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Title: (U) Introduction to Weapon Systems and Pits

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(U) Introduction to Weapon Systems and Pits

Unclassified Briefing

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Based from:
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Classified by: Adam Farrow, Manufacturing Manager
(Name and Title)

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(Guide, Date, Originating Agency)

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- Dwight Jaeger pulled the weapons and NWC slides together for a tutorial for previous students and they are an excellent overview of these subjects
- Doug Kautz and Adam Farrow did a tutorial for PSM and SMS Student Programs

Section 1

Production Complex

Nuclear Testing

Delivery Systems

Requirements

Nuclear Weapons and The Weapons Complex have Undergone a Great Evolution Since 1945



“Fat Man” Implosion Bomb
~10,300 lbs



B83 Modern Strategic Bomb
Megaton-Class



1945
Los Alamos + 2 plants




Peak Complex
~50 sites



Today
8 sites


Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) in 1942



September 1942

Oak Ridge*

(Enriched Uranium)



November 1942

Los Alamos

(Design and Production)

December 1942


Hanford

(Plutonium)




Scientists began arriving in March 1943

The Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Today



The U.S. Conducted 1054 Nuclear Tests



(July 1945 – September 1992)

Nevada Test Site - 62 tests had simultaneous detonations
Rifle, Colorado - 1 test had a simultaneous detonation

Location	Number of Tests	Number of Detonations
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Total South Atlantic	3	3
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
Bikini	23	23
Christmas Island	24	24
Enewetak	43	43
Johnston Island	12	12
Pacific	4	4
Total Pacific	106	106

Alamogordo, New Mexico	1	1
Amchitka, Alaska	3	3
Carlsbad, New Mexico	1	1
Central Nevada	1	1
Fallon, Nevada	1	1
Farmington, New Mexico	1	1
Grand Valley, Colorado	1	1
Hattiesburg, Mississippi	2	2
Nellis Air Force Range	5	5
Rifle, Colorado	1	3
Total Other	17	19

Atmospheric	100	100
Underground	828	921
Total NTS	928	1,021


TOTAL	1,054	1,149
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Weapon Types and Numbers have Dramatically Decreased Since 1989



Nuclear Tests Have Been Conducted for Many Purposes

Purpose	Detonations
Joint US-UK	24
Plowshare	35
Safety Experiment	88
Storage-Transportation	4
Vela Uniform	7
Weapons Effects	100
Weapons Related	891
TOTAL DETONATIONS	1,149



Nuclear Weapons are Complex Devices, Requiring a Broad Range of Engineering and Scientific Expertise

- Nuclear Explosive Package
- Radars
- Impact Fuzes
- Shock absorbers
- Casing
- Detonators
- Firing sets
- Transverters
- Capacitors
- Switches
- Switch tubes
- Rectifiers
- Programmers
- Neutron generators
- Reservoirs
- Stronglinks
- Batteries
- Timers
- Spin generators
- Parachutes
- Ejector systems
- PAL controllers



B83 Strategic Bomb - Total parts = 6,519



Science and Technology Foundations

MATERIALS
AND PROCESSES

COMPUTATIONAL
SCIENCES

DYNAMIC MATERIALS -
HYDRODYNAMICS

MICROELECTRONICS

ENGINEERING
SCIENCES

The NNSA has recaptured the technology to manufacture and certify Pits at LANL



Coater




Plutonium Glove Box

The manufacture and certification of the Pits represents a microcosm of the entire Stockpile Stewardship Program

Stockpile Refurbishments Require Modern Technologies and Components

Several factors prevent us from rebuilding the stockpile in exactly the same manner that the original weapons were built.

For example:



Sunset electronics no longer are available




High-reliability, weapon-specific processes are no longer available



Original materials are no longer acceptable (e.g., carcinogenic epoxies)

The Real Issue is People




Years of highly developed techniques and acquired skills are lost or disappearing

- Plutonium Processing
- Welding and Brazing
- Special Polymers
- High Explosives


Without the integrated test (UGT), knowing how to replace and certify “irreplaceable” parts is a major challenge

- Sunset technologies
- Loss of Vendors
- ESH restrictions



Testing Capabilities and Activities for Reliability

Drop Tower



Centrifuge



B-2 & B61-11



Mechanical Insult



Electrohydraulic
Shaker



Sled Track

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Nuclear Delivery Systems

W80, B61, B83



B52H



W80

ALCM

B61



F15E

B61




F16

B61



F35

B61



B2

W76, W88



D5

Trident

W78, W87



MM III

B61





P200

B83

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How are Requirements Established?

Requirements flow from the MCs and STS




Requirements Validation

- Interpret requirements at system level
- Translate requirements to component level

Systematic Review

- Full System
- Subsystems
- Components



Requirements	Qualification by:		
	Test	Modeling	Model Valid. Test
Reliability			
Vibration	X	X	
Shock	X	X	
Temperature	X	X	
Etc.			
Safety			
Drop	X	X	X
Crush	X	X	X
Impact	X	X	X
Fire	X	X	X
Etc.			
Surety			X


Qualification Method Decision

Test vs Modeling (or Other) decision tradeoff

Qualification Plan Goal

An integrated program of testing and modeling that in a cost and time efficient manner:

1. Qualifies against all requirements
2. Minimizes design risks
3. Understands failure modes
4. Estimates design margins



“Warhead Certification with Confidence”

Section 2

Nuclear Explosive Package


The Pit

Gloveboxes


Surveillance

What is a NEP?

- A Nuclear Explosive Package (NEP) includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components
 - The Primary is an assembly of chemical explosives around a nuclear core (The Pit)
- The Pit (nuclear core) starts at a sub-critical state, and using explosives is quickly driven to a critical state
- The NEP is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield
- The NEP converts energy through various forms (electrical, chemical, mechanical, & nuclear) to produce blast overpressure



What is a Pit?



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The Pit

- The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to nuclear energy
- Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility:
 - Casting
 - Forming
 - Machining
 - Welding
 - Assembly

- Some of the materials used in pits include:
 - Plutonium
 - Uranium
 - Encapsulation Materials (Non-Nuclear)
- Processing of Plutonium and other hazardous materials occurs in Gloveboxes

Why Use Gloveboxes?

Gloveboxes are used for four reasons:

- Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides
 - Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides
 - While not the “Most dangerous material in the world” of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled
- Protect plutonium from chemical/nuclear reactions
 - Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen
 - As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control
 - As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product
 - Gloveboxes also help provide inherent spacing between quantities of material (criticality safety)
- Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: α , γ , and η are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as ^{241}Am and ^{238}Pu
- Provide security and control of the material

How Do We Ensure Stockpile Viability?

- The NNSA has a Stockpile Surveillance program to support the Annual Assessment
- Various major components from weapons are disassembled and sent to their plant of origin (or the plant that now controls that production mission) for testing and analysis
- Major components:
 - Pits: LANL and SRS
 - Detonators: LANL
 - Secondaries: Y-12
 - Neutron Generators: Sandia
 - Main Charge Explosives: Pantex
 - Electronics/Guidance: NSC
 - Gas Transfer Systems: NSC

Nondestructive Testing for Pit Surveillance

- Several nondestructive tests are performed on pits upon arrival at LANL
- These include:
 - Buoyancy-corrected weighing
 - Gas sampling and analysis
 - Radiography
 - Leak testing
 - Dye penetrant testing
 - Ultrasonic testing
 - Dimensional inspection






Figure 6. Radiography of the welded join.



Summary

- Hopefully this presentation has given you a clearer picture of how our mission fits into the big picture.
- Nuclear weapons and our work here is important both militarily and politically.
- The bottom line from a world perspective – Deterrence works.