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A STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH TO AN INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING PROBLEM

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
SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
Discrete Math & Optimization Department
Albuquerque, NM

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About this talk



Joint work with Dr. Walter Guo (UCF),
and Dr. Yueyue Fan (UCDavis)

INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING PROBLEMS

Participants We have a multi-agent system, formed by

Investors/Producers and **Consumers**

Interaction They interact independently by trade, using a price system that indicates the market value of a commodity in a given time-space situation




Network structure Interaction between agents are constrained to a **network structure**, reflecting the physical connection between points of trade/interaction

PROBLEM

Need to find the system state where the total production satisfies the total demand


EV-charging station problem

- ▶ Electric vehicle (EV) adoption is growing fast (EV sales data from Argonne)
- ▶ Charging infrastructure needs to catch up with the increasing charging demand
- ▶ Understanding the pattern of charging infrastructure investment is critical to evaluate the impacts of EV on both power and transportation systems




EV-charging station problem

Network



EV-charging station problem



EV-charging station problem

Optimization

Objective: Maximize Profits

Decisions:

Location
Investment Capacity
Supply Quantity

Objective: Maximize Utility

Decisions:


Facility location
Route

Agents


Investor i

User j

Network



EV-charging station problem



Mathematical modeling: General Setting

Markets We assume that interactions are made using **markets**

Perfect competition We assume that markets are perfectly competitive:
there is a market for each desired commodity traded

Investors Multiple heterogeneous investors, maximizing profit
(depending on **capacity investment costs** and **generation costs**)

Consumers Drivers maximize utility, and their facility choice depends
on **charging price**, **travel/charging time**, and **locational attractiveness**

Traffic Assignment Wardrop user equilibrium

Perfect information Both investors and users have perfect information

Supply side: Investors' problem

$$\underset{c_i^s, g_i^s}{\text{maximize}} \quad \underbrace{\sum_{s \in S_i} [\varrho^s g_i^s - \varphi_g(g^s)]}_{\text{operational net profit}} - \underbrace{\sum_{s \in S_i} \varphi_c(c_i^s)}_{\text{investment costs}}$$

$$\text{subject to } (\gamma_i^s) \quad \underbrace{g_i^s - c_i^s \leq 0}_{\text{capacity constraint}}, \forall s \in S_i; g_i^s \geq 0, c_i^s \geq 0, \forall s \in S_i.$$

where:

S_i : set of investment locations of firm i ;

c_i^s : charging capacity [kW] at location s by firm i ;

g_i^s : energy supply [kWh] at location s by i -firm;

ϱ^s : unit charging price at location s (market determined);

$\varphi_c(\cdot)$: capital cost wrt charging capacity;

$\varphi_g(\cdot)$: operational cost wrt supply quantity and scenario;

I : set of investors.

Travelers and ISO problem

minimize
 x, v, q

U (travel time, local attractiveness,
charging capacities, charging cost)

subject to

$$v_a = \sum_{r \in R} \sum_{s \in S} x_a^{rs}, \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A}$$

$$(\zeta^{rs}) \quad Ax^{rs} = q^{rs} E^{rs}, \quad \forall r \in R, s \in S,$$

$$(\eta^r) \quad \sum_{s \in S} q^{rs} = d^r, \quad \forall r \in R$$

$$x_a^{rs} \geq 0, \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A}, r \in R, s \in S$$

$$v_a \geq 0, \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A}$$

$$q^{rs} \geq 0, \quad \forall r \in R, s \in S.$$

where

$$U(x, v, q) = \underbrace{\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \int_0^{v_a} t_a(u) du}_{\text{Wardrop User Equilibrium}} + \frac{1}{\beta_1} \sum_{r \in R} \sum_{s \in S} q^{rs} \underbrace{\left(\ln q^{rs} - 1 + \beta_3 \frac{e^{rs}}{\text{inc}^r} - \beta_2 \sum_{i \in I_s} c_i^s - \beta_0 \right)}_{\text{Logit choice model}}$$

$U(x, v, q)$: Consumers' utility function;

x_a^{rs} : traffic flow on link a associated with O-D pair rs ;

v_a : traffic flow on link a ;

q^{rs} : traffic flow from r to s ;

$t_a(\cdot)$: travel time function of link a , e.g. the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function;

A : node-link incidence matrix of network (model input based on network topology);

E^{rs} : O-D incidence vector of O-D pair rs with +1 at origin and -1 at destination (modeling input based on network topology);

d^r : total EV travel demand from location r (model input).

e^{rs} : average charging demand from r to s (model input);

Equilibrium

System equilibrium

The system is in **equilibrium** if there exists a price ξ^* such that

- ▶ Investors maximize their utility by producing a quantity $g^i(\xi^*)$,
- ▶ Transportation system maximizes the consumers' utility function with an optimal traffic flow of $q(\xi^*)$,
- ▶ Charging market at each location is balanced, i.e., total supply meets total demand.

MARKET EQUILIBRIUM Find ξ^* such that


$$ES_s(\xi^*) := \underbrace{\sum_{i \in I_s} g_s^i(\xi^*)}_{\text{total generation at } s} - \underbrace{\sum_{r \in R} e^{rs} q^{rs}(\xi^*)}_{\text{total demand at } s} = 0, \quad s \in S$$

Solution strategy: MAX-INF FORMULATION

Walrasian bifunction

$$(\xi, \varphi) \mapsto W(\xi, \varphi) = - \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \varphi_s \text{ES}_s^2(\xi)$$

Maxinf characterization



Main problem

find ξ^* that maximizes $\xi \mapsto \inf_{\varphi} W(\xi, \varphi)$

Approximation and non-concave duality

Main problem as maximization


Find ϱ^* that maximizes $\varrho \mapsto \inf_{\varphi} W(\varrho, \varphi)$

How to approximate?

Construct a sequence of
bi-functions $\{W^v\}$ using

Non-concave duality

[?, II.K]



Approximation and non-concave duality

Main problem as maximization


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
Approximation and non-concave duality

Main problem as maximization

Find ξ^* that maximizes $\xi \mapsto \inf_{\varphi} W(\xi, \varphi)$

How to approximate?

Construct a sequence of
bi-functions $\{W^v\}$ using
Non-concave duality
[?, II.K]



$\sigma : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \bar{\mathbb{R}}$ proper, lsc, convex, $\min \sigma = 0$, $\operatorname{argmin} \sigma = \{0\}$

Augmentation and Walras economic model

Augmented Walrasian

$$\bar{W}^v(\varrho, \varphi) = \inf_z \{W(\varrho, \varphi - z) + r_v \sigma^*(r_v^{-1} z)\}$$

ϱ^*	\in	0	argmaxinf	W
↑		↑		tight-lop ↑
ϱ^v	\in	ε^v	argmaxinf	\bar{W}^v

Augmentation and Walras economic model

Augmented Walrasian

$$\bar{W}^v(\varrho, \varphi) = \inf_z \{W(\varrho, \varphi - z) + r_v \sigma^*(r_v^{-1} z)\}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} \varrho^* & \in & 0 & \operatorname{argmaxinf} & W \\ \uparrow & & \uparrow & & \uparrow \text{tight-lop} \\ \varrho^v & \in & \varepsilon^v & \operatorname{argmaxinf} & \bar{W}^v \end{array}$$

Phase I (or primal)

$$\varphi^{v+1} \in \varepsilon^{v+1} - \operatorname{argmin}_{q \in \Delta} \bar{W}^{v+1}(\varrho^v, q)$$

(solved with Gurobi)

Phase II (or dual)

$$\varrho^{v+1} \in \varepsilon^{v+1} - \operatorname{argmax}_{\varrho} \bar{W}^{v+1}(\varrho, \varphi^{v+1})$$

(solved with BOBYQA)



Numerical example



Figure: Sioux-falls network




Figure: Solution

Solution strategy: ADMM

Capacity investment problem as a MOPEC

In general terms, a capacity investment equilibrium problem can be written as a **MULTIPLE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS WITH EQUILIBRIUM CONSTRAINTS (MOPEC)** as follows

$$x^i \in \underset{x}{\operatorname{argmin}} f^i(x; p), \quad i \in I \quad \sum_i x^i = 0$$

EV example

EV-charging station problem

In our example, we have functions of the form $f^i(x; p) = f_0^i(x^i) + \alpha^i \langle p, x^i \rangle$

$$\begin{aligned}
 f^i(x^i; p) &= \underbrace{\sum_{s \in S_i} \varphi_g(g^s) + \varphi_c(c_i^s)}_{f_0^i(x^i)} + \underbrace{- \sum_{s \in S_i} \xi^s g_i^s}_{\alpha^i \langle p, x^i \rangle} \\
 f^i(x^i; p) &= \underbrace{\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \int_0^{v_a} t_a(u) du + \frac{1}{\beta_1} \sum_{r,s} q^{rs} \left(\ln q^{rs} - 1 - \beta_2 \sum_{i \in I_s} c_i^s - \beta_0 \right)}_{f_0^i(x^i)} \\
 &\quad + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\beta_1} \sum_{r \in R} \sum_{s \in S} q^{rs} \beta_3 \frac{\xi^s e^{rs}}{inc^r}}_{\alpha^i \langle p, x^i \rangle}
 \end{aligned}$$

Representative agent formulation

MOPEC

$$x^i(p) \in \operatorname{argmin}_{x^i \in C^i} \{f_0^i(x^i) + \mu_i \langle p, x^i \rangle\}$$

$$\sum_i x^i(p) = 0$$

REPRESENTATIVE AGENT

$$\min_{\{x^i\}} \sum_i \mu^i f_0^i(x^i)$$

such that $\sum_i x^i = 0$

Distributed optimization approach

SPLIT OPERATOR REPRESENTATION

$$\min_{\{x^i\}} \sum_i \mu^i f_0^i(x^i) + \mu_{\{0\}} \left(\sum_i z^i \right)$$

such that $x^i - z^i = 0, (y^i)$

Individual modified problems Every agent- i solves

$$x^{i,v+1} \in \operatorname{argmin}_{x^i \in C^i} f_0^i(x^i) + \langle y^v, x^i \rangle + \frac{r}{2} \|x^i - x^{i,v} + \bar{x}^{i,v}\|_2^2$$

Price update

$$y^{v+1} = y^v + r\bar{x}^{v+1}$$

EV-charging station problem

24 nodes

76 links

5 origins


5 destinations

5 candidate facility locations







BPR link cost function

Base case:

- ▶ $\beta_0 = 0$
- ▶ $\beta_1 = 1$
- ▶ $\beta_2 = 0.06$



EV-charging station problem

(a) $\beta_2 = 0$ (b) $\beta_2 = 0.06$ (c) $\beta_2 = 0.6$ 

Stochastic model: Investors' problem

$$\text{maximize}_{c_i^s, g_{i,\xi}^s} \underbrace{\sum_{s \in S_i} \left[\mathbb{E} \{ \xi_\xi^s g_{i,\xi}^s \} - \phi_g(g^s) \right]}_{\text{operational net profit}} - \underbrace{\sum_{s \in S_i} \phi_c(c_i^s)}_{\text{investment costs}}$$

$$\text{subject to } (\mathcal{V}_i) \quad \underbrace{g_{i,\xi}^s - c_i^s}_{\text{capacity constraint}} \leq 0, \quad \forall s \in S_i; \quad g_{i,\xi}^s \geq 0, \quad c_i^s \geq 0, \quad \forall s \in S_i, \forall \xi \in \Xi$$

where:

$g_{i,\xi}^s$: energy supply [kWh] at location s by i -firm and scen ξ ;

ξ_ξ^s : unit charging price at location s and scen ξ (market determined);

Ξ : set of scenarios

Travelers and ISO problem

minimize
 x, v, q

U (travel time, local attractiveness,

charging capacities, charging cost, ξ)

subject to

$$v_{a,\xi} = \sum_{r \in R} \sum_{s \in S} x_{a,\xi}^{rs}, \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A}$$

$$(\zeta^{rs}) \quad Ax_{\xi}^{rs} = q_{\xi}^{rs} E^{rs}, \quad \forall r \in R, s \in S, \forall \xi \in \Xi$$

$$(\eta^r) \quad \sum_{s \in S} q_{\xi}^{rs} = d_{\xi}^r, \quad \forall r \in R, \forall \xi \in \Xi$$

$$x_{a,\xi}^{rs} \geq 0, \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A}, r \in R, s \in S, \xi \in \Xi$$

$$v_{a,\xi} \geq 0, \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \xi \in \Xi$$

$$q_{\xi}^{rs} \geq 0, \quad \forall r \in R, s \in S, \xi \in \Xi.$$

Solution strategy

EQUILIBRIUM

$$\sum_{i \in I_s} g_{i, \xi}^s - \sum_{r \in R} e^{rs} q_{\xi}^{rs} = 0, \forall s \in S, \xi \in \Xi$$

SCHEME

Decompose individual agents' problems using

PROGRESSIVE HEDGING ALGORITHM

Decompose the equivalent state-defined equilibrium problem using

ADMM ALGORITHM



General formulation

AGENT PROBLEM

$$(x_0^i, x_{1,\xi}^i) \in \operatorname{argmin} F(x) := \left(f_0^i(x_0^i) + \mathbb{E} \{ f_{1,\xi}^i(x_{1,\xi}^i) \} \right)$$

PROGRESSIVE HEDGING $\forall \xi \in \Xi$

$$(x_{0,\xi}^i, x_{1,\xi}^i) \in \operatorname{argmin} \left\{ f_0^i(x_{0,\xi}^i) + f_{1,\xi}^i(x_{1,\xi}^i) + \langle \omega_\xi^i, x_{0,\xi}^i \rangle + \frac{\rho^{PH}}{2} \|x_{0,\xi}^i - \bar{x}_{0,\cdot}^i\|_2^2 \right\}$$

Remark

The market clearing conditions of the EV-charging station infrastructure planning problem only depend on the second stage variables.

Incorporating representative agent and ADMM decomposition

Combining the ADMM approach to the decompose individual problem:

Step 0. Initialize the algorithm, $\bar{x}^{i,0}$, $\varrho_{PH} > 0$, $\varrho_{ADMM} > 0$, w_ξ^i, y_ξ^0 .

Step 1. For every agent i , and every scenario ξ solves

$$\begin{aligned} (x_{0,\xi}^{i,v+1}, x_{1,\xi}^{i,v+1}) \in \operatorname{argmin} \{ & f_0^i(x_0) + f_{1,\xi}^i(x_1) \\ & + \langle \omega_\xi^{i,v}, x_0 \rangle + \frac{\varrho_{PH}}{2} \|x_0^i - \bar{x}_{0,\cdot}^{i,v}\|_2^2 \\ & + \langle y_\xi^{i,v}, x_1 \rangle + \frac{\varrho_{ADMM}}{2} \|x_1 - x_{1,\xi}^{i,v} + \bar{x}_{1,\xi}^{i,v}\|_2^2 \} \end{aligned}$$

Step 2. Update the multipliers

$$\begin{aligned} y_\xi^{v+1} &= y_\xi^v + \varrho_{ADMM} \bar{x}_{1,\xi}^{i,v+1} \\ \omega_\xi^{i,v+1} &= \omega_\xi^{i,v} + \varrho_{PH} (x_{0,\xi}^{i,v+1} - \bar{x}_{0,\cdot}^{i,v+1}) \end{aligned}$$

Numerical example

Preliminary example

Network Sioux-Falls

Charging station Nodes 6,12,17,22.



Scenarios We consider $|\Xi| = 20$ scenarios

Parameters Consumers' utility function $\beta_0 = 0.0, \beta_1 = 1, \beta_2 = 0.0,$
 $\beta_3 = 0.06.$

Demand $d_\xi = 100 + \xi, \xi \in [0, 2]$

Stochastic Equilibrium Problem

└ Stochastic version



The end

Thank you for your attention
Questions?

Articles

(in progress) *Facility Location in a Competitive and Stochastic Market: incorporating complex user-network interactions*, Deride, J., Fan, Y, Guo, Z.
(2016) *Infrastructure Planning for Fast Charging Stations in a Competitive Market*, Deride, J., Fan, Y, Guo, Z., Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies. vol.68, pp.215-227.



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