


*Exceptional service in the national interest*



# Safety Assessment Tools and Methodology

**Robert J. MacKinnon**

**12 – 16 September 2016**

**JRC Ispra (Italy)**



Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

# Safety Case and Safety Assessment

## Safety Case (*Definition from Outcomes of the NEA MeSA Initiative, OECD 2012*)

**“A safety case is the synthesis of evidence, analyses and arguments that quantify and substantiate a claim that the repository will be safe after closure and beyond the time when active control of the facility can be relied on.”**

## Post-Closure Safety Assessment (or Performance Assessment)



A quantitative assessment of repository performance that predicts the long-term behavior of a repository, including the ability of the repository barriers to perform their safety functions, and plays a key role in substantiating that a repository will be safe and comply with regulatory safety requirements.

# Geologic Repository Safety Case Development

- **International experience *should* lessen the technical challenges**
- NEA (2004). Post-closure safety cases for geological repositories. Nature and purpose. *OECD/NEA report 3679*. Paris.
- **Yucca Mountain Repository License Application: Safety Analysis Report, 2008**  
<http://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app/yucca-lic-app-safety-report.html>
- NEA (2009a). Considering timescales in the post-closure safety of geological disposal of radioactive waste. *OECD/NEA report 6424*. Paris.
- NEA (2009b). International experiences in safety cases for geological repositories (INTESC). Outcomes of the INTESC project. *OECD/NEA report 6251*. Paris.
- IAEA (2011). Disposal of radioactive waste. *Specific Safety Requirements SSR-5*. IAEA, Vienna.
- THE POST-CLOSURE RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY CASE FOR A SPENT FUEL REPOSITORY IN SWEDEN An international peer review of the SKB license - application study of March 2011 (Final report)
- Posiva (2012c). Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto—synthesis, 2012. *POSIVA report 2012-12*. Posiva Oy, Eurajoki.
- The Safety Case for Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: 2013 State of the Art Symposium Proceedings, 7-9 October 2013, Paris, France
- Posiva (2013a). Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto—performance assessment 2012. *POSIVA report 2012-04*. Posiva Oy, Eurajoki.
- Posiva (2013b). Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto—assessment of radionuclide release scenarios for the repository system 2012. *POSIVA report 2012-09*. Posiva Oy, Eurajoki.


# What is a deep geologic repository?

*An engineered facility for safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste that includes disposal rooms or tunnels excavated sufficiently deep beneath the surface to ensure isolation of the waste from external changes or events. The underground facility typically comprises engineered and geologic barriers that act together to contain the waste within the facility and to limit and delay the release of radionuclides to the surrounding geosphere subsequent to loss of containment. Typical engineered barrier systems include the following components - **waste form (and inventory), waste package, buffer/backfill, and engineered seals**.*




# Disposal System Evaluation


- Preclosure Safety Analysis
  - Worker/public exposure from repository operations accidents
  - Include transportation and packaging/handling safety analyses
  - Current knowledge base includes U.S. experience with WIPP and German experience with Asse and Morsleben
- Postclosure Safety Assessment
  - Quantitative comparison to system safety standards (dose or risk)
  - Quantitative/qualitative analysis of barrier capability or subsystem safety functions
  - Uncertainty/sensitivity analyses
- Confidence-Building Activities



# Long-Term Performance



# Performance Assessment (PA) Methodology



# Performance Goals

**Performance goals are typically defined up front because they determine the design of the performance assessment and have considerable influence on scenario construction, model development, and research programs**

**Ideally, performance goals are taken directly from legal regulations governing the repository**


**For early iterations of the performance assessment methodology, final regulatory performance measures may not yet be promulgated, and assumptions about possible standards need to be made**

## Performance Goals cont.

**The performance assessment group designs the analyses to simulate the quantities specified in the regulations (e.g., radiological dose to the receptor group or maximum groundwater concentrations)**

**The performance assessment group should analyze total system and subsystem performance indicators (e.g., temperature in backfill, transport time in the saturated zone) and perform sensitivity analyses to provide input to design, site characterization, and post-closure technical basis**


# PA Methodology



# Characterize System


A system description includes the characteristics of the waste (e.g., radionuclide inventory, decay chains, half-lives), the facility (e.g., layout, thermal loading from emplaced waste, design and properties of engineered barriers), and the site (e.g., geology, hydrogeology, geochemistry).

System information is derived from laboratory and field tests, published literature, natural analogues, and/or expert judgment.





# Integration of Site Characterization Data

## Example: Stratigraphy



# Integration of Site Characterization Data



# Characterize System Cont.

- **Preliminary phase**


- Scope of data collection is broad because something needs to be known about almost everything to support the feasibility analysis
- Literature studies are used to build preliminary conceptual models and identify uncertainties that warrant direct experimental study
- PAs begin (at least qualitatively) with the first system level conceptual models, and guide system characterization toward uncertainties that matter
- Data collection focuses on any data specifically called out by regulation or agreements, on literature data, and on sufficient experimental and field information, to confirm the absence of unacceptable features and to characterize uncertainty in conceptual models of site performance

# Characterize System Cont.


- **As system understanding matures, PA provides evidence that total system performance satisfies applicable safety standards**
  - Site-specific data are collected to support preliminary quantitative estimates of uncertainty in overall performance
  - Models are sufficiently developed to allow assessment of the relative importance of specific features, events, and processes (FEPs) potentially relevant to performance
  - A formal FEP screening process is implemented to identify those FEPs that are sufficiently unlikely or inconsequential to be set aside with no further data collection
  - Data collection is focused on conceptual and data uncertainties that matter, with a focus on increasing realism in model depictions
  - PAs are conducted iteratively with feedback from characterization program to identify areas where data uncertainties have the potential to impact licensing

# Characterize System Cont.

- The final phase confirms the safety of the disposal system
  - Data collection focuses intensively on those areas needed either to support the safety assessment and safety case or required explicitly by other regulatory drivers
  - Data collection activities include any data specifically called out by regulation, data specifically requested by the regulator, data required to support parts of the license application determined to be incomplete or inadequate, and data required for operations-phase monitoring or confirmation activities



# PA Methodology



# Identify Scenarios for Analysis

**Features, events, and processes (FEPs) may be naturally occurring, induced by the disposal system, or related to human activity.**

- **Features**—Features are physical, chemical, or thermal characteristics of the site or repository system
- **Events**—Events are occurrences that have a specific starting time and, usually, a duration shorter than the time being simulated in a model
- **Processes**—Processes are phenomena and activities that have gradual, continuous interactions with the system being modeled

# Identify Scenarios for Analysis



**Scenario development is the identification and specification of potential futures “paths” relevant to safety assessment of radioactive waste repositories**

**A typical approach to scenario development is to create an “expected” or nominal scenario and one or more “disturbed” scenarios**

**A comprehensive set of “scenarios” are developed by combining FEPs that remain after screening**

**The first step of the FEPs analysis is to compile a comprehensive list of FEPs for the repository system**

**FEPs are screened on the basis of several factors:**

- Physical reasonableness
- Probability of occurrence
- Consequence

# Identify Scenarios for Analysis

An important goal in identifying the FEPs potentially relevant to long-term performance is the demonstration of completeness (i.e., nothing is too insignificant or improbable to be considered as potentially relevant)


- NEA FEP list is the basis for many SNF/HLW FEP lists
  - Comprehensive NEA FEP list from NEA FEP database (NEA 2006) contains ~2000 FEPs from 10 international programs in 6 countries
- Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) list = 374 FEPs (SNL 2008)
  - ~400 site- and design-specific phenomena considered in addition to ~2000 NEA FEPs
- Preliminary UFD SNF/HLW list = 208 FEPs (Freeze et al. 2010, 2011)

# Treatment of Aleatory Uncertainty: Defining scenarios based on unlikely events

Four scenario classes divided into seven modeling cases


## Nominal Scenario Class

- Nominal Modeling Case  
(included with Seismic Ground Motion for 1,000,000-yr analyses)



## Igneous Scenario Class

- Intrusion Modeling Case
- Eruption Modeling Case



## Early Failure Scenario Class


- Waste Package Modeling Case
- Drip Shield Modeling Case

## Seismic Scenario Class

- Ground Motion Modeling Case
- Fault Displacement Modeling Case



# PA Methodology



# Build Models and Abstractions

- FEPs and scenarios retained after the screening process are represented in the PA through conceptual models, mathematical models, and computational (numerical) models
- A conceptual model is a description of the physical system and processes (THMBC), dimensionality, and assumptions, consistent with available information, that formalizes the understanding of how a system behaves
- A mathematical model translates the conceptual model into a set of governing mathematical equations or expressions and initial and boundary conditions
- A computational model provides numerical (or analytical) solutions to the mathematical models

# Build Models and Abstractions



**Development of computational models may occur at different levels:**


- Testing interpretation models (site characterization)
- Process Models (e.g., corrosion, thermal, flow and transport)
- Sub-system models (e.g., EBS, Geosphere)
- Total system performance assessment models (PA)

**Abstraction/simplification of sub-system models may be necessary for incorporation into the TSPA model.**

**Abstractions may include reduction in dimensionality, simplified processes, look-up tables, etc.**

# Build Models and Abstractions

*The total system performance assessment model consists of sets of data and information, assumptions, and computational models that together describe the essential processes of the repository system and its long-term performance*




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
# Simulation Tools (Codes)

- **FEHM** - *Zyvoloski, A. George (2007). FEHM: A control volume finite element code for simulating subsurface multi-phase multi-fluid heat and mass transfer (Report). Los Alamos Unclassified Report LA-UR-07-3359*
- **TOUGH2 – MP** - *Keni Zhang, Yu-Shu Wu, and Karsten Pruess: User's Guide for TOUGH2-MP A Massively Parallel Version of the TOUGH2 Code, Earth Sciences Division Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, May 2008*
- **TOUGH** - *Karsten Pruess, Curt Oldenburg, George Moridis: Tough2 User's Guide, Version 2, LBNL-43134 , 1999.*
- **PFLOTRAN** - <http://www.pfotran.org/>
  - *PFLOTRAN is an open source, state-of-the-art massively parallel subsurface flow and reactive transport code. PFLOTRAN solves a system of generally nonlinear partial differential equations describing multiphase, multicomponent and multiscale reactive flow and transport in porous materials.*
- **Dakota** - <https://dakota.sandia.gov/>
  - *The Dakota toolkit provides a flexible, extensible interface between analysis codes and iterative systems analysis methods. Dakota contains algorithms for:*
  - *optimization with gradient and nongradient-based methods;*
  - *uncertainty quantification with sampling, reliability, stochastic expansion, and epistemic methods;*
  - *parameter estimation with nonlinear least squares methods; and*
  - *sensitivity/variance analysis with design of experiments and parameter study methods.*
  - *Stepwise linear regression – most statistical software packages, MATLAB*


# Long-Term Performance




# Enhanced PA Computational Model Architecture



# Generic PA – Computational Framework



# PA Methodology



# Quantify Uncertainty

- **Uncertainties are inherent in projections of long-term performance of geologic repositories**
- **An essential element of the performance assessment is to account for these uncertainties and quantify their impact on future outcomes**
- **Two main types of uncertainty, Aleatory and Epistemic**



# Quantify Uncertainty

- Three major sources of uncertainty should be considered in a performance assessment:
  - Uncertainty in the future state of the system (aleatory uncertainty)
    - Example: time and size of a seismic event
  - Data and parameter uncertainty (aleatory and epistemic uncertainty)
    - Examples: permeabilities, porosities, sorption coefficients, corrosion rates
  - Model uncertainty (usually epistemic, but in general both aleatory and epistemic)
    - Example: dual porosity vs dual permeability

# Data and Parameter Uncertainty

Epistemic uncertainty incorporated through Latin hypercube sampling of cumulative distribution functions and Monte Carlo simulation with multiple realizations

Approx. 400 uncertain epistemic parameters incorporated directly in Yucca Mountain TSPA-LA




# Techniques for constructing PDF for uncertain parameters


- If sufficient measurements exist, construct an empirical distribution function or
- Fit analytical distributions (e.g., Normal, Log normal, Student-t, Uniform, Log-uniform, Triangle, etc)
- If few or no measurements exist, use elicitation processes:
  - Informal request for professional judgement
  - Formal elicitation of expert opinion
- Goodness of fit statistics
  - Chi-Squared; Kolmogorov-Smirnoff; and Anderson-Darling

# Alternative Conceptual Models


Fracture-  
Only  
Transport



Double-Porosity  
Nonreactive Transport  
(Physical Retardation)




Double-Porosity  
Reactive Transport  
(Physical and  
Chemical  
Retardation)




# WIPP Alternative Conceptual Models

*Conceptual model of  
fracture transport  
within the Culebra  
Dolomite has a strong  
influence on WIPP PA  
results.*




# PA Methodology



# Construct Integrated PA Model and Perform Calculations

- The integrated PA model is constructed by coupling the sets of scenario sub-models together to calculate overall system performance

## Long-Term Performance






# Construct Integrated PA Model and Perform Calculations

- **Uncertainty in the input parameters can be treated using deterministic or probabilistic methods**
- **In a deterministic simulation of a specific scenario, each input parameter is assigned a single value, typically representative of best estimate or conservative conditions**
  - The PA model is then used to calculate a corresponding value(s) for the system performance measure(s)
  - Bounding analyses involve parameter values selected such that the performance of the system is “worst case”.
  - Defining what the worst case is can be a challenge, however, it is typically easy to defend if all agree that the performance could not be worse than that calculated

# Construct Integrated PA Model and Perform Calculations

- In a probabilistic simulation, parameter values are sampled and propagated through the coupled set of models to generate a distribution of potential outcomes.
  - Parameter uncertainty is propagated into the PA by conducting multiple calculations for each scenario using values sampled from the distributions of possible values (e.g., Monte Carlo simulation).
  - Each individual calculation uses a different set of sampled input values and produces a different value(s) for the system performance measure(s).



\*Fig. 1: J.C. Helton et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 122 (2014) 267–271.

# Construct Integrated PA Model and Perform Calculations

- The result of each individual calculation represents a different possible realization of the future overall performance of the system, consistent with the uncertainty in the input parameters
- Overall system performance for a specific scenario is then quantified by some measure of the distribution of results from all realizations, such as the mean or median of the system performance measure(s)
- Uncertainty associated with the probability of occurrence of each scenario is included in the PA by conducting separate analyses for each scenario and then probability weighting the results to estimate an overall system consequence


Four scenario classes divided into seven modeling cases

Nominal Scenario Class

- Nominal Modeling Case  
(included with Seismic Ground Motion for 1,000,000-yr analyses)

Early Failure Scenario Class

- Waste Package Modeling Case
- Drip Shield Modeling Case



Igneous Scenario Class

- Intrusion Modeling Case
- Eruption Modeling Case




Seismic Scenario Class

- Ground Motion Modeling Case
- Fault Displacement Modeling Case



# PA Methodology



# Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses



**Uncertainty and Sensitivity** analyses are used to quantify the spread of performance projections and identify those factors that “drive” the spread in the performance projections.

**Sensitivity** analyses are valuable for understanding the processes of the repository system, for improving analyses in the next iterative cycle, and for PA quality assurance.





Interpretation of sensitivity analyses plays an important role in integration between site characterization, repository design, and performance assessment

# Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses

## Uncertainty analysis

Determination of the uncertainty in analysis outcomes that results from uncertainty in analysis inputs




- Distributions
- Histograms
- Box plots



## Sensitivity analysis


Determination of the effect of uncertainty in individual analysis inputs on analysis outcomes

- Scatterplots
- Stepwise regression
- Partial Correlation





# Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses

**Monte Carlo estimates of overall performance**  
**(Example dose histories from Yucca Mountain Total System Performance Assessment for the License Application, total expected dose from all scenarios)**



**DOSE300: 10,000 yr**


Variable	R <sup>2</sup>	SRRC
INFILST	0.28	0.53
SZCORAL	0.40	-0.36
SZGWSPD	0.53	0.36
GTCPU239	0.61	0.27
IGPHI	0.63	0.15
<b>SZHAVO</b>	<b>0.64</b>	<b>0.09</b>
EPILOWU	0.65	0.10
EPSLOWPU	0.66	0.09
<b>SZNVF7</b>	<b>0.66</b>	<b>0.08</b>



**Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analyses**  
**Identify model inputs important to uncertainty in performance estimates**

See - Total System Performance Assessment Model/Analysis for the License Application, MDL-WIS-PA-000005, 2008

# PA Methodology



# Evaluate Performance




- **Quantitative PA results provide indications of subsystem and overall system performance**
- **When combined with sensitivity analyses, PA results can be used to identify the models and parameters that have the greatest effect on the behavior of the system**
- **Identification of the uncertainties that are most important in preliminary PAs can help guide site characterization, repository design, and model development through a directed science and testing program**
- **The steps in the PA process are repeated, as needed, until a final decision is reached**

## Evaluate Performance cont.

**A decision in favor of regulatory acceptability of the repository would only be made at a mature stage of a repository program when PA models are sufficiently well developed and documented to support regulatory decisions.**

**A favorable decision of acceptability requires not only quantitative determination from the PA model, but also requires support from the site characterization and repository design groups and a rigorous Safety Case.**

# PA Methodology



# Directed Science and Testing Program



- Information from the overall performance evaluation and uncertainty and sensitivity analyses serves to identify important parameters and systems for further investigation.
- This may include identifying systems whose performance can be improved by modifications to the design, or parameters with uncertainties that, if reduced through further site or laboratory investigations, would significantly increase confidence in the overall safety assessment results.
- The safety assessment process can help inform programmatic decision-making regarding the testing and scientific investigations that will most effectively improve the accuracy and confidence in safety assessment results and toward design decisions most likely to improve real system performance.

# Directed Science and Testing Program Cont.



**Factors other than the quantitative sensitivity of the TSPA model may be important to consider in the prioritization of data collection and analyses**

**Public and political confidence in the repository system may require a minimum level of understanding for certain aspects of the system, regardless of the expected quantitative impact on performance**

**Some data collection tasks that have a high technical priority may also require long time frames, placing them in conflict with project schedule goals**

# Summary

**The iterative application of the performance assessment methodology through the lifetime of a deep geologic disposal project supports a defensible:**

- **Evaluation of subsystem and total system performance with respect to specific criteria or requirements**
- **Consideration of expected and disturbed scenarios**
- **Evaluation of design options/alternatives**
- **Development of the models used to simulate the important FEPs and scenarios**
- **Determination and representation of significant sources of aleatory, epistemic, and model uncertainty**
- **Incorporation of information from laboratory and field tests, published literature, natural analogues, and expert judgment**
- **Prioritization of research and testing needs**

# Sources of Information

- IAEA Safety Standards: No. SSR-5 “Disposal of Radioactive Waste”
- OECD Radioactive Waste Management Document: “Post-Closure Safety”
- Case For Geological Repositories: Nature And Purpose”
- National Academy of Sciences: “One Step at a Time: The Staged Development of Geologic Repositories for High-Level Radioactive Waste”
- Nuclear Energy Agency: “Confidence in the Long-term Safety of Deep Geological Repositories: Its Development and Communication”
- Yucca Mountain Repository Safety Analysis Report
- WIPP Certification and Recertification Reports
- Examples from various international programs and personal experience
- Geological Disposal: An overview of the generic Disposal System Safety Case, UK, NDA
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, Vienna. Publication STI/PUB/1290, 2007

# FEP References

- Freeze, G., Mariner, P., Houseworth, J.E., and Cunnane, J.C. 2010. Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs): FY10 Progress Report. SAND2010 -5902, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
- Freeze, G., Mariner, P., Blink, J.A., Caporuscio, F.A., Houseworth, J.E., and Cunnane, J.C. 2011. Disposal System Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs): FY11 Progress Report. SAND2011- 6059P, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
- NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency) 2006. The NEA International FEP Database: Version 2.1. Paris, France: Nuclear Energy Agency.
- SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) 2008. Features, Events, and Processes for the Total System Performance Assessment: Analysis. ANL-WIS-MD-000027 REV 01. Las Vegas, Nevada: Sandia National Laboratories.

# Additional Slides

# Four Questions Underlying PA

Q1: *What can happen?*

Q2: *How likely is it to happen?*


Q3: *What are the consequences if it does happen?*

Q4: *What is the uncertainty in the answers to the first three questions?*

# Role of PA in the Case for Safety


- **Performance Assessment (PA) is performed iteratively throughout the development of the repository assessment bases**
  - Evaluate and synthesize the current scientific understanding and data for the given design concept or possible repository at a site
  - Understand and forecast long-term performance of the repository and identify factors that are most important to that performance
  - Identify factors and processes for which improved understanding or data are needed
  - Identify possible repository design modifications to improve performance or to reduce uncertainties
  - Demonstrate that the repository concept meets attendant regulatory requirements and will remain safe over the required timescale
  - Provide the framework around which integration among repository design, site characterization, and PA groups can be organized

# Characterize System: Conceptual Models




Overall Conceptualized Water Flow Behavior in the Unsaturated Zone at Yucca Mountain

# YMP FEPS Process



# Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses




# Quantify Uncertainty

- **Uncertainty in the future state of the system**
  - Aleatory uncertainty is typically addressed in a performance assessment model through scenario construction and screening, where each retained scenario represents a possible future state of the disposal system.
  - Scenario probabilities are used to weight the consequences of each scenario according to its probability of occurrence.
- **Data and parameter uncertainty**
  - Accounted for by developing a distributions of values for each uncertain parameter, each distribution describes a range of values within which the true value is believed to fall, with an expected value that corresponds to the best estimate of the true value
- **Model uncertainty**
  - Alternative conceptual models must be considered when more than one valid interpretation of system behavior is possible from the existing data

# Application of Simplified PA Models

## ■ GoldSim framework


- Single associated 1D flow and transport pathway (streamtube)
  - Assumes multiple WPs and pathways all converge at receptor
    - *No spatial variability in source term or transport*
    - *No temporal variability in WF degradation or WP failure*
    - *No thermal effects (except flow rate abstraction for deep borehole)*




# Consequence Models for Seismic Disruption at Yucca Mountain

- Two Release Scenarios
  - Direct fault displacement ruptures waste packages
    - Minor contributor due to low probability of new fault formation
  - Ground motion damages packages through
    - Vibratory motion and impact
    - Rockfall impact
    - Accumulated loading of rockfall
- Waste package damage is a function of:
  - Event magnitude
  - Type of waste package
  - Time-dependent package degradation

**Right**  
Modeled Waste Package  
Damage and Stress  
Contours following vertical  
loading (DOE/RW-0573  
Rev. 1, Figure 2.3.4-91)



**Below**  
Model for Rubble-Waste  
Package Interactions (DOE/RW-  
0573 Rev. 1, Figure 2.3.4-88)



a) Drift Scale





b) WP Scale

# Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses



- Build a sequence of multivariate linear rank regression models between output and inputs
- At each step, admit the variable which accounts for the largest amount of unexplained variance until no more regression coefficients pass statistical significance tests
- Importance ranking metrics
  - Partial correlation => correlation between output and input after removing linear influence of all other inputs
  - $R^2$ -loss => loss in explanatory power of current model if a variable is excluded from regression model

# Construct Integrated PA Model and Perform Calculations: Construction of Total Dose



# Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses



## Sensitivity Analysis Techniques

- Scatter plot analysis
  - Visual measure of relationship between model output and uncertain inputs
- Regression analysis
  - Quantitative input-output model built via rank regression to determine most important contributors to output variance (spread)

# Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses

## Scatter Plot Analysis - Example

