

# Security Enhancements to the Leksell GammaKnife®

A collaborative project between the  
Office of Radiological Security and Elekta Instrument AB

Per Kjäll, Michal Kuca



IAEA, Vienna, 3-7 December 2018

International Conference on Security of Radioactive Material

Contribution ID :138



# Agenda

- Background
- Project Overview
- Design Challenges
- As-built Security Solution
- Project Experience

# ORS and IDD

- The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security (ORS) works with governments, law enforcement, and businesses across the globe to protect radioactive sources.
- The In-Device Delay (IDD) program supports ORS's Protect mission.
  - Partners with manufacturers to incorporate engineered security enhancements into device or facility designs that will make illicit removal of sources difficult.
  - Incorporate detection components as well as delay where possible to increase time for local law enforcement to respond.
  - Existing devices/facilities retrofitted with enhancements; new devices/facilities incorporate enhancements into manufacturing process.

**IDD provides substantial delay time against an adversary that attempts to remove the source from the device, thus buying time for off-site responders to arrive at the site to contain the adversary.**

- Manufacturer of equipment to treat tumor diseases and brain disorders
- Focus areas:
  - Radiation therapy
  - Brachytherapy
  - Stereotactic radiosurgery
- Leksell GammaKnife®
  - Utilizes Co-60 for stereotactic radiosurgery
  - Treats disorders and tumor diseases in the brain



# The Project

- Initial engagement in 2010
  - Nondisclosure Agreement
  - Requirements Specification Development
  - Vulnerability Assessment
  - Design and Testing
  - Implementation
- Design Objectives:
  - Access Delay
  - Intrusion Detection
  - Meet or exceed potential adversary capability
  - Ability to re-load sources periodically
  - Patient and staff safety
  - Clinical throughput

# Design Challenges

- LGK is required to conform to applicable medical standards and requirements
  - Security solution cannot interfere with these requirements
  - i.e. Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
- Must not effect device maintenance and service
- Device must be accessible at all times during treatment
- High patient treatment throughput

# System Design

- Security system design is proprietary however...
- Delay enhancements cover most likely points of access
  - Delay hardware exceeds design goal
  - Increases time required for source reloading however within acceptable design limits
- Detection solution integrated into delay components
- Utilized common physical security design principles
  - Detection before delay
  - Defense in Depth
  - Layered Approach
- Removed elements that might aid adversary

# Implementation

- Some design modifications made at the factory
- Delay and detection elements installed at licensee (end user) site during:
  - Initial Device Commissioning
  - Source Re-loading
  - Maintenance/Service visits
- Intrusion detection elements integrated into medical facility alarm system
  - Coded as critical alarm
  - Staff/response training

- Pilot installations started in 2016
- ~60% of all eligible LGKs in U.S. completed
  - Some LGKs upgraded in Europe

# Lessons Learned

- Elekta/ORS needed to agree on Potential Adversary Capability (PAC)
- Ensure device compliance is not violated
- Inclusion of all stakeholders (especially end users) is critical
- Requirements Specification
- Run security design through desktop simulations
- Pilot installations provided valuable data:
  - Logistics
  - Technician training
  - Coordination with end users and response entities

# Questions