

Future directions for C/S technologies and approaches – a working group discussion



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PRESENTED BY

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
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SAND2019-

- Seals
- Tags
- Tamper-Indicating Enclosures
- C/S Applications to New Facilities
- Surveillance Systems
- Unattended Systems
- New technologies

- Currently deployed seals:
 - Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) (being phased out)
 - Active fiber loop seal
 - Physically-attached verification
 - Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA)
 - Active fiber loop seal
 - Seal data collected wirelessly and transferred via Internet to HQ
 - Metal Cup (looking for replacement)
 - Single use, passive seal
 - Cobra Seal
 - Single use, passive seal
 - Ultrasonic Sealing Bolt (USSB)
 - Ideal for harsh environments

Pictures from left to right:
EOSS and reader (courtesy
Mirion), RMSA seal (courtesy
SNL), metal cup (courtesy SNL),
Cobra (courtesy SNL)



Seals


- Upcoming seals:
 - Glass Seal (mitigation underway)
 - Active Optical Loop Seal (AOLS)
 - Active fiber seal with wireless verification
 - New IAEA-developed electronic seal
- Where are the new advances in seals?
 - Materials
 - Operator-applied
 - Electronics – crypto-processors, potted electronics, what else?



Glass Seal, IAEA

Tags or unique identifiers

- Reflective Particle Tag (RPT) – not used for safeguards typically, but has been demonstrated in arms control exercises
- Ultrasonic – studied by JRC, Ispra for unique identifying copper canisters (by adding chamfers inside canisters)
- Laser surface authentication – uses unique surface properties of materials as a signature
- Electronic identifiers
- New approaches?
 - Materials
 - Digitizing analog phenomenon (lava lamps)
 - What else?



RPT, SNL

Tamper-indicating enclosures

- Existing
 - Anodized aluminum enclosures
 - Active, conductive foils or fibers surrounding electronics
 - Eddy current for metal containers (external verification equipment)
- Current R&D
 - Bleeding materials
- New approaches?
 - Materials
 - Active approaches through fiber optics or conductive pathways
 - External verification equipment?
 - What else?

C/S approaches at new facility types

- Geological repositories
- Floating reactors
- What else?

- Current:
 - NGSS
- Under consideration:
 - NNGSS
- New approaches?
 - Imaging outside the visible region of electromagnetic spectrum, i.e. UV or SWIR
 - What would these provide us?
 - Assembly of COTS-only components
 - Improving mean time between failure of components, or considering new philosophies?
 - Battery improvements?
 - Sensor fusion (i.e., parallel systems such as NGSS and SWIR camera)
 - What else?



- Current:
 - Lots of radiation detection systems
- Under consideration:
 - Unknown
- New approaches?
 - Cryptography (quantum computing)
 - Blockchain
 - Internet of things (IOT)
 - Sensor fusion, sensor integration
 - 5G/6G
 - Automation
 - Artificial Intelligence

New technologies

- Cryptography (quantum computing)
- Potted electronics
- Blockchain
- Internet of things (IOT)
- Automation
- Artificial Intelligence
- Infinite/long living batteries
- Sensor fusion, sensor integration
- 5G/6G
- Material research
- Battery improvements