



Percival: Secure Data Archival Using Secret Sharing

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Threats to Long Term Data Archives

- **Insider Threat:** Insiders can be put into one of three categories:
 1. Users—those with legitimate operational need for the data
 2. System administrators—system administrators with digital and usually physical access
 3. Facilities personnel—those with physical access (e.g. janitorial staff, security guards etc...)

Resilient to 2 & 3 and new capabilities to mitigate abuses by legitimate users.

- **Compromised Repositories:**
The rate of security events these days necessitates that any wise system designer plan for parts of their system being compromised.

- **Central Point for Attack:**
The central design of most archives provides a clear, single target for attackers.



Secure Foundation: Shamir Secret Sharing

Shamir's Secret Sharing provides a data protection that goes far beyond just splitting the data into parts. It is **information theoretically secure** and uses the fact that one can uniquely define a polynomial curve of order O with $O+1$ points.

Example: Any 3 of 5 Secret $S = 1234$


1. Create a polynomial of degree 2 by generating 2 random coefficients, e.g.

$$f(x) = 5 + 166x + 94x^2$$

2. Generate 5 points along that curve:
(1,1494); (2,1942); (3,2578);
(4, 3402); (5,4414)

Any three enable me to solve for S .

All I know is S is a value on the Y-axis.
If I steal two points, I don't learn anything new.




Searching a Percival Archive


- Data is vulnerable when on the client.
- Create ability to operate on the data without needing to reassemble the shares.

Keyword Search

- Recent research has explored protocols that enable keyword search across our archive.
- We use pre-indexing, key hashes, and bloom filters to provide a blinded search.
- The custodians do the searching but are blinded to the terms searched and the results of the query.
- Initial results with data from the Gutenberg project and Wikipedia have shown promise.



Percival: Using Secret Sharing for Resilient Data Archive



- Splits a 1K document into N shares of 1K that are stored by data custodians creating a distributed archive.
- To retrieve a document, the client gets and combines T shares.
- **Resilient to insider threat.** T different sites would have to collude.
- **Resilient to component compromise.** Able to operate with integrity and data protection in the presence of $T-1$ compromised sites.
- **Resilient to crypto analytical attack.** $T-2$ shares are information theoretic in their protections and are not susceptible to brute force decryption attacks.
- **Keyless.** Issues such as key rotation and revocation are moved to authentication.
- **Secure backup.** Beyond the data privacy protections, this system also provides a platform that, by design, securely protects from data loss due to equipment failure.

Potential Uses of Percival

Percival's architecture enables a broad range of capabilities for archive designers:

NNSA Data Archive

- Repositories at 9 sites, any 5 of which can be used to recover data ($N=9$, $T=5$).
- Secure operations with up to 4 sites compromised.
- Sites disconnecting from the internet because of internal compromise would not impact the archive's secure operations or data integrity.
- For OUD Archives, users could use a keychain for one sign-on to many repositories. For higher level data, multi-person access requirements could provide greater security.

Agency's Credit Card Data

- Many agencies (e.g. FEMA) have a large set of credit card records.
- All must be kept but most are never examined.
- Use Percival to split data into three shares ($N=3$).
- Outsource data repositories to 3 different cloud providers.
- Require two people to recover any credit card records; this inhibits insider abuse of credit card data. ($T=2$)


Percival Directions

Applied Research – Prototype development & Testing

- Expand initial proof of concepts to pursue a detailed prototype
- Exploring and testing searching across the prototype
- Explore adversarial models
 - Denial of service
 - Data integrity ECC type models to offer verification
 - Rebuilding after compromise
 - Detection of compromise
 - Man-in-the-middle threats


Open Research Questions

- Better search models
- Other transactions on split data
- More efficient transforms to split data
- Improved client side operations



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Threats to Long Term Data Archives

- Insider Threat: Insiders can be put into one of three categories:
 - System administrator-type: operational need for the data
 - Physical access
 - Securely guard etc.)
- Resilient to 2 & 3 and new capabilities to mitigate abuses by legitimate users.

Compromised Resiliency

The rate of security events these days necessitates that any wise system has a plan for parts of their system being compromised. The system must be able to continue to operate and provide a clear single target for attackers.

Central Point for Attack

Traditional archives provide a clear single target for attackers.

Secure Foundation: Shamir Secret Sharing

Shamir's Secret Sharing provides a data protection that goes far beyond just splitting the data into parts. It is information that can be reconstructed from a polynomial curve of order Q with $Q+1$ points.

Example: Any 3 of 5 Secret $S = 1234$

1. Create a polynomial of degree 2 by generating 2 random coefficients, e.g.

$$f(x) = 5x^2 + 166x + 942$$

2. Generate 5 points along that curve: $(1, 1494), (2, 1542), (3, 529), (4, 3402), (5, 4414)$

Any three enable me to solve for S .

All I know is S is a value on the Y axis. If I steal two points, I don't learn anything new.


Searching a Percival Archive

- Data is vulnerable when on the client.
- Create ability to operate on the data without needing to reassemble the shares.

Keyword Search

Recent research has explored protocols that enable keyword search across our data without needing to reassemble the shares and bloom filters to provide a blinded search. The custodians do the searching but the results of the query are returned to the user. This is a promising project and Wikipedia have shown promise.

Percival: Using Secret Sharing for Resilient Data Archive



- Split a 1K document into N shares of K that are stored by data custodians creating a distributed archive.
- To retrieve a document, the client gets and combines T shares.

- Resilient to insider threat: T different sites would have to collude.
- Resilient to physical compromise: Able to operate with integrity and data protection in the presence of physical compromise.
- Resilient to crypto analytical attack: T, T shares are information theoretic in their own right and are not susceptible to brute force decryption attacks.
- Secure backup: Beyond the data privacy protections, this system also includes a platform that, by design, securely protects from data loss due to equipment failure.

Potential Uses of Percival

Percival's architecture enables a broad range of capabilities for archive designers.

NSA Data Archive

- Repositories at 9 sites, any 5 of which can be used to recover data ($N=9, T=5$).
- Secure operations with up to 4 sites compromised.
- For NSA, the secure operations would not impact the archive's secure operations or data. Internal compromise would not impact the archive's secure operations or data.
- For OLD Archives, users could use a keychain for one sign-on to many repositories. For higher level data, multi-person access requirements could provide greater security.

Agency's Credit Card Data (CCD) (FFMA) have a large set of credit card records.

- All must be kept but most are never examined.
- Use Percival to split data into three shares ($N=3$).
- Outsource data repositories to avoid data loss due to equipment failure.
- Use Percival to split data into three shares ($N=3$) to create any credit card records, this inhibits insider abuse of credit card data. ($T=2$)

Percival Directions

Applied Research - Prototype development & Testing

- Expand initial proof of concepts to pursue a detailed prototype
- Explore new applications for the prototype
- Identify and address adversarial models
- Denial of service
- Data integrity ECC type models to offer verification
- Rebuilding after compromise
- Rebuilding after compromise
- Main-in-the-middle threats

Open Research Questions

- Better search models
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