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Layer of Protection Analysis LOPA

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Layer of Protection Analysis Overview



- LOPA Definition
- LOPA History
- LOPA Common Elements
- LOPA Use – Motivating Factors
- LOPA Steps
- LOPA Limitations/Benefits
- LOPA Example
- LOPA References





Definition



- Simplified Form of Risk Assessment
- Order of Magnitude Categories
 - Event Frequency
 - Consequence Severity
 - Likelihood of Failure of Independent Protection Layers
- Builds On Qualitative Hazards Analysis
- Rule Based Implementation



Purpose



- Replace Quantitative Risk Assessment
- Determine if Sufficient Layers of Controls
- Use of LOPA as Semi Quantitative Hazard Evaluation Tool for Judging Risk of Accident Scenarios
- Another Risk Analysis Tool that Must be Applied Correctly



Common Elements



- Rules for Controls as IPLs
- Default Frequency Data
 - Event Frequencies
 - Credits for IPLs
- Procedure for Calculation
- Procedure for Application/Acceptance



History



- Origin with Company Specific Development
- Multiple Papers Published ~ 1997
- CCPS International Conference and Workshop on Risk Analysis in Process Safety (10/1997)
 - Recommendation for Book Describing and Defining LOPA
- Parallel Development of Safety Integrity Levels
- Draft IEC 61511 Part 3 ~ 1999
- CCPS Workshop ~ 2000



Common Events

- Consequence Classification Method
 - Typically Company Specific
- Numerical Risk Tolerance Criteria
 - Fatalities & Fire Frequencies
 - Required Number of IPL Credits
 - Maximum Frequency for Specified Categories
- Method of Developing Scenarios



Use



- Effectively Used Throughout Safety Life Cycle
- Preferred Use
 - Detailed Design Stages
 - Modifications to Designs
- Techniques Where Defining
 - Control Hierarchy
 - Control Requirements
- Use for Engineering/Administrative Controls



Steps



- Identify Consequence
- Select Accident Scenario
- Identify Cause-Consequence Pair
- Determine Frequency of Pair



Steps



- Identify Independent Protection Layers
- Identify Probability of Failure on Demand
- Estimate Risk
- Evaluate Risk
- Make Decisions to Reach Tolerable Risk



Benefits



- Less Time Than Quantitative Risk Analysis
- Simplified Framework for Understanding Risk
- Subsequent Improvements to HE Methods
- Rigorous Procedures
- Means of Comparing Risk



Example



- BP Petrochemical Disaster
 - Controls
 - Assignment of Values
 - Hierarchy Analysis



Benefits



- Defensible Process/Procedure
- As Low As Reasonably Possible Risk
- Defines Safety Integrity Levels
- Defines Hierarchy of Controls to Support Budget, Maintenance & Operations



Limitations



- Internal Risk Comparisons Valid Only When Using Same LOPA Method
- Result Values Are Not Precise
- Should Not Be Applied to All Scenarios
- Time/Resource Commitment
- Not Hazard Identification/Evaluation Tool
- External Risk Comparisons Not Typically Valid



References

- Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Ed; CCPS 2008
- Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Process Risk Assessment; CCPS 2001
- Guidelines for Initiating Events and Independent Layers of Protection Analysis, 1st Ed; CCPS 2014
- Guidelines for Enabling Conditions and Conditional Modifiers in Layer of Protection Analysis
- Layer of Protection Analysis; PII 2014