SAND2013-8116P

2013 Athens

TTX Facilitator Guide

GICNT - NDWG

Contents

Inject 1: International Friendly Football Match

(50 minutes)

You are responsible for establishing and integrating nuclear security detection at an international friendly football match between Centralia and Westland at the Hub City Stadium. A capacity crowd of 35,000 people is expected. Due to the proximity of the two countries, many Westland citizens will be attending the match. The Westland footballers are staying at the hotel across from the stadium.

The Military Armed Front (MAF), an international terrorist organization operating in Centralia, has issued threats against public events in the past, but the Intelligence Directorate has not identified any specific threats against this match. The Hub City Police Department has the following radiation detectors available to deploy around the football stadium:

- 15 Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs)
- 2 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)
- 2 Radiation Isotope Identifier (RIIDs)
- 1 Backpack Radiation Detector

Each piece of equipment has been assigned to a trained operator for the event. Besides these operators, no other personnel at the venue have received specialized training on radiological threat awareness and detection. The Hub City Transportation Department has stated that that it is acceptable to close roads if it will improve security; however no streets are currently scheduled to be closed during the match.

In Centralia, the Atomic Energy Commission typically provides expert support in assessing spectra from RIIDs to all Centralia Law Enforcement from a centralized support center. To support this event, the Atomic Energy Commission has stationed a technical expert in Hub City, if needed.

Instructions:

1. Complete the first part of the questionnaire, using the maps as necessary
2. Using the maps provided, draw out the security plan and use the game pieces provided to indicate how the resources are to be deployed
3. Complete the second part of the questionnaire

Inject 1 Questionnaire – Part 1

Question	Response
1. What should be the specific goals of the nuclear security plan?	*In light of there being no specific threat, the goals of the nuclear security plan can include providing a basic level of security against radiological and nuclear threats.*
2. Besides radiation detectors, what other elements should be considered in the nuclear security plan?	*Training and awareness, perimeter control, metal detectors, x-rays, communication equipment*
3. Assuming that all spectators will be screened with metal detectors and have their bags searched prior to entering the security zone, how can radiation detection be integrated into the screening procedure?	*Security personnel can wear PRDs, RPMs can be placed in the vicinity, personnel can be given awareness training, etc.*
4. Are there any radiation detection measures that should be carried out before the match?	*A survey/search of the secure area can be performed where a trained team can use the PRDs and the backpack detectors to look for devices. Background radiation can also be mapped out (which can assist with alarm adjudication during the match)*
5. Is the current location of the security perimeter adequate? Please explain your answer.	*The current perimeter may be adequate in the current threat environment, however the perimeter may be too small to provide adequate protection should a device be detonated at the perimeter*

Inject 1 Questionnaire – Part 2

Question	Response
6. Are the available detection instruments sufficient? Is any additional equipment necessary? If so, what equipment and in what amount?	*There are many ways to answer this: YES – because there is no specific threat against the event. NO the equipment does not provide enough coverage.*
7. Should there be a central alarm station? Should it be located in the control center? At what point should an alarm be communicated to the control center?	*This depends on the deployment. Participants can collocate an expert in the command center, or can have an expert that roams within the security perimeter. An alarm should be communicated if it cannot be safely adjudicated by the security personnel there.*
8. What technical support is required to adjudicate alarms? What should the process be for alarm adjudication?	*Experts may be need to read spectra and/or operate the more sophisticated equipment. The alarm adjudication process should involve safely quarantining the radiation source until an expert can be brought in to adjudicate the alarm*

9. Assuming the current radiation detection equipment and training may not be sufficient for the match, please prioritize the following options (number the options 1-5):

____ Borrow radiation detection equipment and trained personnel from other Centralia agencies

____ Purchase radiation detection equipment and train additional operators

____ Provide radiological or nuclear awareness training to all security personnel at the match

____ Request international assistance from Westland

____ Request international assistance from the IAEA

Facilitators should feel free to ask the participants if there are any other options not listed

Inject 2: Updated Threat

(30 minutes)

It is now the day before the football match between Centralia and Westland; the Westland National Team has already arrived.

Hub City Law Enforcement has just received a phone call from an official at Hub City University indicating that a significant amount of radioactive Cobalt 60 cannot be accounted for at one of its research laboratories. University officials investigated and, through interviews with staff, discovered that one of the research assistants with access to the lab had recently become radicalized by the MAF. The university does not currently know the location of the research assistant.

Centralia's Intelligence Directorate has also reported an increase in communication among cells of the MAF and, while unconfirmed, believes a technically proficient member of the MAF may be in Hub City. An intercepted message contains details suggesting the MAF may have come into possession of the nuclear security plan for the football match. However, no specific threat against the football match has been received.

Instructions:

- Complete the questionnaire and update the map as necessary

Inject 2 Questionnaire

Question	Response
1. Given what is known about the lost radioactive material and the technical capabilities of the MAF, what are the potential threat devices and related tactics that may be used against the events?	*Either an RDD or an RED could be developed from the lost material. The material could be used to contaminate food/water, but that is unlikely in this scenario.*
2. Are current security measures sufficient to protect against these threats? If not, what are the gaps?	*There may not be enough equipment available to provide security at the match*
3. What additional technical and non-technical measures would you need to adequately secure the football match?	*Options may include closing roads, increasing the security perimeter to include the parking lots, screening cars, random patrols, etc.*
4. What changes would you recommend to the instrument deployment? Please feel free to update the map.	

Additional Questions

Time Permitting

Please discuss the following questions:

1. Centralia hosts many events of about the same size each year at this venue. What can be done to sustain the nuclear security detection capabilities designed for the event for use in similar events in the future? Consider documentation of elements of the nuclear security detection plan and the allocated resources as well as sustainment of fielded capabilities.

   Content for the facilitator guide: Develop an After Action Report: types and quantities of detectors used, conops developed, any issues or problems that arose including equipment interference or applicability issues, POCs for involved organizations, any references used for on-site training, locations or routes of detectors during the event, unforeseen impacts on event attendees or traffic patterns, etc.; Ongoing training of field operators; Ongoing communications with venue owners/operators to keep aware of any venue changes; Compile lessons learned from other events around the city/region to improve detection capabilities at events; Use the venue in training and exercises

2. Security at the football match will include personnel from different organizations (e.g., Law Enforcement, Atomic Energy Commission, private security, venue officials). Are there special nuclear detection considerations for ensuring efficient command and control of the event? How will the personnel coordinate and share information with different organizations? The general public?

   Unified Command, Use the command center as a focal point for information flow, Have an interagency meeting in advance of the event to understand each organization's abilities, responsibilities, resources, etc.

Scenario Maps



Map of Centralia and Region

Map of Hub City



Hub City Stadium