

## Sandia National Laboratories

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LABORATORY DIRECTED RESEARCH &amp; DEVELOPMENT

# Early Career R&D Program

## Problem

- How to formally verify a FPGA-based digital system (Figure 1)?
- What are the specific requirements that are different than industrial applications?
- How confident are we after the verification?
- How to automate the verification with respect to specification?
- What is the best design/verification flow (Figure 2)?




Figure 1. How to deliver trusted FPGA-based designs?




Figure 1. Hardware design flow. Left: Design flow without formal methods – passing simulation proves correctness. Right: Design flow augmented with formal verification – passing verification ensures that the formal specification is held.

**Formal Verification** – is the process of checking that the *intent* of the design was preserved in its *implementation*.


## Approach

### Investigation of various formal approaches


- Equivalence checking -- whether two representations of a design is equivalent
- Model checking -- whether a modeled design meets specification
- Symbolic model checking -- build propositional logic instead of graph for FSM
- Automated theorem proving -- proving of mathematical theorems with computer programs
- Integrated approaches

### Integration of event-driven simulator with model checker

- What is the appropriate abstraction level?
- What is the appropriate application programming interface (API)?



Introduction of the concept of “systems are designed to be verified and are verified by design”



## Results

**Potential development framework has been identified**

**Potential application has been identified**

**Several prototype models have been developed for NuSMV**

- Simple ALU
- Shift register
- Single port random access memory (RAM)
- Open source Advanced Encryption System (AES)

**Proved challenge with existing model checking tools for designs involving memory**

- Small sized RAM experienced state explosion problem during model checking with NuSMV (Figure 3)
- An implementation of AES (computational intensive) is too complex to model efficiently with NuSMV




Figure 3. State space explosion for RAM with fixed word size (M) and variable memory size (N).

**Identified the need for a hybrid approach to compensate for the limitations of model checking and theorem proving**

## Significance

**Bring new S&T into mission-critical, high-consequence digital system design/verification to compliment the traditional simulation based testing**

• Simulation: dynamically demonstrate that the design intent is preserved in implementation → **proves correctness**

- Fact: *potentially* identify the presence of a bug
- Challenge: does not ensure the absence of a bug

• Formal verification: statically proves that the implementation satisfies the requirements → **catches fault**

- Fact: exhaustive explore all state space to uncover all incorrect behaviors
- Challenge: identify *enough* properties to check

**Distinguish Sandia's specific needs from industrial applications, which can be handled with commercial tools – how many “9”s will be “good enough”?**

- High-reliability → high functional correctness
- High-availability → low system downtime

Availability (%)	Downtime		
	Weekly	Monthly	Annually
90% “one 9”	16.8 hours	72 hours	36.5 days
99% “two 9s”	16.8 hours	7.2 hours	3.65 days
99.9% “three 9s”	10.1 minutes	43.2 minutes	8.76 hours
99.99% “four 9s”	1.01 minutes	4.32 minutes	52.56 minutes
99.999% “five 9s”	6.05 seconds	25.9 seconds	5.256 minutes
99.9999% “six 9s”	0.605 seconds	2.59 seconds	31.5 seconds

**Leverage this S&T in an improved design/verification flow**




Figure 4. Improved hardware design flow combines model checking and theorem proving

