



Exceptional service in the national interest

CUAS Security Performance Metrics and Requirements

Presented by: JR Russell

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



EXAMPLE OF FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY SYSTEM



OUTLINE



- Sandia's Mission and Background in Physical Security
- Design Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO)
- CUAS Requirements
- Security Performance Metrics – Performance Based
- CUAS Requirements – Based On Performance Metrics
- Analysis of Ability to Meet Requirements
- CUAS Security Requirements- A balance of security risks vs legal/policy risks



SANDIA'S HISTORY

- July 1945: Los Alamos creates Z Division
- Nonnuclear civil engineering
- November 1, 1946: Sandia Laboratory established

Exceptional service in the national interest



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1949

Dear Mr. Wilson:

I am informed that the Atomic Energy Commission intends to ask that the Bell Telephone Laboratories accept under contract the direction of the Sandia Laboratory at Albuquerque, New Mexico.

This operation, which is a vital segment of the atomic energy program, is of extreme importance and urgency in the national defense, and should have the best possible technical direction.

I hope that after you have heard more in detail from the Atomic Energy Commission, your organization will find it possible to undertake this task. In my opinion you have here an opportunity to render an exceptional service in the national interest.

I am writing a similar note direct to Dr. O. E. Buckley.

Very sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Leroy A. Wilson,
President,
American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
195 Broadway,
New York 7, N. Y.

to undertake this task. In my opinion you have here an opportunity to render an exceptional service in the national interest.







SANDIA'S PHYSICAL SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE (PSCOE) MISSION

Provide physical security system designs and technologies for the protection of nuclear weapons, material, and other high consequence assets.



- 50+ years of Department of Defense and Department of Energy support
- Over 1 Billion executed for DOE and DoD over the last decade

DESIGN AND EVALUATION PROCESS OUTLINE (DEPO)




ESTABLISH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS

What are you trying to protect?

- Facility?
- People?
- Mission?
- Materials?
- Reputation/Image?



The same process/questions

ESTABLISH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS

What is the threat?

Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)


- How Big?
- How Fast?
- How High/Low?
- How Many?
- Type of Navigation?

What can they carry?

- Imagers
- Explosives
- Chem/Bio
- People?
- Other?



Photo: UlrichHeither
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
The same process/questions used for Physical Security

ESTABLISH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS

What are the physics based constraints?

- Line of Sight –
Terrain/Buildings/Foliage
- Sensor Phenomenology
- Assessment Phenomenology
- Neutralization Phenomenology
- Weather – Fog, Snow, ...
- Human Response Time




The same process/questions used for Physical Security

ESTABLISH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS

What are the non-physics based constraints?

- Policy/Legal
- What kind of Legal Risk (liability) are you willing to accept?
- What kind of Security Risks are you willing to accept?
 - Loss of life
 - Loss of mission
 - Loss of materials
- What kind of Consequences are you willing to accept?
- Technology Maturity
- Political/Public Perception
- **Cost**




The same process/questions used for Physical Security

CUAS KEY PERFORMANCE METRICS

TEST RESULTS USED TO DESIGN THE SYSTEM

- Sensing Presence of a Potential Intruder
 - Probability of Sense (P_S)
 - Sensing Range (R_S)
 - Nuisance Alarm Rate (NAR)
- Assessing Cause of Alarm
 - Probability of Assessment (P_A)
 - Assessment Range (R_A)
 - Assessment Time -- (T_A)
- Neutralizing Intruder
 - Probability of Neutralization (P_N)
 - Neutralization Range (R_N)
 - Neutralization Time (T_A)



NOTIONAL EXAMPLE OF CUAS SCENARIO AND TEST METRICS

Is this Far Enough?

Is the CUAS fast enough?

When does policy and ConOps allow you to respond?

Asset

Sensor

Neutralize

Assess

Sense

Track

Track

P_N, R_N, T_N

P_A, R_A, T_A

P_S, R_S

Side View




ESTIMATED FROM EMPIRICAL DATA

$$P_D \cong P_S * P_A$$
$$P_e \cong P_D * P_N$$

- $P_S = .9$ at a range of 1000m: threat, daylight, good weather
- $P_A = .8$ at a range of 500m: threat, daylight, good weather
- $P_N = .9$ at a range of 300m: threat, daylight, good weather
 - $T_N = 60$ seconds


$$P_e \cong (.7)(.9) \cong .6$$

Is this good enough?




ANALYZE THE DESIGN

IS IT GOOD ENOUGH?




RESULTS – COMPARISON ACROSS TECHNOLOGIES


Radar/Camera Based Detection/Assessment Systems
with RF Jamming (Example = CUAS 1)



RF Sensing/Detection Systems with RF Jamming (Example = CUAS 2)



VULNERABILITY/DEGRADATION TESTING



KEY CUAS SECURITY

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS

- Sensing Presence of a Potential Intruder
 - Probability of Sense (P_S)
 - Sensing Range (R_S)
 - Nuisance Alarm Rate (NAR)
- Assessing Cause of Alarm
 - Probability of Assessment (P_A)
 - Assessment Range (R_A)
 - Assessment Time -- (T_A)
- Probability of Detection (P_D)
- Neutralizing Intruder
 - Probability of Neutralization (P_N)
 - Neutralization Range (R_N)
 - Neutralization Time (T_N)



Security Systems Effectiveness (P_e)



HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

