



# Electrical Energy Storage Participation in the NYISO Electricity and Frequency Regulation Markets

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## Background

- NYISO restructured its “Regulation and Frequency Response Service” in June 2013 to comply with FERC Order 755
- After restructuring a regulation resource is required to submit two-part Bids:
  - A **Regulation Capacity Bid** indicating the MW and \$/MW it makes available to NYISO
  - A **Regulation Movement Bid** indicating the price (\$/MW) for each MW of Regulation Movement it can provide when instructed
- With the two Bids the NYISO creates a Composite Bid Price:

$$B^{\text{reg}} = B^{\text{cap}} + M_{\text{RM}} B^{\text{mov}}$$

- Idea is to prevent incentives for expensive movement offers and low capacity offers

- Reg. movement multiplier: a factor that relates the actual Regulation Capacity with the actual Regulation Movement. It is computed based on historical data. The current value (2018) is 13. Same for all participating resources
- Regulation Performance Index:** measures the accuracy of regulating resources
- Regulation Performance Charge:** for resources responding *poorly* to the AGC signal
  - Charge is based on the Regulation Capacity that was not provided plus 10%

Note, in the Day-Ahead Market:

- There is NO Regulation Movement Scheduled
- There is NO Regulation Movement Clearing Price

## EES in the NYISO Market

- Objective:** Determine maximum potential revenue from participation in arbitrage and arbitrage + regulation **Day-Ahead Market** for the NYISO

For arbitrage the optimization problem:

State of charge subject to:

$$S_{i+1} = \eta_s S_i + \eta_c q_i^r - q_i^d \quad \underline{S} \leq S_i \leq \bar{S} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{T}$$

Objective function

$$\max_{q^d, q^r} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{T}} [(\lambda_i - C_d) q_i^d - (\lambda_i + C_r) q_i^r] e^{-Ri} \quad 0 \leq q_i^r + q_i^d \leq \bar{Q} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{T}$$

For arbitrage and regulation the optimization problem:

State of charge

$$S_{i+1} = \eta_s S_i + \eta_c q_i^r - q_i^d + \eta_c \delta_i^{\text{rd}} q_i^{\text{reg}} - \delta_i^{\text{ru}} q_i^{\text{reg}}$$

Objective function in the Day-Ahead Market

$$\max_{q^d, q^r, q^{\text{reg}}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{T}} [\lambda_i (q_i^d - q_i^r + \delta_i^{\text{ru}} q_i^{\text{reg}} - \delta_i^{\text{rd}} q_i^{\text{reg}}) + \lambda_i^{\text{cap}} (q_i^{\text{reg}} - 1.1(1 - \gamma_i) q_i^{\text{reg}})]$$

subject to:

$$\underline{S} \leq S_i \leq \bar{S} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$0 \leq q_i^r + q_i^d + q_i^{\text{reg}} \leq \bar{Q} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{T}$$

Table 1: Parameters of Energy Storage Market Participation Model

Decision Variables		Units
$q_i^r$	Energy recharged in period $i$	MWh
$q_i^d$	Energy discharged in period $i$	MWh
$q_i^{\text{reg}}$	Energy used for regulation in period $i$	MWh
$S_i$	State of charge in period $i$	MWh
Storage Parameters		Units
$\bar{S}$	Max. energy storage capacity	MWh
$\bar{Q}$	Energy charged/dischARGE rating (in one period)	MWh
$\underline{S}$	Min. energy storage capacity	MWh
$\eta_s$	Self-discharge efficiency	%/h
$\eta_c$	Round trip efficiency	%
Market Parameters		Units
$\lambda_i$	Electricity price in period $i$	\$/MWh
$\lambda_i^{\text{cap}}$	Regulation capacity price in period $i$	\$/MWh
$\lambda_i^{\text{mov}}$	Regulation movement price in period $i$	\$/MWh
$\beta_i$	Movement in period $i$	-
$\delta_i^{\text{ru}}$	Fraction of regulation up used in period $i$	-
$\delta_i^{\text{rd}}$	Fraction of regulation down used in period $i$	-
$\gamma_i$	Performance index in period $i$	-
$R$	Interest/discount rate	-

## Results

Revenue by stream for the NYISO, CAPITL load zone for the case of arbitrage plus frequency regulation. Year 2017.






TABLE I: ESR Parameters


Parameter	Value
$\bar{S}$	5 MWh
$\bar{Q}$	20 MWh
$\underline{S}$	0 MWh
$\eta_s$	98 %/h
$\eta_c$	85 %
$\gamma$	0.95



RCP for the NYISO, CAPITL load zone for 2017. Note the seasonality.



LMPs for the NYISO, NORTH and LONGIL load zones for 2017. LONGIL has the highest prices while NORTH has the lowest.



2017 yearly revenue for the arbitrage plus regulation case for different NYISO load zones as a function of the performance index.

