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**Title:** Robotic Spent Fuel Monitoring – It is time to improve old approaches and old techniques!

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# Robotic Spent Fuel Monitoring – It is time to improve old approaches and old techniques!

Increasing the available measurement time by a factor of ~1000

Increasing proximity to the fuel by a factor of ~50

... all while improving the quality of the measured signatures

... reducing the inspection burden on the IAEA

... and providing repetitive, frequent, pin level verification

S.J. Tobin, D.V. Rao and H.R. Trellue




December, 2016

# BACKGROUND

# STATE OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT – OECD PROJECTION

## IT IS TIME TO PREPARE FOR THIS 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY REALITY







- Nuclear development is spreading to new regions of the world
- Western nuclear firms are expected to be less involved in this new development with Russian and Republic of Korea firms playing a larger role

# STATE-OF-THE-PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL SPENT FUEL SAFEGUARDS

## SAFEGUARDS IS NOT KEEPING UP WITH TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE



- Present approach ...
  - Inspecting **once a year** to see if **50% of the fuel is present** in some fraction of the fuel at the facility
  - Most measurements made by the IAEA are **qualitative**
  - In general, **no effort is made to compare/contrast** with past measurements, not data base is maintained to aid future measurement interpretation
  - Continuity of Knowledge (COK) is maintained with cameras located on the facility walls
  - Inspections are human resource intensive
- **Is this acceptable, given modern capability?**



**WE CAN DO MUCH BETTER!**

## IT IS TIME TO CHANGE THE STATE-OF-THE-PRACTICE

- The IAEA needs tools that reduce the inspection burden while improving the quality of the inspection
- We can achieve “Full Fuel Awareness”
  - A robotic platform would allow continuous measurements, not just yearly
  - Expanded suite of measured signatures: sonic, ultraviolet (Cerenkov), visible (multi-spectral), and gamma rays
  - Create measurement data base for comparison in case COK is lost
  - Store data on site and transmit data back to IAEA frequently
  - Pin-level diversion detection plausible because a robot can be so close to the fuel!





## **MERIT OF VARIOUS SIGNATURES**

# GAMMA SPECTRUM

Easy to predict change in gamma spectra as a function of time

- A slow moving robot can measure gamma spectra from the upper most part of every pin
  - Quantified intensity of several peaks from each pin – this could be a fingerprint
  - Given known decay rate of each isotope – we can predict the intensity of peaks of interest on any future date




# VISIBLE SPECTRUM – LASER RANGEFINDER

## Addressing the diversion scenario of material in the guide tubes

- Rangefinder technology could be used to verify that each guide tube is empty immediately upon removal from the reactor core ... **addressing the illicit Pu production scenarios involving insertion of partial length rods into guide tubes.**
- Such a measurement is enabled by both the close proximity of robotic platform to fuel and vibrational stability of robotic platform




Laser Rangefinder




# VISIBLE SPECTRUM (CONT.)

You can see the different between an irradiated assembly and a fresh one

- It is clear to fuel assembly handlers that **fresh and irradiated fuel look different**. The irradiated fuel looks dull and brownish while the fresh is shiny and metallic
  - Might this observation be useful for **diversion detection**?
  - Might the optical reflection from the top portion of each pin, perhaps the top 10 cm, provide a **unique identifier** for that assembly?



Spectral Response






# ULTRAVIOLET SPECTRUM

Essentially a Cerenkov-Viewing-Device with unlimited time & ~50x closer to the fuel

- A slow moving robot can create significantly better images than the current DCVD
  - **More time** than an inspector who has typically a few minutes per assembly
  - **Less attenuation** as there would be ~9 meters less water above each fuel assembly
  - Anticipate being able to observe emission from water **between all pins** by using UV fiber optics

DCVD images – false color




# SONIC

## Experimental data needed

- Currently anticipate **measure of each pin individually** to enable pin level diversion detection, speculation of what might be possible:
  - Each pin creates a unique vibrational fingerprint**
  - Or, perhaps each pin is not unique but **each assembly** is given the ~60 to ~300 pins in each assembly
  - Or, pins may fall into classes:
    - Fresh pins** containing uranium pellets (pliable metal with loose pellets inside)?
    - Spent pins containing uranium pellets (vibration impacted by **swelling of pellets** and **radiation induced brittleness** of cladding)?

Example of vibrational response (amplitude) to a scan in input frequency for a given object



## **IMPACT ON SAFEGUARDS**

## SAFEGUARDS WILL BE IMPROVED BECAUSE ...

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- Currently able to verify that “50% of the fuel is there”  
... We will add **pin-level detection capability**
- Currently **incapable** of detection partial length rods in guide tubes  
... We will add **range finder capability**
- Currently there is **no data base** of signature for each assembly  
... We will add such a database stored on site and sent back to IAEA.  
Resulting in a **immensely improved capability to recover from a loss of COK**
- Currently inspections are performed yearly on a subset of assemblies  
... We will measure **all the assemblies with daily-to-weekly frequency**
- Currently inspections are labor intensive  
... We will **free the inspector to spot check irregularities and outliers**

The above benefits can be achieved with passive gamma and a laser range finder on a robot. The range of NDA options are suggested because the best option is not clear.

## CONCLUSION

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- **“Full Fuel Awareness”**

- Robotic deployment enables **~1000 times greater measurement time**
- Instruments **~50 times closer** to fuel, this proximity combined with vastly greater measurement time, **enabling pin level detection**
- No need for a sampling plan, we will measure all assemblies, with **superb spatial resolution, repetitively, while saving the data on-site and/or sending it back to the IAEA.**

# Backup Slides

# Timely Detection of Diversion is a Key Attribute of International Safeguards

*“The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.”*

IAEA INFCIRC/153

## Today's state-of-practice:

- Over reliance on human-intensive technologies