

2013 Athens

TTX Participant Packet

GICNT - NDWG

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Inject 1: International Friendly Football Match

(50 minutes)

You are responsible for establishing and integrating nuclear security detection at an international friendly football match between Centralia and Westland at the Hub City Stadium. A capacity crowd of 35,000 people is expected. Due to the proximity of the two countries, many Westland citizens will be attending the match. The Westland footballers are staying at the hotel across from the stadium.

The Military Armed Front (MAF), an international terrorist organization operating in Centralia, has issued threats against public events in the past, but the Intelligence Directorate has not identified any specific threats against this match. The Hub City Police Department has the following radiation detectors available to deploy around the football stadium:

- 15 Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs)
- 2 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)
- 2 Radiation Isotope Identifier (RIIDs)
- 1 Backpack Radiation Detector

Each piece of equipment has been assigned to a trained operator for the event. Besides these operators, no other personnel at the venue have received specialized training on radiological threat awareness and detection. The Hub City Transportation Department has stated that that it is acceptable to close roads if it will improve security; however no streets are currently scheduled to be closed during the match.

In Centralia, the Atomic Energy Commission typically provides expert support in assessing spectra from RIIDs to all Centralia Law Enforcement from a centralized support center. To support this event, the Atomic Energy Commission has stationed a technical expert in Hub City, if needed.

Instructions:

1. Complete the first part of the questionnaire, using the maps as necessary
2. Using the maps provided, draw out the security plan and use the game pieces provided to indicate how the resources are to be deployed
3. Complete the second part of the questionnaire

Injest 1 Questionnaire - Part 1

Question	Response
1. What should be the specific goals of the nuclear security plan?	
2. Besides radiation detectors, what other elements should be considered in the nuclear security plan?	
3. Assuming that all spectators will be screened with metal detectors and have their bags searched prior to entering the security zone, how can radiation detection be integrated into the screening procedure?	
4. Are there any radiation detection measures that should be carried out before the match?	
5. Is the current location of the security perimeter adequate? Please explain your answer.	

Inject 1 Questionnaire – Part 2

Question	Response
<p>6. Are the available detection instruments sufficient? Is any additional equipment necessary? If so, what equipment and in what amount?</p>	
<p>7. Should there be a central alarm station? Should it be located in the control center? At what point should an alarm be communicated to the control center?</p>	
<p>8. What technical support is required to adjudicate alarms? What should the process be for alarm adjudication?</p>	
<p>9. Assuming the current radiation detection equipment and training may not be sufficient for the match, please prioritize the following options (number the options 1-5):</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Borrow radiation detection equipment and trained personnel from other Centralia agencies</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Purchase radiation detection equipment and train additional operators</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Provide radiological or nuclear awareness training to all security personnel at the match</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Request international assistance from Westland</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Request international assistance from the IAEA</p>	

Inject 2: Updated Threat

(30 minutes)

It is now the day before the football match between Centralia and Westland; the Westland National Team has already arrived.

Hub City Law Enforcement has just received a phone call from an official at Hub City University indicating that a significant amount of radioactive Cobalt 60 cannot be accounted for at one of its research laboratories. University officials investigated and, through interviews with staff, discovered that one of the research assistants with access to the lab had recently become radicalized by the MAF. The university does not currently know the location of the research assistant.

Centralia's Intelligence Directorate has also reported an increase in communication among cells of the MAF and, while unconfirmed, believes a technically proficient member of the MAF may be in Hub City. An intercepted message contains details suggesting the MAF may have come into possession of the nuclear security plan for the football match. However, no specific threat against the football match has been received.

Instructions:

- Complete the questionnaire and update the map as necessary

Inject 2 Questionnaire

Question	Response
1. Given what is known about the lost radioactive material and the technical capabilities of the MAF, what are the potential threat devices and related tactics that may be used against the events?	
2. Are current security measures sufficient to protect against these threats? If not, what are the gaps?	
3. What additional technical and non-technical measures would you need to adequately secure the football match?	
4. What changes would you recommend to the instrument deployment? Please feel free to update the map.	


Additional Questions

Time Permitting

Please discuss the following questions:

1. Centralia hosts many events of about the same size each year at this venue. What can be done to sustain the nuclear security detection capabilities designed for the event for use in similar events in the future? Consider documentation of elements of the nuclear security detection plan and the allocated resources as well as sustainment of fielded capabilities.
2. Security at the football match will include personnel from different organizations (e.g., Law Enforcement, Atomic Energy Commission, private security, venue officials). Are there special nuclear detection considerations for ensuring efficient command and control of the event? How will the personnel coordinate and share information with different organizations? The general public?


Scenario Maps



Map of Centralia and Region



Map of Hub City



Hub City Stadium