

2014 SFPE CONFERENCE & EXPO

Engineering a Fire Safe World



Application of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for Performance-Based Permitting of Hydrogen Fueling Stations

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
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Program Objective and Approach

Objective: Develop & demonstrate methodologies to support the use of QRA as a tool for development & revision of regulations, codes & standards and safety best practices.



Apply risk assessment techniques
in innovative hydrogen technologies




Develop integrated algorithms
for conducting QRA
for H₂ facilities and
vehicles



Develop and validate scientific models
to provide reduced-order
information for accurate
depiction of releases,
flames, etc.

Enabling QRA tools for H₂ industry

QRA Approach Integrates Deterministic and Probabilistic Models



QRA toolkit integrates state-of-the-art H2 models

- All relevant hazards (thermal, mechanical, toxicity)
- H2 probabilistic models and systems data
- H2 phenomena (gas release, ignition, heat flux, overpressure)

The screenshot displays the QRA toolkit interface. On the left, there are tabs for 'NFPA Mode', 'QRA Mode' (selected), and 'Tests'. Below these are buttons for 'Input' (System Description, Scenarios, Data / Probabilities, Consequence Models) and 'Output' (Scenario Stats, Risk Metrics). The 'Risk Metrics' section on the right contains a table with the following data:

| Risk Metric | Value | Unit |
|--|------------|--|
| Potential Loss of Life (PLL) | 7.365e-004 | Fatalities/system-year |
| Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)/100M exposed hours | 1.682e-001 | Fatalities in 10 ⁸ person-ho... |
| Average individual risk (AIR) | 3.363e-006 | Fatalities/year |

Below the table, there is a list of risk metrics and their definitions:

- The risk metrics integrate both probability and consequences of hydrogen risk scenarios
 - FAR (Fatal Accident Rate) is the expected number of fatalities in 100million exposed person-years.
 - AIR (Average Individual Risk) is the expected number of fatalities per exposed person-year.
 - PLL (Potential Loss of Life) is the expected number of fatalities per system-year.

Metrics Currently Supported

Calculates 3 risk metrics:

- FAR (Fatal Accident Rate)
 - Expected number of fatalities per 100million exposed hours
- AIR (Average Individual Risk)
 - Expected number of fatalities per exposed individual
- PLL (Potential Loss of Life)
 - Expected number of fatalities per dispenser-year


And physical behavior of:

- Hydrogen jets
 - Width, velocity, density, ...
- Jet fires
 - Flame length, heat flux, ...
- Deflagrations (coming soon)
 - Ignitable volume, overpressure, ...

Flow Chart

Integrates best available probabilistic and deterministic models for:


- Component failure
- Ignition occurrence
- Gas release
- Gas dispersion
- Jet flames
- Deflagration / detonation
- Harm to humans and structures



Modules: Cause & Harm Models

Accident sequences

- Hazards considered: Thermal effects (jet fire). overpressure (def)




$$\text{Risk} \sim \sum_n \sum_j (f_{nj} \cdot c_{nj})$$

$$f(\text{JetFire}) = f(\text{H2release}) * (1 - \text{Pr}(\text{Detect})) * \text{Pr}(\text{IgnImmed})$$

Release frequency

- Expected annual leak freq. for each component type -- Data developed from limited H2 data combined w/ data from other industries

$$f(\text{H2release}) = \sum_{i=9 \text{ comps}} n_i * E(f(\text{Leak})_i) + E(\text{Pr}(\text{accidents})) * n_{\text{demands}}$$





Ignition probability

- Extrapolated from methane ignition probabilities
- Flow rate calculated using *Release Characteristics* module

| Hydrogen Release Rate (kg/s) | Immediate Ignition Probability | Delayed Ignition Probability |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <0.125 | 0.008 | 0.004 |
| 0.125 – 6.25 | 0.053 | 0.027 |
| >6.25 | 0.23 | 0.12 |

Harm models


- Probability of fatality from exposure to heat flux and overpressures – multiple options



Physics Modules: Behavior & Consequence


Release Characteristics

- H₂ jet integral model developed & validated
- Source models developed for LH2 & choked flow inputs




Ignition/Flame Light-up *(pending addition)*

- Flammability Factor verified for ignition prediction
- Light-up boundaries identified
- Next: sustained flame prediction




Flame Radiation

- Flame integral model developed
- Multi-source models significantly improve heat flux prediction
- Surface reflection can be a major potential heat flux contributor



Deflagration within Enclosures


- Ventilated deflagration overpressure explored experimentally and computationally
- Current QRA module requires CFD results.
- Engineering model framework pending



Activity 1: Pilot Implementation

First Iteration - Baseline


- QRA Toolkit is being used to calculate risk values for the Performance Criteria on a typical station, fully compliant with prescriptive codes
- This will provide a Baseline for risk values and enable easy comparison of the changes made in the second iteration
- The AIR value is used for comparison purposes



Activity 1: Pilot Implementation

Second Iteration

- Industry partner selected key parameters to shift from the prescriptive requirements to optimize the design for implementation
- Risk values are being recalculated and mitigating or off-setting measures are being explored that move toward risk-equivalent values for AIR
- Performance-based design and mock permitting documents will be submitted to industry experts and experienced AHJs for vetting



Activity 2: Field Validation

- One element of optimization of the station design will be incorporated in to a real world retail refueling station planned by our industry partner, Linde. Separation distance to non-classified electrical equipment (car wash vacuums) are the target element currently.
- Performance-based design and permitting documents will be submitted to the actual AHJ for the site in California.



Design Brief Elements: Project Scope and Goals

- Scope

Design a retail hydrogen refueling station utilizing liquid hydrogen (LH2) storage tank and associated components. This station is built on an existing gasoline fuel site located in an urban or suburban city in the State of California.

- Goal

Compare a fully code-compliant, prescriptive-based fueling station design with a fueling station that was designed using a performance-based approach utilizing QRA

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Explosion Scenarios

| | Pressure Vessel Burst | Hydrogen Deflagration | Hydrogen Detonation |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Scenario Description | 5.4.3.1: Pressure vessel ruptures | 5.4.3.2: Deflagration of a hydrogen-air or hydrogen-oxidant mixture within large process equipment | 5.4.3.3: Detonation of a hydrogen-air or hydrogen-oxidant mixture within a process vessel or within piping containing hydrogen |
| Outdoor Fueling Station Scenario | Gaseous H ₂ vessel ruptures due to relief valve failure | Deflagration within/nearby the vaporizer | Unintended release forms localized H ₂ /air mixture that detonates |
| Toolkit Inputs | Calculate local blast wave impulse, needs to be added to Toolkit | Calculate local blast wave impulse, needs to be added to Toolkit | Calculate local blast wave impulse, needs to be added to Toolkit |

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Hazardous Materials Scenarios

Unauthorized Release

5.4.4.1: Unauthorized release from a single control area

Unintended release (Jet Fire)

Toolkit, Input Set #2

Exposure Fire

5.4.4.2: Exposure fire on a location where hydrogen is being stored, used, handled or dispensed

A unrelated car fire at the gasoline dispensing pump

Discussion and Toolkit, Input Set #3

External Factor

5.4.4.3: Application of an external factor that is likely to result in a fire, explosion, toxic release or other unsafe condition

Seismic Event where a pipe bursts (100% Leak Size on largest system pipe)

Toolkit, Input Set #4

Discharge with protection system failure

5.4.4.4: Unauthorized discharge with each protection system independently rendered ineffective

An unauthorized discharge where the interlock or pressure relief valve fails

Toolkit, Input Set #5

Scenario Description

Outdoor Fueling Station Scenario


Toolkit Inputs

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Scenarios not applicable to an outdoor fueling station

| Scenario Description | <div data-bbox="442 443 834 497">Egress System</div> <div data-bbox="463 730 812 874">5.4.2: Design for life safety affecting the egress system</div> <div data-bbox="463 1120 812 1264">No egress system since fueling station is outdoors</div> | <div data-bbox="974 386 1451 555">Max Occupant Load with Blocked Exit</div> <div data-bbox="1017 746 1408 874">5.4.5.1: Maximum occupant load is in the assembly building and the principal exit/entrance is blocked</div> <div data-bbox="1025 1129 1400 1279">No assembly occupancies in the vicinity and no exits to block</div> | <div data-bbox="1570 322 2004 619">Construction in area of building with suppression system out of service</div> <div data-bbox="1591 667 1983 954">5.4.5.2: Fire in an area of the building undergoing construction while remainder of building is occupied. The suppression system has been taken out of service.</div> <div data-bbox="1591 1129 1983 1279">No partially-occupied buildings with suppression system out of service to analyze</div> |
|---------------------------|---|---|--|
| Not Applicable Discussion | | | |

NFPA 2 Performance-Based Design: Fire Scenario

- Description
 - Leak from gaseous side of H2 system, at dispenser. System parameters for largest pipe size, pressure and temperature were used to model the release behavior. QRA considers both an immediate ignition (jet fire) and a delayed ignition (explosion)



Baseline Result for Fire Scenario

- PLL: 5.012×10^{-3} Fatalities/system-year
- AIR: 6.19×10^{-4} Fatalities /year
- Risk Values for US Gasoline Stations
 - Member of Public (Used in NFPA 2): PLL or AIR below 2×10^{-5} fatalities/station-yr
 - Based on 2 fatalities/yr and 100,000 refueling stations in the US
 - Workers: One order of magnitude higher than public risk 1×10^{-4}
- Other Risk Statistics
 - Average Individual Risk (CDC actuarial data 2005)
 - = (9117,809 Deaths/Year)/296,748,000 Total U.S. Pop.
 - = 4×10^{-4} Deaths/Person-Year ($\sim 1/2,500$ Deaths/Person-Year)
 - In any given year, approximately 1 out of every 2,500 people in the entire U.S. population will suffer an accidental death
 - Norwegian Petroleum Directorate guidelines use a total frequency of 5×10^{-4} /yr for all accidents for all safety functions
- Future research activities
 - Better data is needed for ignition probabilities and component failure rates specific to new hydrogen applications.
 - Improved ability to evaluate risk mitigation features

Questions?

- Contact Information:

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