

# The Office of Infrastructure Protection

SAND2013-7502P

National Protection and Programs Directorate  
Department of Homeland Security

Infrastructure Interdependencies Simulation and Analysis

NSTC Infrastructure Subcommittee Meeting  
10 September 2013



# Homeland Security



Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. SAND2013-0556C

Los Alamos National Laboratory is operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy under contract DE-AC52-08NA25396.



# Overview

- NISAC Overview
- Constraints on Modeling and on Model Sharing
- Lessons Learned



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
# NISAC Overview: Who we are

- The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) is
  - A program of the Office of Infrastructure Protection
  - With researchers and analysts at
    - Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM
    - Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM
  - Began as a collaboration between the two laboratories in 1999
    - Built on top of years of prior modeling and simulation of infrastructures and systems
  - Established under §1016 of The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
  - Transferred to DHS under §201 (g) (4) of The Homeland Security Act of 2002



# NISAC Overview: What we do

- NISAC performs a range of infrastructure simulation and analysis tasks for and through DHS
  - Conducts incident consequence analyses
    - Planned analyses
    - Ad-hoc analyses
  - Provides support for national and regional exercises
  - Conducts capability development to support analysis



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# NISAC Overview: What we do





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# NISAC Overview: What we do

## Example: Healthcare Dependencies

- Determine Critical Dependencies
  - Natural gas may only be used for backup generation and cooking so it is only critical if electric power supply is lost
  - Without electric power, the hospital may not run operating rooms even with backup generators
- Mitigation Options
  - How and where can patients be relocated?
  - Did the event cause higher demand on hospitals?
  - Analyze the effect of existing patient demand on healthcare resources and infrastructure
  - Assess how the quality of care and patient prognoses may be altered by a lack of resources
  - Assess the impact of allowing resources and patients to be redistributed between healthcare providers
  - Determine how resources and patients can be shifted to maximize treatment outcomes and minimize response costs



Regional Impacts



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# NISAC Overview: What we do

Provide fundamentally new modeling and simulation capabilities for the analysis of critical infrastructures, their interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and complexities

These domains are

- Large
- Complex
- Dynamic
- Adaptive
- Nonlinear
- Behavioral




*These advanced capabilities improve the robustness of our Nation's critical infrastructures by aiding decision makers in the areas of policy assessment, mitigation planning, education, training, and near real-time assistance to crisis response organizations.*



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# NISAC Overview: Critical Infrastructures are Interconnected

- Interconnections exist
  - Within an infrastructure sector
  - Across infrastructure sectors
- This includes
  - Dependencies
  - Interdependencies
- These dependencies and interdependencies include
  - Humans in the loop
  - Rules and other constraints
    - Functionally specific
    - Geographically specific
    - Treaties, regulations, etc.
- Dependencies and interdependencies can result in
  - Unexpected consequences
  - Cascading failures and impacts
- History is increasingly full of long-tail events



Images: NOAA





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*Too complex for mental models to be effective decision tools.*

# NISAC Overview: Perspective Drives Process



## Spatial/Physical

- Location of key infrastructure assets
- Asset Characteristics
- Co-location



## Network


- Flow of resources and goods
- Flow Capacity
- Critical Nodes



National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center  
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center  
Office of Infrastructure Protection  
National Protection and Programs Directorate




Houston, Texas, Hurricane Scenario Analysis Report  
April 2013



## System Dynamics

- Feedback
- Interdependencies
- Structure → Dynamics



## Economics/Human Behavior

- Input-Output modeling
- Computable General Equilibrium modeling
- Evacuation



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
# Constraints on Modeling and Model Sharing

- Temporal constraints
  - On the timing needed to reflect certain system elements
  - On the time needed to deliver analytic products
- System uniqueness
  - Generalizing systems can result in a model of infrastructure systems that doesn't respond to hazards/dependencies accurately
- Variation across the risk landscape
  - Failure mechanism can greatly influence cascading impacts across infrastructure systems
- Information constraints
  - Data
- The Human in the Loop
  - Within the model
  - Using the model
    - Properly defining the use case(s) for which the model was designed and applying the model to the appropriate use case(s)




# Constraints: Variation Across the Risk Landscape

- Understanding how infrastructure components become damaged
  - What components are susceptible to different hazards
  - May differ by location
  - Will vary by infrastructure system
- Large-scale versus local event
  - Damage to many infrastructure systems within a region
  - Regional differences (earthquakes act differently in different regions)



# Constraints: System Uniqueness

- Geographic distribution
  - What areas will be directly impacted
    - How many people are affected
    - What other infrastructure systems are in disruption area
- Components that are damaged
  - More components, the longer restoration/recovery times
  - Severity of damage impact repair times



# Lessons Learned

- Common metrics beneficial and useful in comparing alternatives and discussing differences within and across sectors
  - Economic consequence
  - Resilience metrics
- Identifying the ‘next problem’ is important – identifying the right way to address it is equally important
  - Flexibility to deal with variants to the ‘next problem’ is desired
- Validation is important and hard
  - Especially for low probability, high consequence system disruptions
- Modeling is a constant balance of the tradeoff between breadth and depth
- The scope of unaddressed problems within sectors, especially those that involve cross-border concerns, is still large





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For more information visit:  
[www.dhs.gov/criticalinfrastructure](http://www.dhs.gov/criticalinfrastructure)

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