

# Power Grid Interdiction Using Pyomo

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# Overview

- Research Objective: Scaling and adapting power grid interdiction algorithms to work with a real power grid.
- Teamed with a real utility company.
- Utilized Pyomo & Python to create meaningful results.

# Exact Interdiction Model

- As a baseline, used model from “A Mixed-Integer LP Procedure for the Analysis of Electric Grid Security Under Disruptive Threat” by Motto, Arroyo, and Galiana.

$$\max_{\substack{\delta^{Gen}, \delta^{Line}, \delta^{Bus}, \\ \delta^{Sub}, b, v}} \gamma(\delta^{Gen}, \delta^{Line}, \delta^{Bus}, \delta^{Sub}, b, v) \quad (1)$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_g M_g^{Gen} \delta_g^{Gen} + \sum_{\ell} M_{\ell}^{Line} \delta_{\ell}^{Line} \\ + \sum_i M_i^{Bus} \delta_i^{Bus} + \sum_s M_s^{Sub} \delta_s^{Sub} \leq M \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$v_{\ell} = (1 - \delta_{\ell}^{Line})(1 - \delta_{o(\ell)}^{Bus})(1 - \delta_{d(\ell)}^{Bus}) \\ \prod_{s: \ell \in L_s^{Sub}} (1 - \delta_s^{Sub}) \prod_{\ell' | \ell \in L_{\ell}^{Par}} (1 - \delta_{\ell'}^{Line}), \forall \ell \quad (3a)$$

$$v_{\ell} \in \{0, 1\}, \forall \ell \quad (3b)$$

$$b_g = (1 - \delta_{i(g)}^{Bus})(1 - \delta_g^{Gen}), \forall g \quad (4a)$$

$$b_g \in \{0, 1\}, \forall g \quad (4b)$$

$$\delta_g^{Gen} \in \{0, 1\}, \forall g \quad (5)$$

$$\delta_{\ell}^{Line} \in \{0, 1\}, \forall \ell \quad (6)$$

$$\delta_i^{Bus} \in \{0, 1\}, \forall i \quad (7)$$

$$\delta_s^{Sub} \in \{0, 1\}, \forall s \in S \quad (8)$$

$$\gamma(\delta^{Gen}, \delta^{Line}, \delta^{Bus}, \delta^{Sub}, b, v) \\ = \min_{P^{Gen}, P^{Line}, S, \theta} \left( \sum_g h_g P_g^{Gen} + \sum_c f_c S_c \right) \quad (9)$$

subject to

$$P_{\ell}^{Line} = B_{\ell} v_{\ell} (\theta_{o(\ell)} - \theta_{d(\ell)}), \forall \ell \quad (10)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{g \in G_i} P_g^{Gen} + \sum_{c \in C_i} S_c - \sum_{\ell | o(\ell) = i} P_{\ell}^{Line} + \sum_{\ell | d(\ell) = i} P_{\ell}^{Line} \\ = \sum_{c \in C_i} d_c, \forall i \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

$$-\bar{P}_{\ell}^{Line} \leq P_{\ell}^{Line} \leq \bar{P}_{\ell}^{Line}, \forall \ell \quad (12)$$


$$-\bar{\theta} \leq \theta_i \leq \bar{\theta}, \forall i \quad (13)$$

$$0 \leq P_g^{Gen} \leq b_g \bar{P}_g^{Gen}, \forall g \quad (14)$$

$$0 \leq S_c \leq d_c, \forall c. \quad (15)$$



# Interdiction Heuristic

- “Analysis of Electric Grid Security Under Terrorist Threat”, Salmeron, Wood, Baldick.



# Model Adaptations

- Numerically problematic susceptance values.
- Nonnegative generator dispatch lower bound




- Existence of contingencies

# Development through Pyomo

- Step 1: Baseline model and heuristic implementation
  - Need trustworthy models and heuristic implementation before adaptations can be made.
  - Compare results to results in papers to ensure heuristic was interpreted correctly.
- Step 2: Connect exact model and heuristic to real power grid data and watch both of them crash




# Experiment Development Architecture






# Troubleshooting

- Use NetworkX to generate a graphml file in order to see grid networks.
- Graph visual together with model inspection before and after solve is effective for resolving issues.



# Hardening

- After hardening, components cost more resources to attack, so attacker will make different choices.



# Results

- Generate results data file which includes interdiction results as well ad DCOPF data. Use R to plot results on a map for presentation to customer.
- Customer can identify components
  - Make sense of our results
  - Identify any issues
- Reiterate experiments to resolve issues.

# Future Work

- Contingencies are even more complicated than what we expected.
- Work with full power grid rather than reduced version.
- Further develop component hardening technique.

# Thank you!



Any questions?