


```

55 event modbus_write_single_register_request
56 {
57   (if (connection.headers["ModbusAddress"], address: count, value: count) {
58     local master = cidrstrig_b;
59     local outstation = cidrstrig_b;
60     if (master in DiscoverNodes) {
61       local node = DiscoverNodes[master];
62       if (address in DiscoverNodes[master][registers]) {
63         DiscoverNodes[master][registers][address] = vector();
64         local new_req = DiscoverNodes[master][registers][address];
65         #new_req = vector();
66         new_req[new_req] = value;
67       } else {
68         local req = DiscoverNodes[master][registers][address];
69         req[new_req] = value;
70       }
71     } else {
72       local new_modbus_node: ModbusNode = [ip_address:master, registers:table(),
73         address:vector(value)];
74       DiscoverNodes[master] = new_modbus_node;
75     }
76   }
77 }

```



ICS-CERT Modbus Anomaly Detection

Mike King, Susan Wade

Overview

- Original Tasking
 - Why it is hard
 - Why it is possible
- Implementation
- Demonstration
- New Approach
 - Why?
 - How is it better?
 - Short term benefits

Original Tasking

- “Detect anomalies in ICS traffic”
 - Define what malicious ICS traffic means
 - Create a tool detect it

Why Is This Hard?


- "Anomaly" is a vague concept
- Anomalies are well-understood in an enterprise network, but the ICS network is different
 - In ICS: Anomaly \neq Malformed packet
 - In ICS, Anomaly \neq SQL injection
 - We're not looking for attacks on a browser
- Requires knowledge of ICS Protocols
- Requires some baseline, "non-anomalous" traffic
 - Unique to particular facilities

Why Is This Possible?

- ICS traffic is very regular (deterministic)
- ICS network has a very specific goal (process control)
 - The enterprise network has to be “everything to everyone”
- The Bro network tool has a Modbus protocol analyzer
 - We don't have to invent one

Implementation – BroBounds

- We chose bad process input values as our anomalies
- How do we do it?
 - Collect every register read and write from a capture of ICS network traffic
 - From that collection of values, create a “default” Bro script (in memory) that alerts on a register value exceeding the bounds from that capture
 - Highlight statistical outliers to the user for modifying the “default” bounds
 - Provide a GUI for modifying that default script (instead of coding in BroScript)
 - Visualize these alerts in a meaningful way



Bro Scripting


- Turing-complete, domain-specific language
- ICS security should not depend on ICS engineers learning this language
- BroBounds abstracts the details away

```
event modbus_write_single_register_request
(c: connection, headers: ModbusHeaders, address: count, value: count) {
  local master = c$id$orig_h;
  local outstation = c$id$resp_h;
  if ( master in DiscoveredNodes ) {
    local node = DiscoveredNodes[master];
    if ( address !in DiscoveredNodes[master]$registers ) {
      DiscoveredNodes[master]$registers[address] = vector();
      local new_reg = DiscoveredNodes[master]$registers[address];


      #new_reg = vector();
      new_reg[|new_reg|] = value;
    } else {
      local reg = DiscoveredNodes[master]$registers[address];
      reg[|reg|] = value;
    }
  } else {
    local new_modbus_node: ModbusNode = [$ip_address=master, $registers=table([
      address]=vector(value))];
    DiscoveredNodes[master] = new_modbus_node;
  }
}

event modbus_write_single_register_response
(c: connection, headers: ModbusHeaders, address: count, value: count) {
  local master = c$id$orig_h;
  local outstation = c$id$resp_h;
  if ( outstation in DiscoveredNodes ) {
    local node = DiscoveredNodes[outstation];
    if ( address !in DiscoveredNodes[outstation]$registers ) {
      local new_reg = DiscoveredNodes[outstation]$registers[address];
      #new_reg = vector();
      new_reg[|new_reg|] = value;
    } else {
      local reg = DiscoveredNodes[outstation]$registers[address];
      reg[|reg|] = value;
    }
  } else {
    local new_modbus_node: ModbusNode = [$ip_address=outstation,
      $registers=table([address]=vector(value))];
    DiscoveredNodes[outstation] = new_modbus_node;
  }
}
```



BroBounds Application




Generate Bro Script – Last Step




BroBounds Workflow – Create Script



BroBounds Workflow – Run Bro



BroBounds Dashboard



New Approach - Archimedes

- Expand on BroBounds analysis model
- More statistical rigor to find anomalies
- In contrast, BroBounds was designed with very tight definition of “anomaly”
 - Simple integer comparison
 - To facilitate rapid development
- Integrates with existing network tools
 - BroBounds is stand-alone
 - New tool designed to integrate with ELK-stack workflow


What is Archimedes?

- A platform for running one or more analysis modules on ICS protocol data
- A set of modules for finding anomalous behaviors from packets/messages which are:
 - Valid
 - Well-formed
 - “Harmless” – (when out of context)
- A platform for storing/sorting/displaying with a json database backend

What is an Archimedes Analysis Module?

- A small program that runs an analysis algorithm on a set of 'register-operations'
- A program that may call one or more analysis programs to find relationships including:
 - Statistical analysis
 - Machine learning
 - Any algorithm a computer scientist can devise
- A program that can be written in:
 - Python
 - Haskell
 - C/C++
 - Anything really...

Archimedes Workflow



Why A New Approach?

- Multiple statistical approaches to find more kinds of anomalies
- Instead of stand-alone, distributed
- Backend/framework in Haskell
 - Analytics in multiple languages
 - Front-end in JavaScript
- Why Haskell?
 - Designed for mathematical reasoning
 - Designed for parallel processing
 - We are not yet using this, but plan to
- BroBounds is a one-instance-per facility tool
 - But Archimedes is designed to be distributed
 - Multiple analysts can use multiple instances at one time

Why Is This Work Important To ICS-CERT

- Tool will display results automatically to Kibana
- Design goal - CERT analysts will be able to deploy the tool quickly
- Design goal – easy to write and run new, complex algorithms for anomaly detection

How Does This Work Fit in the ICS- CERT Workflow

- At present, BroBounds and ELK-stack is a proof-of-concept in a Virtual Machine
- New BroBounds is a prototype
 - Haskell framework in place
 - Python environment in development
 - “Toy” algorithms so far

Next Steps

- Continue Archimedes development
 - Develop more analytics
 - Test Python interface
- Add new ICS protocol analyzers to Bro
- Improvements to BroBounds as required

Questions