language safety case brochure is intended to convey the bases for its confidence in safety of the Yucca Mountain repository
 - The brochure can be downloaded at:

http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ym_repository/license/docs/Safety_of_a_repository.pdf

