




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## Nuclear Power Accident Analysis at Sandia National Labs


Matthew Denman  
Risk and Reliability Analysis  
Presentation to MIT, October 2015

# How Sandia Got Involved in the Safe Production of Nuclear Energy



- **Atomic Energy Commission divided 1974**
  - Department of Energy to develop commercial nuclear energy
  - US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to assure nuclear energy development provides adequate protection of public health and safety
- **Sandia made a National, multi-mission laboratory**
  - Expertise in nuclear science and engineering
  - No past involvement with commercial nuclear power

# Timeline of Nuclear Safety Technology Evolution



## Nuclear Power Outlook

Optimistic  
Guarded  
Pessimistic

## Emerging Issues.....

**Risk Informing Regulation**  

- Modernization, NUREG-1465

**License Amendments and Extension**  



- MOX, High Burnup
- Plant aging

**Emergency Response Planning**  
**Advanced Reactors**  

- AP1000, ESBWR, US-EPR
- NGNP - HTGR, VHTGR, H2 Economy
- GNEP - Fast Burner Reactor, Reprocessing

# MELCOR Severe Accident Phenomena


## Modeling and Analysis of Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants




Severe accident codes are the "Repository" of phenomenological understanding gained through NRC and International research performed since the TMI-2 accident in 1979

*Integrated models required for self consistent analysis*

### Important Severe Accident Phenomena



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


# The Fukushima Accident Reconstruction





Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

# Timeline of Major Fukushima Damage Events




# Sequential Degradation of Control Blades and Fuel Rod Geometry



- Core damage starts at  $\sim 4$  hours – Control Blade fails first
- Progressive fuel damage after 6 hours
- Core exit gas temperatures very high

# Combustible Conditions Follow PCV Venting in 1F1




- At around ~23 hours, steam and hydrogen leakage from PCV greatly reduced
  - Water injection was stopped
  - PCV was depressurized by operator venting action
- Continuing condensation without steam source....
  - Reduces steam molar fraction to below 50% in refueling bay, and
  - Produces partial vacuum that draws in outside air
- Air ingress and steam condensation leads to conditions favoring combustion
- Hydrogen stratification produces flammable or detonable concentrations of  $H_2/O_2$

# Damage from Explosions



Used by permission from TEPCO  
Kenji Tetawa

# Cs Release 1F1



Radiation monitors at front gate jump at  $\sim 13$  hr

Cs Env release about 400,000 Ci




# Extended legacy in Probabilistic Risk



## Assessment

### Foundations


Establish basis for assessing and managing risks



$$\text{Risk} \sim \sum_n \sum_j (f_{nj} \cdot c_{nj})$$


### Evolutionary PRA

Address gaps in foundational methods




### Revolutionary PRA

Introduce dynamic elements






### New frontiers

Use foundation to solve problems beyond PRA



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


New Frontiers

“Smart Procedures”



# Approach: “Smart Procedures” Model development methodology





# Discrete-Dynamic-Event-Trees (DDET)

## [Uncertainty Exploration]


- DDET is a methodology for exploring large spectrum of possible accident scenarios via **Dynamic Programming**.
  - Simulates multiple accident sequences by branching based on physics calculations.
  - Scheduler (ADAPT) was created by a Sandia LDRD completed in 2008.

Evolution of accident sequences is determined by physics and engineering calculations, not a priori analyst decisions.



# Accomplishment: Proof-of-concept model for LOF and TOP diagnosis

- Yellow nodes denote accident types.
- Grey nodes denote systems and components.
- Green nodes denote reactor parameters (light green are not instrumented in the control room, lime green are instrumented)
- Blue nodes denote physical states/conditions (unmonitored)




BN-based tool can be used to provide insight into instruments are most essential for diagnosis of specific accidents. This information can provide insight into, reactor design e.g., which instruments need to be hardened for severe accidents.


# “SMART Procedures” Next steps

- Experiment with model to get insights on value of specific indicators (in progress).
  - Example of insights:
    - Reactivity is a better diagnostic indicator than Power
    - Hot pool temperature (T\_Coolant) has high diagnostic value for both LOF and TOP
    - Cold Pool Temperature has better diagnostic value for LOF than TOP
    - Power and Reactivity are redundant
- Expand model scope to cover additional accident sequences
- Conceptualize addressing “failed” instrumentation states
- Test and Validation activities on existing model

## Loss Of Flow Diagnosis







## Transient Overpower Diagnosis



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Thank you!

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