

Leveraging Formal Methods and Confronting Complexity for Digital System Reliability and Security

**Computer Sciences and Information Systems
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About Sandia

- DoE national lab.
 - Primary mission is develop, engineer, test the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons
 - R&D in arms control, nonproliferation, waste disposal.
 - Research in computer science and supercomputing, computational biology, mathematics, alternative energy
- Located in Albuquerque, NM and in Livermore, CA



Our digital systems

- Embedded systems for high reliability
- Command and Control networks.
- Software for simulation



We view formal verification as one facet of the digital complexity problem



- Includes issues in cyber security, reliability and safety
- Complexity causes digital systems to have unknowable, and in general, unanalyzable faults, vulnerabilities
- Formal methods are currently relegated to simple systems or high levels of abstraction
 - New approaches are improving on this



Securing an arbitrary code is not just hard; it's impossible

- **Restated: Generic code has vulnerabilities that are unprovable and unknowable**
 - *Not* statistical, even in principle
 - Turing completeness demands that a generic code is undecidable

Program




vulnerabilities

- **So now what?**

Complexity makes cyber threats *asymmetric*

Bad Guy needs
to find one



You have to
find them all


- Developer, user, *and attacker* all don't know where the vulnerabilities are (*undecidable*)
- Worse, attacker may have planted a vulnerability
- **Asymmetry: One vulnerability compromises the whole code**
 - Developer has to find all of them (impossible in general)
- **No one can guarantee “this code is clean” or even quantify improvement**



What is complexity?

- Complex systems are characterized by **large** numbers of interacting entities where even a **few** entities can **strongly** affect system behavior
- Complex systems are **irreducible**; their behavior is **emergent** and not evident *a priori*, but is accessible via **observation** and **simulation**
- **Examples are ubiquitous**
 - Living things and ecosystems
 - Human societies, economies, and institutions
 - Highly engineered artifacts – e.g., airplanes, NWs
 - Large-scale infrastructure – e.g., power grids
 - Computer software, hardware, and networks

Complexity space illustrates tradeoffs in device engineering and analysis



- Pink region is what **cannot be built**
- Rest of plot shows **how analysis can be done**



Formal methods are a bridge to complexity, filling an important gap

- **Formal methods use computer analysis to verify digital systems rigorously and exhaustively**
 - Applicable to less complex systems that are still beyond the reach of manual analysis
 - Widely used in high-consequence industrial applications
- **Verification of components does not generally translate to verification of whole system**
- **Irreducible complexity enters when exploring entire state space is infeasible**
 - Reliability and security assertions become probabilistic
- **Both formal verification and complexity science are vital for gaining confidence in digital systems**




Complexity science offers a new perspective on modeling and design

- **Most real-world systems are too intricate to analyze directly; they are irreducible**
- **Reductionism requires “bottom-up” understanding**
 - Use expert knowledge to model component entities
 - Validate system model vs. observations
 - Make each component entity as reliable as possible
 - Formal methods are the pinnacle of this approach
- **Complexity science provides “top-down” insight relating system structure to emergent behavior**
 - New modeling paradigm: Identify entities by abstraction from idealized models with known emergent behavior
 - New design paradigm: Build real systems based on models with desired emergent behavior




Self-organized criticality is a simple example of emergent behavior

- “Sandbot”: cyber model of coordinated malware
- **SOC** is *spontaneous* development of multi-scale phenomena with power-law distributions
 - Similar to thermodynamic criticality but without tuning
- Illustrated by sandpile model: physics-like cellular automaton
 - Sand is sprinkled randomly
 - Avalanches occur at all scales



Complexity is a fact of “life”

- **Biological phenomena are a prototype and inspiration for many complex domains**
 - Life involves a large chemical regulatory network



Eukaryotic
cell-cycle
regulation

- “Game of Life” model is based on population dynamics
- Bio concepts pervade computing (viruses, mutations)
- **Biology typifies complex couplings of manmade systems – economy, energy, cybersecurity**




Robustness is key to understanding real-world systems with “organic” behavior

- **Highly optimized tolerance (HOT):** Systems *designed* or *selected* to perform well despite perturbations
- **Robustness is necessary for biological evolution and for effective engineering**
- **HOT systems exhibit power-law distributions like SOC but have organic structure (not self-similar)**
- **Adapted robustness to one set of perturbations induces extra fragility to different perturbations**
- **Indeed, rare but catastrophic failures are seen in highly engineered/evolved systems**
 - Electrical blackouts, cyber shutdown of Estonia, financial panics, hacker penetration of bank database, etc.




Complexity can address “whole system” robustness and stability


- **Consider designing a digital circuit to add two 1-bit numbers (a “half adder”)**
 - This is among the most basic functions appearing in microelectronics
- **There are many ways of composing logic gates to implement this functionality**
- **The next slide shows two such circuits; each performs as a half adder when run for twenty steps**
 - Shown correctly adding $1 + 1$ to get the binary result 10
 - They also give correct answers for the other possible inputs



A



B





What distinguishes the two implementations? *Resilience*

- For this very simple functionality, both circuits can be verified by exhaustive testing
- More realistic circuits cannot be tested exhaustively, so we need to understand the effect of untested states
- In this example, we introduce occasional gate errors to represent unanticipated behavior
- The next slide shows a typical run of each circuit with a 1% error rate per gate update
 - States that deviate from the ideal run are outlined in red
- **Circuit A has much less error in the final output (greater resilience) than circuit B – why?**
 - In this case, average inputs per node (k) makes the difference




A

$k = 1.5$

Inputs

Step 0




Outputs
(Average incorrect bits: **0.10**)

B

$k = 2.5$


Inputs

Step 0



Outputs
(Average incorrect bits: **0.73**)


Formal methods can be applied at various levels of abstraction




Analog mixed signal control systems

Hybrid systems: Dynamical systems that exhibit both discrete and continuous change

- Their discrete variables are updated in discrete steps that consume no time (resulting in jumps)
- Their continuous real-valued variables (clocks and drifting clocks) are updated as continuous functions while time elapses (during delays, resulting in so-called “flows”)




PLL diagram (Little et al, 2004)



Today formal verification is limited to the digital domain


- **A computer model is generated for the digital logic**
 - Very accurate as long as:
 - **The circuit behaves digitally**
 - **Inputs remain in their expected range**
- **Not considered in formal verification:**
 - Digital circuit ceases to behave digitally because of extreme environments
 - Out-of-nominal digitized analog inputs appear from the external environment
- **We seek to broaden current techniques to verify function for digital systems in extreme environments**

Digital system analysis research will increase utility of HPC in simulation



- Complex system simulation leverages HPC but confronts issues of tractability and V&V that current research is addressing
- HPC, formal methods, and complexity theory can work together to expand our capabilities

Composition of formally verified systems



Decomposing a complex digital design may enable component-level formal verification using HPC

Composition to the whole device is nontrivial, but the formal results can usefully constrain behavior