



Sandia  
National  
Laboratories

SAND2019-2648C

# A SUNNY RESILIENT ENERGY FUTURE



PRESENTED BY

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
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




*"Early morning shot of Hurricane #Joaquin from @space\_station before reaching #Bahamas. Hope all is safe. #YearInSpace" Scott Kelly, 10/2/2015.*

*Image Credit: NASA*













PV deployment  
has come a  
long way...

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...but none of these  
systems work during a grid  
outage!



# PV Eras




We are here, and solar is ready to play major role.

Flexible demand and storage enable a solar powered future



Birkenstock Era



Chicken Little Era



Essential Reliability Era



Mudskipper Era



Super Inverter Era



Grand Bargain Era



RELIABILITY


99.97%

*What would it cost add another “9” of reliability?*












Reliability focuses on average system performance, skips large-scale events, and does not consider consequences...



Histogram of Customer Minutes Interrupted, Selected Causes




Customer Minutes Interrupted (Filter)


0 to 2000





## Large-scale events becoming more frequent...




















“You don’t really know better until you do better.”

Existing grid planning framework does not effectively deal with high-consequence events, even if those that are likely!

SQUIRRELS	
NATURAL DISASTERS	
PHYSICAL ATTACK/THEFT	
CYBER ATTACK	
INSIDER THREAT/ CATASTROPHIC HUMAN ERROR	
COORDINATED PHYSICAL & CYBER ATTACK	
SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTION OR COMPROMISE	
PANDEMICS	
GEOMAGNETIC DISTURBANCE	
DIRECT ENERGY WEAPON	
CBR ATTACK	
HIGH-ALTITUDE EMP	
NUCLEAR	



# Resilience can be considered an extension of Reliability...



## Resilience


Includes Reliability concepts, but also **low probability, high consequence** events.

Not widely adopted for grid infrastructure investment. Need new **methods, metrics and tools**

## Reliability


Focuses on system performance with respect to **commonly expected events** (component failure, etc.)

**Widely adopted** for infrastructure investment decision-making.





# Defining Resilience



Ability to **Prepare for, Withstand and Recover** from disruptions caused by major **Accidents, Attacks, or Natural Disasters.**



# What problem are we trying to solve?

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Improve resilience of the whole grid

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Improve resilience of infrastructure that supports critical services at selected locations



# A consequence-based view of Resilience




Measure	Examples of Resilience Metrics
<b>Economics</b>	Gross Municipal Product / Net Economic Losses
	Change in Capital Wealth
	Business Interruption Costs
<b>People and Community</b>	Number of People Without Basic Services
	Lives at Risk
	Societal Burden to Acquire Services



*Image Credit: REUTERS / S. Stapleton*




# A Resilience Planning Framework



# Resilience Analysis using Economic and Community Metrics



## Norfolk, VA




	100yr+0ft	100yr+1.5ft	100yr+3.0ft
Annual Direct Losses	\$135 M	\$182 M	\$231 M
Annual Indirect Losses	\$219 M	\$296 M	\$375 M
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$354 M</b>	<b>\$478 M</b>	<b>\$606 M</b>

## San Juan, PR

Total burden to acquire food for a random 34-microgrid portfolio

$$B_C = \sum_{inf} \sum_{pop} \frac{E_{inf,pop}}{A_{pop}}$$




Food Burden

- (0.289,0.435]
- (0.435,0.579]
- (0.579,0.724]
- (0.724,0.868]
- (0.868,1.01]
- (1.01,1.16]
- (1.16,1.3]
- (1.3,1.44]
- (1.44,1.59]


Social  
Burden








Total burden to acquire food for a

$$B_C = \sum_{inf} \sum_{pop} \frac{E_{it}}{A}$$



Social Burden






# Energy Resilience – A Case for PV \*

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- ☐ Rugged, dependable
- ☐ Modular, scalable, portable
- ☐ Fuel available onsite, everywhere
- ☐ **And** generates value all the time!

\* As part of a grid-tied microgrid with storage and/or other fuel, depending on the application.







Hybrid microgrid supporting US Army's  
Ft Carson in Colorado Springs, CO





Large hybrid microgrid supporting rail and ferry transportation in Newark, NJ (under development)







*Image Credit: Green Mountain Power*

PV + Storage Microgrid supporting community resilience in Rutland, VT





Image Credit: Eos Energy Storage

PV + Storage Microgrid for a water treatment facility in Cardwell, NJ



# Necessary Institutional and Technical Considerations



Resilience-based  
planning methods



Advanced power  
electronics: Grid-tied  
grid-forming inverters



New regulatory &  
business models



Advanced grid  
architectures: Dynamic,  
Networked microgrids



Proactive codes  
and standards



Resilience by Design:  
Built-in Physical and  
Cyber Security

# What problem will we solve with a large fleet of PV-based resilient microgrids?

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Improve resilience of the whole grid

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
Improve resilience of infrastructure that supports critical services at selected locations

Pop Quiz, Reframed



Bonus: access to a vastly larger market for solar!





## Closing Argument

- ❑ Planning for resilience is an imperative
- ❑ Need practical methods, models, tools
- ❑ Solar can and must play a key role
- ❑ Time to think really big:

***Solar can indeed enable a sunny  
and resilient energy future!***