




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# Unique Signatures from Printed Circuit Board Design Patterns and Surface Mount Passives

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U.S. Patent Pending 15/624,907 "Authenticating a Printed Circuit Board"




U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
ENERGY



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# Research Gap


- Globalization in supply chains of electronics has increased concerns of counterfeits and malicious modifications
- Challenge is how to detect & prevent tampering and counterfeiting, and determine electrical system authenticity
- Current manufacturing tests do not account for authenticity
- Existing work and mitigations:
  - Silicon-based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF)
  - Tamper prevention/detection enclosures
  - Cryptographic algorithms (hardware/software)
- Gap: approaches do not address the whole electronic system



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**Malicious** circuit board  
with ability to manipulate  
data, control, system




**Counterfeit** circuit board or components

# Our Approach

- Determine feasibility of using:
  - Printed circuit board wire trace design patterns for unique signatures
  - Discrete surface mount passive components for unique signatures
- Leverage existing design tools and manufacturing processes
- Identify low-cost sampling and signature generation techniques
- Bound the sampling and analysis problem to COTS components and techniques that can be quickly/easily adopted

# Sources of Variation – Circuit Boards




<http://www.4pcb.com/media/building-printed-circuit-board.pdf>

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- Photoresist & Printing resolution
- Etching
- Dielectric layers
- Machining (drilled holes)
- Plating


# Sources of Variation – Passives

## Thin Film Resistor



[http://www.mouser.com/pdfDocs/Yageo\\_R-Chip\\_Resistor.pdf](http://www.mouser.com/pdfDocs/Yageo_R-Chip_Resistor.pdf)

## Multilayer Ceramic Chip Capacitor




<http://www.kemet.com/Lists/TechnicalArticles/Attachments/110/TechTopics%20Vol1No4%20Aug91.PDF>

- Ceramic build-up
- Thermal fusing process
- Laser cutting
- Plating

# Test Boards & Components


SMD components



Wire trace patterns

Components in series and in parallel



# Examples of Wire Trace Design Patterns



- Several patterns include multi-layer routing

# Design of Experiments


- 10 test boards, each had:
  - 16 wiretrace patterns (8 designs)
  - 100 discrete components
  - 9 pairs of components in series
  - 9 pairs of components in parallel
- Component values measured with DMM
- Wire traces: 250kHz steps (0 – 25MHz)
- Measurements:
  - Levels (high and low)
  - Overshoot
  - Rise time
  - Undershoot
  - Skew (rising and falling)



# Building Signatures

- From a collection of  $n$ -measurements:
  - The first  $n/2$  measurements are placed in one set
  - Remaining  $n/2$  measurements in a second set
- Compare each element between sets:
  - ‘1’ if the value from set A is greater than that from set B
  - ‘0’ otherwise.
- Results in an  $(n/2)^2$  bit signature
  - Applies to combination of manufacturers or within same mfg/lot
- Normalize by comparing each measurement to the mean or median of the full set of measurements for that component
- To obtain a signature:
  - Divide the measurements into two sets (A and B)
  - Then XOR each element in A with each element in B
- Can combine wire trace, component or other measurements

# Wire Trace Variation Results



- Intra-board variation - zero is ideal
- Inter-board variation - 50% is ideal

- More traces or tests would increase bitstring size
- Passed all NIST statistical suite for Random and Pseudo Randomness (NIST SP800-22, rev 1A)

*Overlap between intra- and inter-board variation creates a possibility of signature aliasing between distinct boards*


# Wire Trace Variation Results

- Inter-board Hamming Distance for each trace/test (up to 10MHz)
- Design patterns have promising results: near 0.5 in some measurements
- Optimization problem exists:
  - selection of sampling frequencies, measurement types, design pattern, etc.
- Data used in final signatures are highlighted in green

16 Printed Circuit Board Test Structures																
	AV1	AV2	LBRD1	LBRD2	MP1	MP2	S1	S2	SPF1	SPF2	SPV1	SPV2	W1	W2	ZZSQ1	ZZSQ2
<b>Fall Time</b>	0.3542	0.3333	0.2278	0.2139	0.3639	0.3069	0.3556	0.3444	0.1986	0.2361	0.0236	0.0292	0.3389	0.3250	0.3458	0.3250
<b>Levels</b>	0.5125	0.4736	0.1639	0.1931	0.4917	0.5056	0.5042	0.5000	0.2597	0.2750	0.2361	0.3486	0.4944	0.4667	0.4875	0.4958
<b>Overshoot</b>	0.0431	0.0333	0.0236	0.0111	0.0472	0.0583	0.0194	0.0319	0.0181	0.0375	0.0708	0.0681	0.0264	0.0250	0.0417	0.0431
<b>Rise Time</b>	0.3333	0.3542	0.3014	0.2597	0.3514	0.3278	0.3917	0.3750	0.2278	0.2111	0.0139	0.0139	0.3236	0.3347	0.3847	0.3667
<b>Undershoot</b>	0.0778	0.0764	0.0569	0.0486	0.0986	0.1028	0.0708	0.0542	0.0417	0.0347	0.0250	0.0403	0.0972	0.0778	0.0847	0.0736
<b>Skew</b>	0.3208	0.3097	0.1972	0.2000	0.3292	0.3847	0.3958	0.2889	0.1056	0.1167	0.0917	0.0500	0.3750	0.3806	0.2528	0.1889

# Passive Components

- Raw measurement of different manufacturers indicates that process variation of capacitors and resistors might be useful



# Passive Component Results

- Individual manufacturer signatures, median normalized, random set assignments
- High entropy after normalization
- Combining measurements of different component types and values produces longer signatures

Capacitors			
Values	Bias	Entropy	Min Entropy
0.01 $\mu$ F (mfg. 1)	0.50	1	1
0.01 $\mu$ F (mfg. 2)	0.50	1	1
0.01 $\mu$ F (mfg. 3)	0.52	0.9993	0.9556
0.1 $\mu$ F (mfg. 1)	0.57	0.9857	0.8102
0.1 $\mu$ F (mfg. 2)	0.50	1	1
0.1 $\mu$ F (mfg. 3)	0.53	0.9972	0.9125
10 $\mu$ F (mfg. 1)	0.55	0.9937	0.8707
10 $\mu$ F (mfg. 2)	0.50	1	1
10 $\mu$ F (mfg. 3)	0.51	0.9998	0.9776

Resistors			
Value	Bias	Entropy	Min Entropy
1k $\Omega$ (mfg. 1)	0.55	0.9937	0.8707
1k $\Omega$ (mfg. 2)	0.52	0.9993	0.9556
1k $\Omega$ (mfg. 3)	0.50	1	1
10k $\Omega$ (mfg. 1)	0.48	0.9984	0.9339
10k $\Omega$ (mfg. 2)	0.45	0.9937	0.8707
10k $\Omega$ (mfg. 3)	0.48	0.9993	0.9556
100k $\Omega$ (mfg. 1)	0.52	0.9984	0.9339
100k $\Omega$ (mfg. 2)	0.55	0.9937	0.8707
100k $\Omega$ (mfg. 3)	0.50	1	1

# Summary and Applications

- Successful at constructing unique signatures with printed circuit board wire trace patterns and passive components
- Existing design tools and COTS components can be used

## Applications:

- Hardware built-in testing & integrity measurements
- Advanced watermarking to identify electronic system counterfeits
- Basis for challenge-response authentication
- Signature can seed cryptographic key generation
- Ties device security technologies together at system level

# Future Work

- Exploitation of environmental effects on signature variations
  - Passives are extremely susceptible to effects
  - Utilize environment for uniqueness of installation location
- Optimize the measurements per feature:
  - Sampling frequencies, measurement type, design pattern, etc.
- Abstract the best characteristics to provide design guidance to industry