

Overview of Sandia National Laboratories Capabilities

to support NRC NSIR

*in the Development of a Regulatory
Guidance Document Supporting the ISFSI
and MRS Security Rulemaking*

May 21, 2009


Ken B. Sorenson
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico



Contents

- **SNL Organization for NRC Program Support**
- **Science and Engineering Capabilities**
- **Past NRC Security Assessment Work**
- **Benchmarking**
- **Independent Reviews and QA**

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Programs



Breadth of Sandia support to NRC

NRR

- Fire Protection Support
- ESBWR Design Certification Support
- Alternative Source Term for License Amendment
- License Renewal: Oyster Creek (structural) and Pilgrim (MELCOR/MACCS)
- Security assessment for research and test reactors

NSIR

- Security for New Plants – NUREG-CR1345
- Evacuation and Emergency Response
- Incident Response Documents and Procedures
- Spent Fuel Pool explosives experiment
- Categorization Table for Radionuclides

HR


- Training for NRC staff: Perspectives in Reactor Safety, Materials Security

NMSS

- Transportation Safety Risk Assessment
- Security Assessment for Materials

RES

- 34 projects in FY06
- Primary areas include PRA, HRA, Fire Protection, severe accident modeling and analysis, security assessments for power reactors, structural/containment analyses, spent fuel pool experiments, State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA)
- Includes Regulatory Guide revision, PRA methods and documents, HRA best practices, tech support for PTS rulemaking, fire protection standards




Science and Engineering Capabilities

- Sandia has the analytic/experimental capabilities to address complex engineering problems
 - Hardware
 - Massively parallel processing capability to handle coupled-code, large model problems
 - Software
 - Extensive library of application codes specifically developed to address high strain rate, large deformation problems
 - Coupled codes to address response spectra
 - People
 - Internal SNL capability to access subject matter experts
 - SNL has used staff from across the labs on past NRC vulnerability projects that addresses the complete problem
 - Experience
 - SNL has a large library of past projects to use as a basis for new work
 - SNL has a large data base of empirical data that provides a basis for benchmarking of new analytic work
 - Infrastructure
 - SNL has the facilities, processes, and cleared staff for working on sensitive and classified projects.

NRC Security Assessments Supported by SNL

- After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, SNL worked with NRC to understand threats and consequences to
 - Nuclear power plants
 - Fuel cycle facilities
 - Research and test reactors
 - Spent fuel and casks
- Threat Definition
 - Aircraft
- Building Response Analysis
 - Structural Damage
 - Fire Damage
 - Confirmatory Testing
- Plant Systems Response
 - Plant Damage States
 - Consequences
- Mitigation




Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Project Title	JCN	Office	(\$K) Project Funding LTD	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09
RDD Modeling Software Support	R1108	NSIR	\$125					1/1/03 - 12/31/06			
Revision of NUREG/CR-1345	R1133	NSIR	\$200						6/1/2006 - 6/1/2007		
Structural Pool Testing	R1137	NSIR	\$1,100						8/9/2005 - 9/30/2007		
Basic Security Training	M1123	NSIR	\$341					8/31/03 - 12/31/06			
Review NUREG	J3162	NSIR	\$1,241					7/15/04 - 3/31/07			
Radioactive Transportation/Storage	J5412	NMSS	\$6,501					3/11/02 - 9/30/07			
Physical Protection Vulnerabilities	J5428	NMSS	\$529					6/15/02 - 1/30/04			
Vulnerability Assessments - Facilities	J5431	NMSS	\$2,946					8/12/02 - 10/28/05			
Vulnerability Assessment RTR	J3094	NRR	\$1,314					5/1/03 - 9/30/07			
Public Evacuation Studies	J3056	NRR	\$290					4/1/03 - 12/31/04			
Redo Evacuation NUREG	J3103	NRR	\$214					8/1/03 - 12/31/04			
Security Assess for Nuclear Facilities	N6233	RES	\$1,298					4/30/2005 - 6/30/200			
New NPP Vulnerability	Y6623	RES	\$18,375					3/25/02 - 4/30/06			
Dispersal Character. Of NRC-Lic. Mat.	Y6787	RES	\$316					3/27/03 - 12/30/06			
Tech. Evaluation of Pool Designs	Y6856	RES	\$989					3/4/04 - 3/31/07			
SFP Heatup & Propagation Phenomena	Y6758	RES	\$4,030					3/26/04 - 4/30/07			
NPP/SFT Land/Sea Vulnerability	Y6825	RES	\$6					5/1/04 - 7/28/05			
Dispersal Characteristics of SNF	Y6988	RES	\$1,100					4/15/03 - 4/30/09			
Confirmatory Research Structural Response	Y6876	RES	\$706					5/1/04 - 9/30/05			
Confirmatory Research VA Fire Analysis	Y6739	RES	\$395					8/9/04 - 11/30/06			
	Total		\$42,015 K								


Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Problem Statement:

- Threat environments represent a wide range of physics and response phenomena:
 - Problem spans a wide range of engineering and science disciplines
 - Problem spans a wide range of physical and time scales
 - Different physics phenomena must be modeled
- Modeling and analysis of material response must simulate true conditions
 - Benchmarking is important
 - Understanding of code V&V is important



- Blast
 - Explosive charge
- HEDD
 - CSC
 - EFP
- KE/Lo-V(elocity)
 - Bullet/Penetrator



Pressure

Example Problem

Physical Dimensions

- < 10 microns to > 100 meters

Material Form

- Liquid
- Solids
- Gases


Time Scales

- milliseconds (impact) to hours (dispersion)

Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Facility Assessments:

- **Conduct Vulnerability Assessments of the U.S. NPP fleet: 3 Phases**
 - Quick look survey of all plants
 - In-depth study of selected plants
 - Address uncertainties and perform mitigation studies
- **SNL Peer Review of NRC Dry Cask Storage PRA Report**
 - Technical peer review of a dry cask storage PRA using ASME PRA guidance
- **Conduct Vulnerability Assessments of 3 U.S. Irradiator Facilities**
 - Physical Protection Vulnerabilities Assessment and Guidance Development for 10CFR36 Licensees, September 2003
 - Develop guidance needed to implement any new physical protection requirements
 - Scope: Consider only explosives and not required to consider a thermal driver in the analyses
- **Parametric Evaluation of Seismic Behavior of Freestanding Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage Systems: NUREG/CR-6865**
 - Used coupled models to investigate the soil/rock foundation interaction with nonlinear friction contacts at interfaces
 - Results provided in nomograms to facilitate safety reviews of LAs by NRC staff
 - e.g., classes of casks evaluated for tipping $\sim f$ (ground acceleration)





Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Transportation and Storage of SNF & other RAM

- **Estimate SNF package response to airplane impacts and large blast events in response to 9/11**
 - Two transport casks
 - Four storage casks
 - Analyses of licensed casks conducted using benchmarked codes
 - Potential source terms and consequences estimated
- **Develop source term guidance for additional sabotage events**
 - Expert panel – qualitative in nature
 - Spent fuel transport and storage packages
 - Non-SF packages
- **Used as a basis for the NRC framework document**

Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Aircraft Impact Analysis Methodology


- **Global analyses evaluated overall crash response**
 - Transient force on cask: impulse as well as momentum transfer
 - Cask velocity & displacement
 - CTH was used for these calculations
- **Local analyses evaluated cask and canister detailed response**
 - Cask integrity to impacts from aircraft & components
 - Penetration from hard components
 - Cask-to-cask impacts
 - Canister response
 - Analyses conducted using FEM



Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Aircraft Impact Analysis


Global Analysis



Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Aircraft Impact Analysis


Local Analyses



Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Blast Analysis


- Loading and standoff specified by NRC
- Standoff representative of a realistic delivery scenario



Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Guidance Documents & Qualitative Vulnerability and Threat Assessments

- **Non-Spent Fuel Radioactive Materials Source Term Guidance Document**
 - 6 packages, 180+ scenarios, August 2004
- **Spent Fuel Source Term Guidance Document**
 - 7 packages, 150+ scenarios, November 2004
- **16 scenarios were included in these evaluations**
 - **Documents provide basis for estimating public health consequences**




Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Sabotage - Aerosol Testing

- **SCENARIO:** plausible sabotage attack on nuclear transport casks by HEED
- **GOALS:** Quantify source-term data and conduct aerosol analyses on CeO₂, DUO₂, and SNF to determine:
 - Measure respirable fractions
 - Calculate enrichment factors
 - Determine spent fuel ratio
- Supported jointly by DOE & NRC
- Collaboration with an International Working Group
- Four Phase Test Program:
 - Phase 1: CSC characterizations, glass targets (2001-2002)
 - Phase 2: CeO₂ ceramic pellet rodlets, ~ 30 tests (2002-2005)
 - Phase 3: DUO₂ pellets/rodlets, 6 tests (2006-2007)
 - Phase 4: TBD – testing real spent fuel

Surrey and H.B. Robinson



DUO₂ Aerosol – Explosive Test Chamber

Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Sabotage - Aerosol Testing (cont.)

- Reliable source-term data and supporting analyses will determine the release of respirable aerosol particles
 - YMP EIS conservatively assumed 5% respirable fraction
- Guide and validate the technical basis for transport & storage regulations (10 CFR Parts 71, 72, and 73)
- Support security/safeguards procedures & mitigation strategies
- Provide basis for evaluating appropriate levels of physical protection for SNF shipments & site operations
- Significant results to date:
 - CeO₂ respirable fraction = 1.4% +/- 0.6%
 - DUO₂ respirable fraction = 1.3% +/- 0.4%

→ **Results predicting reduced consequences**




← post-test DUO₂ rodlet

Past NRC Security Assessment Work


Independent Analysis for Licensing of PFS

Sandia F-4 Crash Test & F-16 Simulation




Past NRC Security Assessment Work


PRONTO SPH Aircraft Impact



SPH Model




SPH Model
(Fuel Tanks and Engine)




Past NRC Security Assessment Work

Fire and Heat Transfer Analyses



Fire



Heat Transfer





Thermo-Mechanical



Benchmarking of Analytical Tools

Sandia is cognizant of the need to properly verify computer models, codes, and results. Direct benchmarking is not always possible. Verification is done in various ways;

- comparison to first principles
- comparison to empirical data
- comparison between independent codes, analysts




Benchmarking of Analytical Tools

Rail car impact into a LWT SNF Type B cask

- Qualitative links between testing, analysis, real-life accident



Test performed @ SNL




Analysis performed @ SNL



Accident in South Carolina
1995


Pool Fire Test and Modeling Comparison

- Validated fire models can be used with confidence to estimate heat flux on target surface



Benchmarking of Analytical Tools

**Benchmarking of
particle size production
as a function of input
energy**





Independent Reviews and QA

- The NRC asked the National Academy of Sciences to perform and independent review of SNL's security Assessment work:
 - The NAS conducted extensive reviews of the Nuclear Power Plant and Transport/Storage Cask vulnerability work. In general, the reviews;
 - indicated acceptance of basic approaches and assumptions
 - indicated acceptance of basic results
- SNL has a long history of managing NRC projects with the proper level of QA
 - Corporate processes are linked to NRC requirements