


# Overview and Development of Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM)



PRESENTED BY


Brian Ehrhart

Web Meeting with NREL Team

8/8/2019



SAND2019-9332PE



Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

SAND2019-XXXX PE

# Introduction to Risk Assessment

**Risk** takes both **likelihood** and **consequence** into account

**Likelihood** measures how often or how probable an event is

- Frequency (events per year)
- Probability


**Consequence** measures the effects of some event occurring

- Heat flux or overpressure
- Fatalities/injuries
- Economic losses


So the event with the highest risk may not be the most or least likely, and it may not be the worst or best case outcome

- Instead, some combination of the two


# Building a Scientific Platform for Hydrogen QRA



**QRA:**  
Quantitative Risk  
Assessment



# Challenge: A quality QRA incorporates a large body of information from different areas



**It is non-trivial to...**

- Find best-available models & data for all of these pieces
- Validate those models
- And combine those all into a single framework




**First-of-its-kind integration platform for state-of-the-art hydrogen safety models & data - built to put the R&D into the hands of industry safety experts**

## Core functionality:

- Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methodology
- Frequency & probability data for hydrogen component failures
- Fast-running models of hydrogen gas and flame behaviors

## Key features:

- GUI & Mathematics Middleware
- Documented approach, models, algorithms
- Flexible and expandable framework; supported by active R&D



# Physics models

Properties of Hydrogen

Unignited releases: Orifice flow;  
Notional nozzles; Gas jet/plume;  
Accumulation in enclosures

Ignited releases: Jet flames; overpressures  
in enclosures

# Software Language


Python for Modules

C# for GUI

# Documentation


Algorithm report (SAND2017-2998)

User guide (SAND2018-0749)




# HyRAM Physics Models


## Un-ignited Jet Plume




## Accumulation in Enclosure



## Jet Flame Temperature



## Jet Flame Heat Flux



## Benefits of Reduced-Order Models

Short run-time


Modeling expert not required

Useful for quantification

- If a hydrogen leak occurs, how far away does the hazard get?

Useful for comparisons

- What is the effect on safety is a system size is reduced?



## 9 More Details on Physics Models

Physics models are 1-dimensional

Un-ignited and ignited jets are 1-D along the jet centerline

- Steady-state
- X- and Y-coordinates are solved for each point along the centerline
  - Gives shape of jet
- Parameters for Gaussian profiles solved for each point along centerline
  - Gives velocities, concentrations away from jet centerline

Accumulation (overpressure) model is 1-D along the height of the enclosure



- Upper and lower vents are “points” along this dimension
- Layer is mixture of hydrogen/air and is assumed uniform concentration
- Height of layer changes with time; leak jet and layer solved for at each time step
- Flammable mass just looks at if the H<sub>2</sub>-in-air concentration is between 4-75vol%, and calculates mass of hydrogen if so
- Overpressure is based on volumetric expansion \*only\* and is just based on flammable mass

# Example Physics Calculations

How far away is a safe distance from a jet flame?

How far away does a flammable concentration of gas reach?

What gets farther: a smaller leak from a high pressure system, or a larger leak from a lower pressure system?



## QRA Methodology

Risk metrics calculations: FAR, PLL, AIR

Scenario models & frequency

Release frequency

Harm models

## Generic Freq. & Prob. data

Ignition probabilities

Component leak frequencies (9 types)

## Software Language


Python for Modules

C# for GUI

## Documentation

Algorithm report (SAND2017-2998)


User guide (SAND2018-0749)



# HyRAM QRA Analysis

## Fault Trees

- Calculate frequency of different size leaks
- Considers random leaks from equipment in system
- Considers fueling dispenser leak



## Event sequence diagram


- Considers probability of outcome for each leak size
- Probability of ignition

## Consequence

- For ignited releases, calculates harm (fatalities) for each ignited release

## Overall Risk

- Combines all of the above to overall risk metric
- Outputs:
  - Overall risk metrics
  - Importance Measures (scenario contribution to overall risk)
  - Cut Sets (expected frequency of leaks from equipment)



# More Details on QRA Calculations: Fault Trees

20 risk scenarios considered

- 5 leak sizes: 0.01%, 0.1%, 1%, 10%, 100% of pipe area
- 4 possible end-states: leak isolated, jet fire, explosion, no ignition


All leak sizes have a fault tree based on random leaks from equipment

- Leak frequencies multiplied by number of components

100% leak size has additional fault tree based on failures from dispenser

- Leak frequencies multiplied by annual fueling demands

All fault tree result values can be over-ridden by user



## More Details on QRA Calculations: Consequences

Event sequence diagram considers consequences of leak

All consequences are based on fatalities


- Injuries or property damage not considered

Jet fire model used to calculate heat flux experienced by occupants

- Probit model used to calculate fatalities for a given heat flux

Overpressure values used for explosion scenarios

- Probit model used to calculate fatalities for a given overpressure
- Currently overpressure values are “dummy” not validated



## Example QRA Calculations



What has a lower risk, a system with welded pipe or fittings?

- Comparison of overall system risk

What has a lower risk, fewer people closer to the system, or more people further away from the system?

- Comparison of overall system risk

What system component is driving overall risk?



- PLL contribution in Scenario Ranking
- Component leak frequencies in Cut Sets

What is the setback distance away from the system to achieve overall risk below a threshold?

- Overall system risk

Focused on a gaseous hydrogen dispenser fueling forklifts located in a warehouse


Analysis can be altered for generic fueling stations, but applicability is limited beyond that scope



Dispenser

Fuel Cell

Vehicle






## Analysis beyond hydrogen

Customization of the components, failure modes and accidents, will allow for the risk analysis of alternative fuels (CNG, LNG, propane) ***with the addition of the appropriate physics/behavior models***

Component release frequencies, failure frequencies, accident frequencies, ignition probabilities and gas detection probabilities would all have to be calculated



# Current Status of Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models (AltRAM)

## Gas plume:

- Implemented in code, not yet validated
- Will be validated Summer 2019

## Cold plume:


- Implemented and validated

## Jet fire:


- Implemented in code, not yet validated
- Will be validated Summer 2019

All models still need to be implemented in GUI

Physics models need to be incorporated with QRA models





Hydrogen



Natural Gas



Thank you!



Questions?