Russia-U.S. Joint Program on the Safe Management of Nuclear Materials: Approaches to Prioritizing the Lab to Lab Project
The U.S. and Russian weapons dismantlement process is producing hundreds of tons of excess plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) fissile materials. The nuclear operations associated with the final disposition of these materials will be occurring in both countries for decades. A significant accident during these operations could delay the disposition process. Russia- U.S. collaborative efforts to address safety issues associated with disposition processes have been ongoing since 1993. The experience of these collaborative efforts have demonstrated the need for a systematic and formalized approach to identifjring and prioritizing collaborative projects. A systematic approach to the successfid implementation of a formal program will require the definition of year by year program objectives, specific technical program areas, a process for the prioritization and selection of projects, and identification of performance measures to evaluate the success of projects. Specialized working groups established for each technical area are needed to define research priorities, review research proposals, and recommend proposals for tiding. A systematic approach to the establishment of a formal U.S.-Russia cooperative program will serve to ensure the safety and continuity of disposition processes and reduce the nuclear proliferation risks presented by this material. The U.S. and Russian weapons dismantlement process is producing hundreds of tons of excess plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) fissile materials. The U.S. and Russia are both converting and blending HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in existing reactors. Russia also plans to fiel reactors with excess Pu. The U.S. is on a two-path approach for the disposition of excess Pu: (1) use of Pu in existing reactors and/or (2) immobilization of the Pu in glass or ceramics followed by geologic disposal. The fissile nuclear materials storage, handling, processing, and transportation processes associated with the disposition process will be occurring in both countries for decades. A significant accident at any point in the process could significantly delay the disposition process. Russia-U.S. collaborative efforts to address safety issues associated with nuclear processes required for the disposition of excess weapons grade nuclear materials were initiated in response to the 1993 Tomsk-7 accident. A joint Russia-U.S. team evaluated the causes of an explosion in a nuclear fuel reprocessing tank at the Tomsk-7.
- Research Organization:
- Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC04-94AL85000
- OSTI ID:
- 1546
- Report Number(s):
- SAND98-1507C; ON: DE00001546
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: NATO Advanced Research Workshop Nuclear Materials Safety II: St. Petersburg, Russia; 06/08-10/1998
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Russia-U.S. joint program on the safe management of nuclear materials
Advanced research workshop: nuclear materials safety