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SAND2019-5076C

Trusting Embedded Hardware and Software in Treaty Verification Systems




PRESENTED BY
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2 Trusting Hardware and Software in Disarmament Verification Equipment

Treaty verification includes:




Certification: the process by which the **host** gains confidence in equipment

- Safety
- Security
- Information security


Authentication: the process by which the **monitor** gains confidence in equipment

- Data is correct
- Data is complete


3 System Development Cycle



4 Functional Comparisons



5 Functional Comparisons




PCB = Printed Circuit Board


6 Exact Comparisons




7 Exact Comparisons




8 Exact Comparisons



9 Evaluating Functional Comparisons



Evaluating Functional Comparisons



11 Recommendations

Functional comparison methods should be adapted from other industries, such as hardware error control in the integrated circuit industry.

Authentication and certification methods should be researched and developed alongside treaty verification equipment.

These two areas of R&D could be pursued as inter-organization, or international, collaborations.