



*Exceptional service in the national interest*



# Fundamental Aspects of Large-Scale Energy Storage System Safety

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Babu Chalamala

Power Sources Conference  
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Sandia National Laboratories

# Energy Storage Safety/Reliability Issues Have Impact Across Multiple Application Sectors



2006 Sony/Dell battery recall  
4.1 million batteries



2008 Navy, \$400M Advanced  
Seal Delivery Sub, Honolulu

2010 FedEx Cargo  
Plane Fire, Dubai



2011 NGK Na/S Battery  
Explosion, Japan (two weeks  
to extinguish blaze)



2011 Chevy Volt Latent Battery  
Fire at DOT/NHTSA Test Facility



2012 Battery Room Fire at  
Kahuku Wind-Energy Storage  
Farm



2012 GM Test Facility  
Incident, Warren, MI



2013 Storage Battery Fire,  
The Landing Mall, Port  
Angeles, (reignited one week  
after being "extinguished")



2013 Boeing Dreamliner Battery  
Fires, FAA Grounds Fleet



2013 Tesla Battery Fires,  
Washington, resulting from a  
highway accident



2013 Fisker Battery Fires, New Jersey,  
in the wake of Super Storm Sandy

# By nature, stored energy can be hazardous

- Potential hazards associated with stored energy couple with inexperience regarding safety and mitigation practices.
  - What are ignition characteristics?
  - What are hazards, both thermal and chemical?
  - What mitigation is appropriate?
- Other stored energy:
  - Chemical energy in fuels.
  - Pumped hydroelectric storage.
- Safety characteristics need to be evaluated; standards and best-practices need to be developed.




JP-8  
pool fire



# The Problem of Scale

- Field failures of single cells are relatively rare
  - Failure rates as low as 1 in several million
- The number of cells used in the transportation and energy storage industries is potentially huge (billions)
- EV and PHEV batteries: 10-50 kWh
- Batteries for stationary storage applications:  $O(\text{MWh})$
- A single cell failure that propagates through the pack could lead to an impact even with very low individual failure rates




[www.nissan.com](http://www.nissan.com)  
[www.internationalbattery.com](http://www.internationalbattery.com)  
[www.samsung.com](http://www.samsung.com)  
[www.saft.com](http://www.saft.com)



# The Grid Energy Storage Safety Challenge

- *Variety of technologies*
- *Proximity to population*
- *Use conditions*
- *Scale and size*
- *Design considerations*
- *System complexity*



## ***Key Challenges:***

Utility safety incidents have highlighted the need for a focused effort in safety

# Much has been done to address potential failure modes

Development of  
Inherently Safe Cells



- Safer cell chemistries
- Non-flammable electrolytes
- Shutdown separators
- Non-toxic battery materials
- Inherent overcharge protection

Safety Devices and  
Systems



- Cell-based safety devices
  - current interrupt devices
  - positive T coefficient
  - Protection circuit module
- Battery management system
- Charging systems designed


Effective Response to  
off-normal Events




- Suppressants
- Containment
- Advanced monitoring and controls

# Battery Abuse Testing Laboratory (BATLab)

- Comprehensive abuse testing platforms for safety and reliability of cells, batteries and systems from mWh to kWh
- Mechanical abuse
  - Penetration
  - Crush
  - Impact
  - Immersion
- Thermal abuse
  - Over temperature
  - Flammability measurements
  - Thermal propagation
  - Calorimetry
- Electrical abuse
  - Overvoltage/overcharge
  - Short circuit
  - Overdischarge/voltage reversal
- Characterization/Analytical Tools
  - X-ray computed tomography
  - Gas analysis
  - Surface characterization
  - Optical/electron microscopy



## 12 Ah (~50 Wh) Cell Overcharge Abuse



### Key Challenges:


- Potential heat release can exceed stored energy.
- Potential cascading failure to other cells

*(Internal temperature limited due to ejection of cell contents)*

**50 Wh cell in 8' containment**  
**50 kWh battery failure -- 50 MWh battery failure?**



Thermal runaway is associated with anode reactions followed by cathode reactions




DSC  
measurements  
from Pete Roth

- DSC and ARC results suggest that the first step involved in thermal abuse is the breakdown of the SEI layer, exposing Li/C to the solvent.
- Further heating leads to oxygen release from cathode and reaction with electrolyte.

# Changing Cathode Chemistry


## ARC of cells with different cathode chemistries



*Changes in material properties: potential to mitigate runaway*

*Differences in runaway enthalpy and reaction kinetics are related to oxygen release from the cathode and the electrolyte combustion*

# Characterizing Thermal Runaway







- *Full cell runaway enthalpy shows a significant amount of heat generation from even an LFP 18650 cell*
- *But that heat is generated at much different rates for the different cell types*

Cell Type	Capacity (Ah)	Runaway Enthalpy (kJ/Ah)		Peak Heating Rate (W/Ah)
		Full Cell	High Rate Region	
LCO 18650*	1.2	28.4	15.9	281
NCA 18650*	1.0	21.6	9.8	266
NMC 18650*	0.95	22.0	8.3	105
LFP 18650*	0.9	18.0	2.4	1
LFP 26650*	2.6	8.2	4.6	65
LFP 26650†	2.6	8.0	4.5	65
*ΔH based on dT (exotherm) †ΔH based on dT/dt (exotherm)				

***Data provide a quantitative measurement of the runaway enthalpy***

# Improving Runaway Response




## NMC/Graphite cells



**Materials choices can be made to improve the runaway response in cells**  
**Reducing runaway enthalpy and kinetics has direct implications in battery system safety**



# Failure Propagation Testing




Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5  
Cell 6 Cell 7 Cell 8 Cell 9 Cell 10

Limited propagation of the single point failure in the 10S1P pack


# Propagation Testing – Series vs Parallel

- Comparing cells in parallel with cells in series (previous slide):
- Opportunity to discharge cell energy through failed cell leads to cascading failure through entire pack.

- Successful initiation at Cell #6
- Propagation to adjacent cells first, followed by outlying cells
- Cascading failure to entire battery over 450s
- Some thermocouples (K-type) saturated during test




# Thermal runaway occurs if heat release exceeds heat losses



- Predicted heating rates based on ARC measurements.
- Higher environment temperature leads to thermal runaway.
- Low temperature degradation occurs in both cases.


# Thermal runaway occurs if heat release exceeds heat losses



- Predicted heating rates based on ARC measurements.



# Thermal runaway occurs if heat release exceeds heat losses




But, if the temperature dependence is strong, sensitivity to scale and heat losses is small.

**Focus mitigation on shallow-sloped regions!**


- Predicted heating rates based on ARC measurements.

# Predicting thermal environments in fire scenario



# Models allow parameter study for large-scale scenarios

## Help determine pack thermal environment.




Three ventilation comparison still shot

# Other hazards of energy storage: Taum Sauk reservoir


- A lesson in our reliance on sensors and apparently simple systems.
- A depth sensor became unmoored from reservoir bottom, giving false depth readings, leading to overfilling reservoir.

450 MW Pumped Storage Project  
Located in Reynolds County, Missouri  
One of the First PSP, Started in 1963  
Licensed by FPC in August 1965  
Owned and Operated by AmerenUE  
Upper Dam is a Continuous Hilltop Dike 6,562 Ft. Long



Taum Sauk – Upper Reservoir Full


Upper Reservoir Water Level Overtopped the Dam  
Upper Reservoir Dam Failed on December 14, 2005



Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Breached



# Battery Safety – Moving toward large-scale storage



## Materials R&D to date:

- Non-flammable electrolytes
- Electrolyte salts
- Coated active materials
- Thermally stable materials


## Materials R&D needs:

- Viable flow batteries
- Aqueous electrolyte batteries
- High specific heat suppressants
- Vent gas composition



## Testing

- Electrical, thermal, mechanical abuse testing
- Failure propagation testing on batteries/systems
- Suppressants and delivery with systems and environments
- Large scale thermal and fire testing (TTC)



## Simulations and Modeling

- Multi-scale models for understanding thermal runaway
- Validating failure propagation models
- Fire dynamic simulations to predict the size, scope, and consequences of battery fires



## Procedures, Policy, and Regulation

- UL 1973-13 Batteries for Use in Stationary Applications
- ANSI/UL 9540-P (ESS Safety)
- UL 1974 (Repurposing)
- IEEE 1635-12 (Ventilation and thermal management)