

Refining the Foundations for Cyber Zone Defense

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



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Agenda

- Cyber Security Concept of Operations
- Threat Model
- Metrics of Interest
- Closed-Form Mathematical Model
- Simulation
- Results
- Parameter Estimation
- Conclusions

Cyber Security Concept of Operations



Threat Model

- Insider Threat
 - Witting: carrot and stick
 - Unwitting: spear phish, watering hole and document exploit
- Lateral Movement
 - File shares
 - RDP
 - SSH
- Exfiltration
 - Beacon
 - Upload sensitive data

Metrics of Interest

- Probability of Compromise
 - Represented by p_c
 - How likely an arbitrary host is to be compromised
- Probability of Reachback
 - Represented by p_r
 - How likely the adversary is to be able to beacon

Closed-Form Mathematical Model

- p_e = probability an exploit is available
- z = zone size
- n = network size
- ϕ = interzone porosity
- x = number of externally facing hosts
- $$p_c = \frac{1 + p_e \left(\frac{z}{n} + \phi \frac{n-z}{n} \right) (n-1)}{n}$$
- $$p_r = 1 - (1 - p_c)^x$$



Simulation

- Instrumented in Python.
- Start with one or more insiders (for whom $p_c = 1$) and legitimate hosts (for whom $p_c = 0$).
- Simulate lateral movement in rounds.
 - Update $\overrightarrow{p_c}$ (per-host probabilities of compromise) based on adjacencies, p_e and prior $\overrightarrow{p_c}$.
- Repeat until $\overrightarrow{p_c}$ converges.
- Calculate $\overline{p_c}$ (average probability of compromise).
- Calculate p_r based on actual p_c for externally-facing nodes.



Results

- Two Dependent Variables: p_c and p_r
- Five Independent Variables: z , n , p_e , x and ϕ



Results: Impact of Zone Size and Network Size





Results: Impact of Zone Size and Exploit Probability



Results: Impact of Zone Size and External Ports



Results: Impact of Zone Size and Porosity



Parameter Estimation

- Probability an Exploit Exists

- Simple

- $p_e = \frac{\text{vulnerable hosts}}{\text{hosts scanned}}$

- Weight Host Vulnerabilities

- $p_e = \sum_i \frac{s_i}{s_{\max}}$

- Porosity

- Simple

- $\phi = \frac{\text{ports open}}{\text{total ports}}$

- Weight by Port's History of Exploitation

- $\phi = \frac{\sum_i w_i o_i}{\sum_i w_i}$

Conclusions

- Technology Transfer Obstacles are Diminishing
- Future Work
 - Dynamic Zones
 - Intrazone Porosity
 - Per-boundary Porosity
 - Time Impact
 - Host Remediation

Recap

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