

# Information Leakage in Encrypted IP Video Traffic

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# Outline


- It is possible to detect activity in a video stream by analyzing network packet metadata
- Background
- Early experiments and results
- Information leak origins
- Testing repeatability
- Our “Big Skype Experiment”

# Origin


- Inspired by “Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations” - Wright et al.
- Our question: Can network traffic also reveal activity in a video stream?

# Image and Video Compression

Spatial  
compression




Temporal  
compression




# Indicators in Video Streaming Traffic

- Focus: single person in front of a still background
- Objective: classify uniquely identifiable events in video using network packet metadata

# Experiment Setup





# Video Encoder Pipeline




# Event Detection Without Encryption

- Quickly found information leaks in three ways:
  - Time between packets (inter-arrival time)
  - Packet size
  - Video stream bandwidth




# Motion Detection in Encrypted Video

- Encryption did not fix information leaks



- At right: Encrypted traffic reveals two hand waves



# Expanding Variables

- Variety of encoders
  - Skype, Google Hangouts, GStreamer, Facetime, proprietary hardware




- Multiple video cameras
  - High, medium, low grade consumer



- Variation on computation capability
  - Laptop, desktop, phone




# Detectable Events




- **Image Content**
  - Lighting transitions
  - Hand wave past camera
  - Stand up and walk away from computer
- **Encoding application**
  - Start/stop encoding

# Interference




- Image – too much movement
- Cameras – varying resolution and quality
- Encoders – dozens of setting in each type
- Computer – other apps and raw power
- Network – bandwidth truncating data
- Encryption – ... none

# Interference from Encryption




- ‘Good’ encryption algorithms:
  - Don’t significantly expand data size
  - Don’t delay transmission of data
- Packet destination and port aren’t encrypted


# Network Traffic Analysis




## Window size




vs.



# What's Leaking?



# GStreamer x264 Encoder




- Simple image yield fast encoding
- Adding abrupt movement slows down the encoder

# Outline


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# Skype Traffic Analysis (Lab Results)









# Skype Network Traffic Collection

- We used Amazon Turk to recruit participants from around the country to call our lab
- Video calls were automatically answered and the video content and corresponding network traffic were recorded
- Participants followed a script which was transmitted to them on their screen to perform each action



# Skype Traffic Analysis (Diverse Sources)



# Conclusions

- It is possible to detect activity in a video stream by analyzing network packet metadata
  - Higher bandwidth transmissions showed activity more obviously
  - Better camera technology increases detectability
  - Better compression algorithms smooth out the inactivity and accentuate the changes
- Analysis would have worked poorly in the past, but it is starting to reveal data and could potentially become more revealing as technology advances

# Questions