Radiological Exposure Devices (RED) Technical Basis for Threat Profile

Technical Report · Fri Jun 01 00:00:00 EDT 2018

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/1452666· OSTI ID:1452666

Bland, Jesse John ^[1]; Potter, Charles A. ^[1]; Homann, Steven ^[2]

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1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
2. Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

Facilities that manufacture, store or transport significant quantities of radiological material must protect against the risk posed by sabotage events. Much of the analysis of this type of event has been focused on the threat from a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or "dirty bomb" scenario, in which a malicious assailant would, by explosives or other means, loft a significant quantity of radioactive material into a plume that would expose and contaminate people and property. Although the consequences in cost and psychological terror would be severe, no intentional RDD terrorism events are on record. Conversely, incidents in which a victim or victims were maliciously exposed to a Radiological Exposure Device (RED), without dispersal of radioactive material, are well documented. This paper represents a technical basis for the threat profile related to the risk of nefarious use of an RED, including assailant and material characterization. Radioactive materials of concern are detailed in Appendix A.

• Research Organization: Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC04-94AL85000
• OSTI ID: 1452666
• Report Number(s): SAND-2018-6003; 664091
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English