

GICNT – NDWG – Garmisch, Germany 2014

Participant Guide

TTX Overview and Centralia
Factbook

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
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
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All information contained in this packet is completely fictional and was created for the purposes of this tabletop exercise.

Infrastructure Map of Centralia and Surrounding Region



Centralia Government Structure



Centralia Overview

Demographics

- Population: 3,000,000
- Major cities:
 - Capitol City (500,000)
 - Borderville (200,000)
 - Hub City (900,000)
 - Bayside (300,000)
- Literacy: 85%
- Unemployment: 9%
- Employment by sector:
 - 30% energy

- 15% high tech
- 15% services
- 10% manufacturing
- 10% government
- 10% agriculture
- 10% other

Economy

- GDP: \$130 billion
- Exports: \$25 billion
- Major exports:
 - Oil & gas (refined and unrefined)
 - Agricultural products (fruits and nuts)
 - High tech products (software and IT)
- Imports: \$27 billion
- Major imports:
 - Industrial chemicals (petro-related)
 - High tech products (computers, manufacturing equipment, scientific instruments)
 - Agricultural products (grain and vegetables)
 - Textiles
- Major export partners:
 - North Island (30%)
 - Westland (25%)
 - Southland (20%)
 - Other (25%)
- Major import partners:
 - Westland (25%)
 - North Island (20%)
 - Southland (10%)
 - Other (45%)

Transportation Infrastructure

- 1800km highway
- 3200km paved non-highway
- 650km rail
- 2 seaports
- 1 airport

Communication Infrastructure

- Land line telephone access countrywide (approximately 1 million main lines)
- Widespread cellular communication access in major urban areas and along major highways (1.6 million users)
- Reasonably good access to high-speed internet

connectivity in major urban areas (1.2 million users)

Nuclear and other Radiological Materials Overview

Nuclear Energy Infrastructure

- 1x 1000 megawatt light water reactor (LWR) at one generating facility on the Middle Sea coast (online since January 2012)
- Reactor fueled by Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), sourced from abroad
- Spent fuel stored in onsite storage pool

Other Radiological Materials

- Industries utilizing radioactive sources:
 - Medical
 - Oil and gas
 - University research

Authorities

- The Atomic Energy Commission, Ministry of Energy, is the primary competent authority responsible for nuclear and other radioactive materials, including:
 - Safety
 - Security
 - Safeguards
 - Licensing of materials and associated facilities
- The Domestic Nuclear Energy Law provides legal authority and regulatory guidance

Treaties and Conventions

- Signatory to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Implemented Additional Protocol (AP) safeguards agreement
- Signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- Signatory to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)
- Signatory to the Convention on Nuclear Safety
- Signatory to the Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Law Enforcement Authorities and Areas of Responsibility

	Points of Entry and Exit				“Green” Land Borders	“Blue” Maritime Borders	Domestic Interior			
	Road	Rail	Sea	Air			Urban & Rural	Major Roads	Strategic Locations	Public Events
Border Guard	X	X			X					
	Responsibilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical security and access control at road and rail POEs Patrolling border areas between designated POEs Intercepting unauthorized or criminal cross-border movement of people, vehicles, and goods 									
Coast Guard						X				
	Responsibilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Patrolling maritime areas within Centralia’s Exclusive Economic Zone Intercepting unauthorized or suspected criminal maritime traffic Emergency response in the event of maritime accidents and disasters 									
Customs	X	X	X	X						
	Responsibilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of vehicles, people, and goods for contraband and tariff enforcement 									
Immigration	X	X	X	X						
	Responsibilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screening of personal travel and immigration-related documentation 									
Municipal Police							X			
	Responsibilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Law enforcement in urban and surrounding rural areas 									
Highway Police								X		
	Responsibilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Law enforcement on major road transportation routes between urban areas 									
Public Security				X					X	X
	Responsibilities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Law enforcement and physical protection at strategic locations and major public events Passenger screening and physical security at the National Airport Emergency law enforcement in the event of natural or man-made disasters 									

Radiological Detection Capabilities

	Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD)	Radio-Isotopic Identification Devices (RIID)	Vehicular Radiation Portal Monitors	Container Crane Detection Systems
Border Guards	50	5	0	0
Coast Guard	25	5	0	0
Customs	100	15	5 ¹	2 ²
Law Enforcement Directorate	0	0	0	0
Total	175	25	5	2
<p>Resources have been purchased, allocated, and in some cases deployed. However, these assets can be redeployed or replaced.</p> <p>¹ Total includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 portal monitor deployed at each of three road border crossings for screening of inbound motor traffic • 2 portal monitors deployed at Port of Capitol City for scanning of container trucks • 2 portal monitors planned for deployment at Port of Bayside for scanning of container trucks <p>² Total includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 container crane detection system deployed at Port of Capitol City • 1 container crane detection system planned for deployment at Port of Bayside 				

Scenario and Injects

INTRODUCTION: OPERATIONAL INFORMATION AND THREAT

Yesterday at approximately 3:00 PM a high-strength Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) was detonated in a major shopping center in Capitol City killing 32 people (mostly due to the blast). Initial estimates are that approximately 75,000 people live and work in the vicinity of the blast and may have potentially been exposed to radioactive material. The Militant Armed Front (MAF) terrorist organization is taking credit for the attack and credible evidence suggests that a second vehicular attack on the city of Bayside is imminent. MAF is highly dedicated to their mission and is willing to sacrifice their own lives by detonating the device if interdicted by law enforcement. It is presumed that at least 2 of the dead in the Capitol City attack were MAF members. In response to this threat, all major cities in Centralia are on high alert, but Bayside law enforcement takes action to implement aggressive, yet covert, screening of vehicle traffic using immigration checkpoints. This will enable officers to covertly search vehicular traffic with radiation detection equipment with the objective of interdicting any vehicle-borne RDD and minimizing the chance that the adversary is alerted.



INJECT 1:

In an effort to quickly enhance security particular to a radiological threat, the Bayside Law Enforcement Directorate is coordinating with local assets as well as the Centralia Ministry of Interior to ensure checkpoints are rapidly set up and staffed with officers having operational



knowledge of Personal Radiation Detector (PRD) use, alarm adjudication protocols, and safe interdiction strategies. Bayside has a limited number of trained customs authorities who routinely screen for radioactive materials at the seaport; however the majority of the public safety/security officers have not received training on radiation detection equipment or interdiction tactics for at least 3 years. Sufficient equipment is

also an issue. What is known about the checkpoint operations is as follows:

- 6 officers
- 1 Personal Radiation Detector (PRD)
- 2 lanes of traffic

- Radiation Isotope Identification Device (RIID) for secondary inspection in Bayside, reasonably could get to any established checkpoint in 30-60 minutes

Discussion Questions

- A. Strategize and draw how the checkpoint should be set up to maximize detection, localization, and interdiction of the potential threat radiological source. Describe officer roles and strategic locations as vehicles are being screened at the checkpoint.
- B. Radiation detection and interdiction experts have been made available for a 2-hour just-in-time training course intended for officers assigned to man the checkpoints; describe what should be included in the curriculum.
- C. Beyond training on equipment use, what other key information or awareness training should checkpoint officers be given about the threat? This information may include safeguarding, contacting technical reachback assets, notifying appropriate government authorities, and other items.
- D. Identify the experts within Centralia most suited to provide the training.
- E. If the training had to be shortened to only 20-30 minutes, what are the most essential pieces that would have to be communicated to officers? Prioritize the top two or three items.
- F. Available equipment is very limited for this operation, what other institutions might be have equipment that can be deployed to support the mission? In addition to equipment, where might there be trained staff to operate the equipment with minimal training?

INJECT 2:

By 5:00 AM today, 7 checkpoints have been set up in and around Bayside City. At 10:42 AM, a PRD at Checkpoint 4 alarms indicating a radiation source. At the time of the alarm, there are 10 vehicles in close proximity to the checkpoint going through the inspection lines. Officers must localize and adjudicate the alarm, but because of the operational information that exists related to the threat, time is of the essence.



Discussion Question

- A. Create an adjudication flow chart that investigates the PRD alarm. Discuss both technical and non-technical indicators and associated considerations and decisions. Plan to provide a short briefing on the flow chart. Flow chart should work all the way through adjudication and technical reachback decisions to determine conclusively if a threat exists.

INJECT 3:

Law enforcement operators demonstrate some confusion on actions to take once the alarm has been adjudicated and it is confirmed to be a second RDD. The source has been isolated from the public, but currently the officers working the checkpoint are in custody of the radiological material.

Discussion Question

- A. Identify the authority that should be notified to take over the scene. Provide rationale for choosing this authority.

Checkpoint Map

