

The Office of Infrastructure Protection SAND2013-7502P

National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security

Infrastructure Interdependencies Simulation and Analysis

NSTC Infrastructure Subcommittee Meeting
10 September 2013



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Overview

- NISAC Overview
- Constraints on Modeling and on Model Sharing
- Lessons Learned




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NISAC Overview: Who we are

- The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) is
 - A program of the Office of Infrastructure Protection
 - With researchers and analysts at
 - Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM
 - Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM
 - Began as a collaboration between the two laboratories in 1999
 - Built on top of years of prior modeling and simulation of infrastructures and systems
 - Established under §1016 of The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
 - Transferred to DHS under §201 (g) (4) of The Homeland Security Act of 2002



NISAC Overview: What we do

- NISAC performs a range of infrastructure simulation and analysis tasks for and through DHS
 - Conducts incident consequence analyses
 - Planned analyses
 - Ad-hoc analyses
 - Provides support for national and regional exercises
 - Conducts capability development to support analysis



Pre-Hurricane
Analyses

Simulation & Analysis Center



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NISAC Overview: What we do





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NISAC Overview: What we do

Example: Healthcare Dependencies

- Determine Critical Dependencies
 - Natural gas may only be used for backup generation and cooking so it is only critical if electric power supply is lost
 - Without electric power, the hospital may not run operating rooms even with backup generators
- Mitigation Options
 - How and where can patients be relocated?
 - Did the event cause higher demand on hospitals?
 - Analyze the effect of existing patient demand on healthcare resources and infrastructure
 - Assess how the quality of care and patient prognoses may be altered by a lack of resources
 - Assess the impact of allowing resources and patients to be redistributed between healthcare providers
 - Determine how resources and patients can be shifted to maximize treatment outcomes and minimize response costs



Regional Impacts



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NISAC Overview: What we do

Provide fundamentally new modeling and simulation capabilities for the analysis of critical infrastructures, their interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and complexities

These domains are

- Large
- Complex
- Dynamic
- Adaptive
- Nonlinear
- Behavioral





These advanced capabilities improve the robustness of our Nation's critical infrastructures by aiding decision makers in the areas of policy assessment, mitigation planning, education, training, and near real-time assistance to crisis response organizations.

NISAC Overview:

Critical Infrastructures are Interconnected

- Interconnections exist
 - Within an infrastructure sector
 - Across infrastructure sectors
- This includes
 - Dependencies
 - Interdependencies
- These dependencies and interdependencies include
 - Humans in the loop
 - Rules and other constraints
 - Functionally specific
 - Geographically specific
 - Treaties, regulations, etc.
- Dependencies and interdependencies can result in
 - Unexpected consequences
 - Cascading failures and impacts
- History is increasingly full of long-tail events



Images: NOAA



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
Too complex for mental models to be effective decision tools.

NISAC Overview:

Perspective Drives Process


Spatial/Physical

- Location of key infrastructure assets
- Asset Characteristics
- Co-location




Network

- Flow of resources and goods
- Flow Capacity
- Critical Nodes




System Dynamics

- Feedback
- Interdependencies
- Structure → Dynamics





Supply Chain

- Inputs, Processes, Outputs
- Process → Infrastructure
- Dependencies



Economics/Human Behavior

- Input-Output modeling
- Computable General Equilibrium modeling
- Evacuation




Constraints on Modeling and Model Sharing

- Temporal constraints
 - On the timing needed to reflect certain system elements
 - On the time needed to deliver analytic products
- System uniqueness
 - Generalizing systems can result in a model of infrastructure systems that doesn't respond to hazards/dependencies accurately
- Variation across the risk landscape
 - Failure mechanism can greatly influence cascading impacts across infrastructure systems
- Information constraints
 - Data
- The Human in the Loop
 - Within the model
 - Using the model
 - Properly defining the use case(s) for which the model was designed and applying the model to the appropriate use case(s)


Constraints: Variation Across the Risk Landscape

- Understanding how infrastructure components become damaged
 - What components are susceptible to different hazards
 - May differ by location
 - Will vary by infrastructure system
- Large-scale versus local event
 - Damage to many infrastructure systems within a region
 - Regional differences (earthquakes act differently in different regions)



Constraints: System Uniqueness

- Geographic distribution
 - What areas will be directly impacted
 - How many people are affected
 - What other infrastructure systems are in disruption area
- Components that are damaged
 - More components, the longer restoration/recovery times
 - Severity of damage impact repair times



Lessons Learned

- Common metrics beneficial and useful in comparing alternatives and discussing differences within and across sectors
 - Economic consequence
 - Resilience metrics
- Identifying the ‘next problem’ is important – identifying the right way to address it is equally important
 - Flexibility to deal with variants to the ‘next problem’ is desired
- Validation is important and hard
 - Especially for low probability, high consequence system disruptions
- Modeling is a constant balance of the tradeoff between breadth and depth
- The scope of unaddressed problems within sectors, especially those that involve cross-border concerns, is still large



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For more information visit:
www.dhs.gov/criticalinfrastructure

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