




# *Quantifiable Assurance Workshop Fabrication Data Sources for Rad Hard*

*Todd Bauer, Nick Pattengale, Nick Hilbert,  
Vivian Kammler, MESA CIM Team  
Sandia National Laboratories  
Day 1*


*9 Oct 2019*

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# Data Driven Quantifiable Assurance



*As a starting point, our focus is the application of Trust principles, Distributed Ledger and/or Blockchain to Fabrication.*

*The same approaches could be applied continuously across the entire lifecycle.*



# *Introduction*

- Who we are: Todd Bauer, Nick Pattengale, Nick Hilbert, Vivian Kammler, MESA Computer Integrated Manufacturing Team
  - Sandia National Laboratories
    - Microsystems Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) Center
    - Threat Intelligence Center
- What we do: design, fab, package, & test strategically radiation hardened microelectronics for National Security systems
  - Primary customer is NNSA
  - Full flow silicon CMOS, radiation hardened by process and by design
- In support of Assurance Enabled Manufacturing, can we increase stakeholder confidence in the integrity and reliability of our manufacturing flow?



# Current State

- For MESAFAB, protection measures include robust physical security & cleared staff
- DMEA Trust certification
  - Relies on physical security and chain of custody of silicon and photomasks
- Extensive use of computing resources, controlled through internal restricted network and access control lists
  - All fabs generate data and the data is important!
  - Many sensitivities to manage
- Material tracking from lot starts to delivery
- What are we measuring?
  - Linear physical measurements, electrical parametrics, equipment settings, etc.
  - Compliance with operating procedures
  - Material tracking




*Are We Measuring Assurance?*



# Future Directions

- Future state: Develop and demonstrate cryptographic blockchain and distributed ledger for provenance tracking of microelectronics
  - Establish a framework, not a point solution!
    - Use MESA as a model system
    - Note: Si CMOS that is RHBP looks a lot like standard Si CMOS
  - Complements existing DMEA Trusted flow
- If we 1) operate in a trusted environment, 2) verify compliance to requirements, and 3) document evidence of compliance in a blockchain, is that assurance?



*Easy to Measure Compliance to Requirements  
Can We Translate That To Assurance?*

# Future Directions

- Questions to be answered: Data from what sources? Incorporate sensitive information? How much distribution? Over what network?


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IMDCMP_TQ	DMF1910.0	special (IMD)	DMF10	9/10/2019 2:11:14 PM	24		0035
	DMF1873.0	Post CMP Decon	WB26-TANK1	9/10/2019 7:34:24 PM	24		0037
	DMF0900.0	spin rinse dry	SRD23	9/10/2019 7:34:42 PM	24		0038
NONPROD_V1_L1	LIT5175.0	UVBL c/d, 0.73AM,BSEBR,NE non prof	PSM1	9/11/2019 2:35:28 PM	24		0039
	LIT5054.0	spin rinse dry	SRD23	9/11/2019 5:24:12 PM	24		0040
		EMG	EMG	9/11/2019 5:43:44 PM	24		0041
		EG2	EG2	9/11/2019 5:49:11 PM	24		0042
	WET1540.0	PRS1000 w/o CO2, WET1540	SOLS3	9/12/2019 11:50:33 AM	24		0045
	WET1452.0	8.1 EGBOE, 3 mins	WB20-TANK1	9/12/2019 1:23:16 PM	24		0046
	WET0920.0	spin rinse dry	SPD19	9/12/2019 1:35:14 PM	24		0047
	DRY0194.0	special 1 day CD, no EDC	SEMG	9/12/2019 3:53:01 PM	24		0048
		special 1 day CD, no EDC	WFE1M1JDP.F	9/12/2019 4:13:43 PM	24		0049

**PROCESS FLOW**

### Reticle Information

SubPlan	Layer	Rev	Comments
			Process on either scanner
			std targeting
			std targeting
			std targeting
NONPROD PAD LITHO_CVV	23		std targeting


**LITHO & MASK DATA**




**INLINE DATA**

ProcessType/Name	ToolName	Run	RunStart/Time	Timestamp	WAFER_NUMBER	AR_S_AFC_current_Rev	CF4_AFC_current_Rev
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:14.985	551	15	2
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:16.040	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:16.985	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:18.040	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:18.984	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:20.039	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:20.985	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:21.940	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:22.035	551	15	15
TOD-CENTURA_EFCH MxP Plus	EMEMONT_8	5505	2017/03/29 17:07:13.086	2017/03/29 17:07:23.075	551	15	15

**TOOL DATA**



**ELECTRICAL PARAMETRICS**



**DIE TRACKING?**



– Bonus: Develop sanitized reference data for other researchers

*Our Focus Is Fabrication But Concepts Are Applicable Across Full Lifecycle*



# *Impact*



- Compliance to Requirements Linked Through Blockchain
  - Immutability of Manufacturing Data
  - Verification of Manufacturing Conformance
- Robust Track & Trace Throughout Product Lifecycle
- Decentralization of Data Ownership and Data Storage
- Demonstrated in our fab but transferable to other fabs

*Measure Compliance to Requirements & Link through Blockchain*  
*Can We Quantify Assurance Value?*



# *Status, Conclusions, Metrics*

- Blockchain from *archived* data already demonstrated
- Studying trade space for *real-time* implementation of blockchain
  - High complexity!
  - Considering constrained implementation to start
- Studying trade space for distribution of ledger
  - For our specific implementation, thoughtful database design may be sufficient
- Transition: Engaging Colvin Run Networks

*Easy to Measure Compliance, Harder to Measure Assurance*