

-----

-----  
-----  
-----

# Locally Operated Cooperative Key Sharing

## LOCKS

Michael Bierma, Aaron Brown, Troy DeLano,  
Thomas M. Kroeger, Howard Poston

# Background


- Increase global TLS traffic 30-40x between 2012 and 2018
- Adversaries increasingly utilize encrypted protocols
- Challenge to network security monitoring
  - Web
  - Email

# TLS

- 3 assurances
  - Integrity
  - Authenticity
  - Privacy
- Explain how the keys work

# Existing Methods

- Man-in-the-middle



# Existing Methods

- Endpoint monitoring
  - Pushing things to the edges


# Existing Methods

- Fixed keys
  - Moving away from this in TLS 1.3

# Moving Forward

- Goals
  - Enable enterprise-scale encrypted traffic DPI
  - No integrity compromise
  - No authentication compromise

# Architecture







# Benefits

- TLS operates as designed
- No need to manage root CA at boundary
- Users can control their keys
- Theoretic efficiency > MITM
- Allows for rich set of enterprise policies

# Evaluation: Browser Latency




(a) 100KB files



(b) 10MB files

# Evaluation: IDS Performance



# Conclusion

- Developed enterprise-scale DPI system for encrypted traffic
- Comparable performance to current solutions
- Provides rich set of enterprise policies
- **Doesn't break TLS**

# Questions

# References

# Test Architecture

