


reach<sub>2</sub>



# Overview of Sandia's Hydrogen Safety, Codes and Standards Program Area

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Provided by: Aaron Harris, [apharri@sandia.gov](mailto:apharri@sandia.gov), Sandia National Laboratory

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- Hydrogen Fuel Cell Powered Electric Vehicles (FCEV)
  - Electric vehicles which use a hydrogen fuel cell to convert hydrogen to electricity
- Fuel Cell
  - “Battery with a gas tank”
  - Electrochemical device to convert chemical energy to electrical energy
- Fueling
  - High pressure hydrogen (5,000 or 10,000psi)
  - Fueling Time is 3-5 min

More information:

[University of Washington Program](#)

[US Department of Energy Program](#)

[Sandia Safety, Codes and Standards](#)



## Common uses of hydrogen:

- 9 million tons annual in US (56 Bkg global)
- Oil Refinery
  - 60% of current hydrogen use
  - “Sweetens” and removes sulfur
  - 21 Million Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs) equivalent
- Food – partially-hydrogenated fats
- Electrical power equipment coolant
- Ultra-clean heating ovens – metals, silicon wafers, etc.



## Not yet common use:

- Personal vehicles, private residences
- 12,000 hydrogen stations would put hydrogen within two miles of 70 percent of the U.S. population

# Sandia's Role




- Laboratory Mission Area: Energy, Climate & Infrastructure Security
  - Transportation Energy Center
    - Combustion and Technology Branch
      - Hydrogen & Combustion Technology Program
        - Hydrogen Safety, Codes and Standards R&D

## Hydrogen Safety, Codes and Standards R&D Goals:

- Eliminate barriers to access and availability of safety data and information.
- Enable market development with consistent regulations, codes and standards.
- Provide technical data for creation and revision of regulations, codes and standards.

## Hydrogen behavior



Simulation and experimental validation of release during indoor refueling

## Quantitative Risk Assessments



Quantitative Risk Assessment helps establish requirements for hydrogen installations

## H<sub>2</sub> effects in materials, components, and systems



Technical Reference

| Section                             | Material composition | Code         | Breakdown detail |       |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------|-------|
| Introduction                        |                      | IS033        | (300)            |       |
| <b>Plain Carbon Ferritic Steels</b> |                      |              |                  |       |
| C-Mn Alloys                         | Fe-C-Mn              | 1100         | (6/0)            |       |
| <b>Low-Alloy Ferritic Steels</b>    |                      |              |                  |       |
| Cr-Mn Alloys                        | Fe-Cr-Mn             | 3011         | (12/0)           |       |
| Fe-Cr-Mo Alloys                     | Fe-Ni-Cr-Mo          | 3022         | (12/0)           |       |
| <b>High-Alloy Ferritic Steels</b>   |                      |              |                  |       |
| High-Strength Steels                | Fe-Mn-4Cr-8Mo        | 3403         | (10/0)           |       |
| Fe-15Cr                             | 3500                 | (18/0)       |                  |       |
| <b>Ferritic Stainless Steels</b>    |                      |              |                  |       |
| Duplex Stainless Steels             | Fe-22Cr-18Ni-Mo      | 3600         | (9/0)            |       |
| Grain-Austenitic Stainless Steels   | Fe-15Cr-7Ni          | 3700         | (3/0)            |       |
| <b>Martensitic Stainless Steels</b> |                      |              |                  |       |
| Precipitation-Strengthened          | Fe-Cr-Ni             | 3810         | (3/0)            |       |
| Heat Treatable                      | Fe-Cr                | 3820         | (6/0)            |       |
| <b>Resistive Steels</b>             |                      |              |                  |       |
| Pressure Vessel Stainless Alloys    | Type 316 & 316L      | Fe-18Cr-10Ni | 2001             | (8/0) |
| Type 316 & 316L                     | Fe-18Cr-10Ni-Mo      | 2002         | (3/0)            |       |
| Type 304 & 307                      | Fe-18Cr-10Ni-TiNb    | 2004         | (12/0)           |       |

Mechanical load-frame used to characterize H<sub>2</sub> effects in materials

## C&S development support



Regulations Codes and Standards Advocacy


Research, Engineering, and Applications Center for Hydrogen

# Risk-Informed Approach

Use validated simulations, field data and expert input to determine risk through quantitative risk assessment.


## Release Probability

- Permeation
- Buoyant creeping flow
- Turbulent jet
- Volumetric rupture




## Field Data Input

- incident data,
- environmental/human factors,
- system design/mitigation




## Ignition Probability

- Ignition mechanism
- Mixture ignitability
- Ignition delay/location
- Sustained light-up



## Hazard Probability

- Flame radiation
- Pressure wave (deflagration/detonation)
- O<sub>2</sub> dilution/depletion



## Informed Input

Code development groups, industry, regulators and code enforcers

QRA







## Harm Probability

- Burns
- Lung damage
- Shrapnel wounds
- Building collapse

# Simulation and Experimental Validation

| Test #   | Initial pressure (psi) | Final pressure (psi) | Fill time (sec) |
|----------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| 1        | 20                     | 1500                 | 60              |
| 2        | 20                     | 1500                 | 90              |
| 3        | 20                     | 1500                 | 150             |
| 4        | 20                     | 1500                 | 300             |
| 5        | 20                     | 1000                 | 90              |
| <b>6</b> | <b>20</b>              | <b>2000</b>          | <b>90</b>       |
| 7        | 145                    | 2000                 | 90              |
| 8        | 290                    | 2000                 | 90              |
| 9        | 725                    | 2000                 | 90              |

| Test #   | Initial pressure (psi) | Final pressure (psi) | Release rate (g/sec) |
|----------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1        | 1300                   | 20                   | 1.5                  |
| 2        | 1300                   | 20                   | 0.75                 |
| 3        | 1300                   | 20                   | 1.0                  |
| <b>4</b> | <b>1300</b>            | <b>20</b>            | <b>1.9</b>           |
| 5        | 1700                   | 20                   | 0.4                  |
| 6        | 1700                   | 20                   | 1.5                  |
| 7        | 1700                   | 20                   | 0.75                 |



## Model Results:


- ✓ Model completed, currently in validation
- ✓ Goal: results available for SAE Interface Group (J2601) discussion; Sept 2012
- ✓ Goal: Comparison with other research and industrial datasets in support of 2015 vehicle deployment

# Improve Mixture Measurement

Flamelet models can be used to predict these turbulent flame front propagation speeds

Burned Gas

Turbulent Eddies




Unburned Gas

H<sub>2</sub> preferentially diffuses toward reaction front (differential diffusion)

- Increased flame front distortion

Driscoll, 2007



$\Sigma$ : flame surface density

$u'$ : fluctuating turbulent velocity

$\Lambda$ : integral length scale

$S_{Lam}$ : laminar flame speed

$\alpha_{H_2}$ : thermal diffusivity

$D_{H_2}$ : molecular diffusivity

$D_{diff}$ : differential diffusion


$D_{turb}$ : turbulent diffusivity

$q$ : heat release

$c$ : reaction progress variable

# Turbulent Jet Experiment

Scalar field of a momentum driven, turbulent H<sub>2</sub> jet was examined via high-resolution Planar Rayleigh Scatter Imaging (PLRS).



Air co-flow & barriers to minimize impact of room currents

Additional diagnostics include Particle Image velocimetry (PIV), Laser Doppler Velocimetry (LDV) and OH Laser Induced Fluorescence (LIF).

## PIXIS 400B low noise CCD Camera

- 2 x 2 binning for 3.94 pix/mm resolution
- ~400:1 signal-to-noise
- 5 interrogation regions (37 x 125 mm<sup>2</sup>)
- 400 images per interrogation region


$$\begin{aligned}r_0 &= 0.95 \text{ mm} \\L_{\text{pipe}} &= 250 \text{ mm} \\Q &= 100 \text{ lit/min} \\Fr_{\text{den}} &= 1170\end{aligned}$$

High power injection seeded ND: Yag laser (1 J/pulse, 532 nm)



# Flame Light-Up Imaging

Ignition w/ light-up




Rapid volumetric ignition kernel growth

Kernel forms into turbulent flame front

Flame front broadens

Front **overcomes** flow convection

Ignition w/o light-up




Slower kernel growth

Thinner, less turbulent flame front


Front **overcome** by convection

- ✓ Imaging observations indicate sustained flame light-up correlates with 1D flame front propagation speeds.

*Hydrogen embrittlement accelerates fatigue cracking*




$$N_f = N_{\text{initiation}} + N_{\text{growth}}$$




# Hydrogen Embrittlement

- Hydrogen is the smallest element
- Hydrogen ‘interrupts’ the metal structure
- Material becomes more brittle
- Hydrogen affects are different for different types or classes of metals
- Sandia has an enduring program in hydrogen effects in materials for the national defense mission area
- This expertise was used to provide assistance to this investigation



# AC Transit Emeryville, CA

## Incident Summary



- Hydrogen release and subsequent jet fire from vent system
- No significant damage, injuries or fatalities

- Root Causes – improper material and poor quality control
- Contributing factor – inadequate communication of critical data
- Contributing factor – inadequate communication of design changes (canopy)
- Contributing factor – lack of sub-system isolation and inadequate communication of vulnerabilities during safety reviews

# Thank You

## Questions?