A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
In this paper we propose a formal game theoretic model of thermonuclear cyberwar based on ideas found in [1] and [2]. Our intention is that such a game will act as a first step toward building more complete formal models of Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD). We believe the proposed thermonuclear cyberwar game is an ideal place to start on such an endeavor because the game can be fashioned in a way that is closely related to the classical models of nuclear deterrence [4–6], but with obvious modifications that will help to elucidate the complexities introduced by a second domain. We start with the classical bimatrix nuclear deterrence game based on the game of chicken, but introduce uncertainty via a left-of-launch cyber capability that one or both players may possess.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC52-07NA27344
- OSTI ID:
- 1404836
- Report Number(s):
- LLNL-TR-737335
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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