

2014 SFPE CONFERENCE & EXPO

Engineering a Fire Safe World



Application of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for Performance-Based Permitting of Hydrogen Fueling Stations


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Program Objective and Approach

Objective: Develop & demonstrate methodologies to support the use of QRA as a tool for development & revision of regulations, codes & standards and safety best practices.



Apply risk assessment techniques
in innovative hydrogen technologies



Develop integrated algorithms
for conducting QRA for H₂ facilities and vehicles




Develop and validate scientific models
to provide reduced-order information for accurate depiction of releases, flames, etc.




Enabling QRA tools for H₂ industry

QRA Approach Integrates Deterministic and Probabilistic Models



QRA toolkit integrates state-of-the-art H₂ models

- All relevant hazards (thermal, mechanical, toxicity)
- H₂ probabilistic models and systems data
- H₂ phenomena (gas release, ignition, heat flux, overpressure)



The screenshot shows the QRA toolkit interface. At the top, there is a menu bar with File, Help, NFPA Mode, QRA Mode (which is selected), Tests, and a toolbar with icons for Save, Open, and Print. Below the menu is a navigation bar with tabs: Input, System Description, Scenarios, Data / Probabilities (which is selected), and Consequence Models. On the right side, there is a section titled "Risk Metrics" with the sub-instruction "Calculate the risk in terms of FAR, PLL, and AIR". Below this is a table showing risk metrics:

Risk Metric	Value	Unit
Potential Loss of Life (PLL)	7.365e-004	Fatalities/system-year
Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)/100M exposed hours	1.682e-001	Fatalities in 10 ⁸ person-h...
Average individual risk (AIR)	3.363e-006	Fatalities/year
*		

At the bottom of the interface, there is a list of bullet points:

- The risk metrics integrate both probability and consequences of hydrogen risk scenarios
 - FAR (Fatal Accident Rate) is the expected number of fatalities in 100million exposed careers).
 - AIR (Average Individual Risk) is the expected number of fatalities per exposed
 - PLL (Potential Loss of Life) is the expected number of fatalities per system-yea

Metrics Currently Supported

Calculates 3 risk metrics:

- FAR (Fatal Accident Rate)
 - Expected number of fatalities per 100million exposed hours
- AIR (Average Individual Risk)
 - Expected number of fatalities per exposed individual
- PLL (Potential Loss of Life)
 - Expected number of fatalities per dispenser-year


And physical behavior of:

- Hydrogen jets
 - Width, velocity, density, ...
- Jet fires
 - Flame length, heat flux, ...
- Deflagrations (coming soon)
 - Ignitable volume, overpressure, ...

Flow Chart

Integrates best available probabilistic and deterministic models for:


- Component failure
- Ignition occurrence
- Gas release
- Gas dispersion
- Jet flames
- Deflagration / detonation
- Harm to humans and structures



Modules: Cause & Harm Models

Accident sequences

- Hazards considered: Thermal effects (jet fire), overpressure



$$\text{Risk} \sim \sum_n \sum_j (f_{nj} \cdot c_{nj})$$

$$f(\text{JetFire}) = f(\text{H2release}) * (1 - \text{Pr}(\text{Detect})) * \text{Pr}(\text{IgnImmed})$$

Ignition probability


- Extrapolated from methane ignition probabilities
- Flow rate calculated using *Release Characteristics* module

Hydrogen Release Rate (kg/s)	Immediate Ignition Probability	Delayed Ignition Probability
<0.125	0.008	0.004
0.125 – 6.25	0.053	0.027
>6.25	0.23	0.12

Release frequency



- Expected annual leak freq. for each component type -- Data developed from limited H2 data combined w/ data from other indus

$$\begin{aligned} f(\text{H2release}) &= \sum_{i=9 \text{ comps}} n_i * E(f(\text{Leak})_i) \\ &+ E(\text{Pr}(\text{accidents})) \\ &* n_{\text{demands}} \end{aligned}$$



Harm models



- Probability of fatality from exposure to heat flux and overpressures – multiple options



Physics Modules: Behavior & Consequence

Release Characteristics

- H₂ jet integral model developed & validated
- Source models developed for LH₂ & choked flow inputs




Ignition/Flame Light-up (pending addition)

- Flammability Factor verified for ignition prediction
- Light-up boundaries identified
- Next: sustained flame prediction


Flame Radiation

- Flame integral model developed
- Multi-source models significantly improve heat flux prediction
- Surface reflection can be a major potential heat flux contributor



Deflagration within Enclosures


- Ventilated deflagration overpressure explored experimentally and computationally
- Current QRA module requires CFD results.
- Engineering model framework pending



Activity 1: Pilot Implementation

First Iteration - Baseline


- QRA Toolkit is being used to calculate risk values for the Performance Criteria on a typical station, fully compliant with prescriptive codes
- This will provide a Baseline for risk values and enable easy comparison of the changes made in the second iteration
- The AIR value is used for comparison purposes



Activity 1: Pilot Implementation

Second Iteration

- Industry partner selected key parameters to shift from the prescriptive requirements to optimize the design for implementation
- Risk values are being recalculated and mitigating or off-setting measures are being explored that move toward risk-equivalent values for AIR
- Performance-based design and mock permitting documents will be submitted to industry experts and experienced AHJs for vetting



Activity 2: Field Validation



- One element of optimization of the station design will be incorporated in to a real world retail refueling station planned by our industry partner, Linde. Separation distance to non-classified electrical equipment (car wash vacuums) are the target element currently.
- Performance-based design and permitting documents will be submitted to the actual AHJ for the site in California.

Design Brief Elements: Project Scope and Goals

- Scope
Design a retail hydrogen refueling station utilizing liquid hydrogen (LH₂) storage tank and associated components. This station is built on an existing gasoline fuel site located in an urban or suburban city in the State of California.
- Goal
Compare a fully code-compliant, prescriptive-based fueling station design with a fueling station that was designed using a performance-based approach utilizing QRA

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Explosion Scenarios

Pressure Vessel Burst

Scenario
Description

5.4.3.1: Pressure vessel
ruptures

Gaseous H₂ vessel
ruptures due to relief
valve failure

Calculate local blast
wave impulse, needs to
be added to Toolkit

Hydrogen Deflagration

5.4.3.2: Deflagration of a
hydrogen-air or hydrogen-
oxidant mixture within large
process equipment

Deflagration within/nearby
the vaporizer

Calculate local blast wave
impulse, needs to be added
to Toolkit

Hydrogen Detonation

5.4.3.3: Detonation of a
hydrogen-air or hydrogen-
oxidant mixture within a
process vessel or within
piping containing hydrogen

Unintended release forms
localized H₂/air mixture that
detonates

Calculate local blast wave
impulse, needs to be added
to Toolkit

Outdoor
Fueling
Station
Scenario

Toolkit Inputs

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Hazardous Materials Scenarios

Unauthorized Release

5.4.4.1: Unauthorized release from a single control area

Unintended release (Jet Fire)

Toolkit, Input Set #2

Exposure Fire

5.4.4.2: Exposure fire on a location where hydrogen is being stored, used, handled or dispensed

A unrelated car fire at the gasoline dispensing pump

Discussion and Toolkit, Input Set #3

External Factor

5.4.4.3: Application of an external factor that is likely to result in a fire, explosion, toxic release or other unsafe condition

Seismic Event where a pipe bursts (100% Leak Size on largest system pipe)

Toolkit, Input Set #4

Discharge with protection system failure

5.4.4.4: Unauthorized discharge with each protection system independently rendered ineffective

An unauthorized discharge where the interlock or pressure relief valve fails

Scenario Description

Outdoor Fueling Station Scenario

Toolkit Inputs

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Scenarios not applicable to an outdoor fueling station

Scenario Description

Not Applicable Discussion

Egress System

5.4.2: Design for life safety affecting the egress system

No egress system since fueling station is outdoors

Max Occupant Load with Blocked Exit

5.4.5.1: Maximum occupant load is in the assembly building and the principal exit/entrance is blocked

No assembly occupancies in the vicinity and no exits to block


Construction in area of building with suppression system out of service

5.4.5.2: Fire in an area of the building undergoing construction while remainder of building is occupied. The suppression system has been taken out of service.

No partially-occupied buildings with suppression system out of service to analyze

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Fire Scenario

- Description
 - Leak from gaseous side of H2 system, at dispenser. System parameters for largest pipe size, pressure and temperature were used to model the release behavior. QRA considers both an immediate ignition (jet fire) and a delayed ignition (explosion)



Baseline Result for Fire Scenario

- PLL: 5.012×10^{-3} Fatalities/system-year
- AIR: 6.19×10^{-4} Fatalities /year
- Risk Values for US Gasoline Stations
 - Member of Public (Used in NFPA 2): PLL or AIR below 2×10^{-5} fatalities/station-yr
 - Based on 2 fatalities/yr and 100,000 refueling stations in the US
 - Workers: One order of magnitude higher than public risk 1×10^{-4}
- Other Risk Statistics
 - Average Individual Risk (CDC actuarial data 2005)
 - = $(9117,809 \text{ Deaths/Year})/296,748,000 \text{ Total U.S. Pop.}$
 - = $4 \times 10^{-4} \text{ Deaths/Person-Year}$ ($\sim 1/2,500 \text{ Deaths/Person-Year}$)
 - In any given year, approximately 1 out of every 2,500 people in the entire U.S. population will suffer an accidental death
 - Norwegian Petroleum Directorate guidelines use a total frequency of $5 \times 10^{-4}/\text{yr}$ for all accidents for all safety functions
- Future research activities
 - Better data is needed for ignition probabilities and component failure rates specific to new hydrogen applications.
 - Improved ability to evaluate risk mitigation features

Questions?

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