



Virtual Presence and Extended Defenses in a Physical Security System

ICCST

October 19th 2006



Presented by:
Mr. Brad Norman
Sandia National Labs
bnorma@sandia.gov
505-284-1762





Presentation Overview


- Virtual Presence and Extended Defenses (VPED) System Overview
- VPED system components
- Wireless sensors (sensor nodes)
- Wireless video (cluster nodes)
- Multilevel sensor fusion
- Empirically based simulations
- Conclusion





Extended Detection & Presence Beyond the Fence

A new approach to site security at High Consequence Facilities

Inside the Fence: PIDAS



Beyond the fence: SNL's VPS





Why is Extended Detection Important?

Detection

Delay

Response

$$p_{\text{sensor activation}} \times p_{\text{sensor process}} \times p_{\text{sensor comm}} \times p_{\text{sensor display}} = p_{\text{sense}}$$

$$t_{\text{sensor activation}} + t_{\text{sensor process}} + t_{\text{sensor comm}} + t_{\text{sensor display}} = t_{\text{sense}}$$


$$p_{\text{image capture}} \times p_{\text{image process}} \times p_{\text{image comm}} \times p_{\text{image display}} = p_{\text{assessment imagery}}$$

$$t_{\text{image capture}} + t_{\text{image process}} + t_{\text{image comm}} + t_{\text{image display}} = t_{\text{assessment imagery}}$$

$$p_{\text{correct assessment}} \times p_{\text{response force}} = p_{\text{interruption}}$$



VPED Architecture





VPED-SNL Sensor Nodes

2005

- SNL fielded a combination of COTS & GOTS – from other programs
- Sensors nodes demonstrated advanced sensor algorithms & fieldability



2006/2007



- Facilitate time gated fusion
- Transducer / signal-level fusion (capable)
- Sensor node will have more features, be low-cost, have a long lasting power supply, and allow sensor transducers to be remotely tuned



Sensor Node (Now and Future) Capabilities

Now (or easy to do):

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| • Seismic | Footstep, ATV, vehicle, rain, thunder, animals, helo, aircraft |
| • Magnetic | Weapon, vehicle, ATV |
| • Passive IR | Heat signature, low res. (point) or medium resolution (shapes) |
| • Microwave | Motion |
| • Acoustic | Vehicle, helo, aircraft, weapons fire, speech, listening, intercom |
| • Disturbance | Tilt, tamper, fault |
| • Clock | Sync'd to 1 usec |
| • Temp/pressure/humidity | Environmental conditions |
| • Remote actuation | Active delay/denial, flash/bang, relay-closure |
| • PV-solar/battery | Use common batteries, lifetime limited by battery wear-out |
| • Battery voltage, current | State-of-health |
| • Strobe light | Repel animals, warn adversaries |
| • Ultrasonic emitter | Repel animals |
| • Loudspeaker | Repel animals, warn adversaries, use as half-duplex intercom |
| • Short-range RF comm | 100m in foliage, 50-100 kbits/sec, low power, secure |
| • Day/night sensor | Can use PV array voltage |
| • Ad-hoc routing | Data Source Routing protocol, self-discovery, self-healing |

Future:

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| • Ultra Wide Band | Future radar, secure communications |
| • EMI/RFI | Radio emissions, engine emissions |
| • Inhalation | Chemical detection, human scent, future option? |
| • IR data port | No exposed terminals |
| • Imaging | Snapshot, compression, transmission, live-optional/future |



Cluster Node Hardware

2005


Wireless video / imaging / snapshot
Solar Powered and fielded for 12 months





Cluster Node Hardware

2006/2007



- Wireless Imager
- Three different packaging concepts
- Video Motion Detection
- Stand-off Illuminator
 - Sensor Node Control
- Sensor localization / beam forming (enabled)



Sample Cluster Node Images






VPS System Components and Sensor Fusion

- VPS architecture maps into the first three “standard” levels of sensor fusion

- **Level 0 fusion:** Sensor Node
 - Transducer / signal-level fusion
 - Time-gating of triggers
- **Level 1 fusion:** Cluster Node
 - Video / imaging / snapshot
 - Correlating sensor reports
 - Preliminary adversary tracking
 - Localization / beam forming
- **Level 2 fusion:** Site-Wide
 - “Global” threat analysis
 - Adversary force prediction
 - Awareness of site operations
 - Decision support





Wireless - Basic Receive Power Equation

$$P_r = P_t(G_t)(G_r)\lambda^2/(16\pi^2d^2)$$


P_r is the received power, P_t is the transmitter output power, G_t is the gain of the transmitting antenna, G_r is the gain of the receiving antenna, λ is the wavelength in meters, and d is the range or distance.

Ways to increase distance:

1. Use a lower frequency
2. Increase transmitter power
3. Increase receiver sensitivity
4. Use directional antennas
5. Minimize obstructions



802.11g (2.4GHz) Radio Evaluation at Kirtland




- Performance was satisfactory to 2,500m, 1.55 miles
- Notice the signal degradation at 750m and 1,800m
- Throughput with 256 bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- 100mW (-10dB) transmitter and 14dBi antenna





Sandia's Extended Detection Simulation Capabilities

- Simulate radar, seismic, video geographic coverage, and detection patterns
- Model network performance, however, site surveys typically still need to occur for all wireless deployments
- Solar power & other renewable energy modeling
- Model validate by industry and utilizes 30 years of historical NOAA weather data





VPED Summary

- Virtual Presence and Extended Defenses (VPED) System provides:
- Wireless sensors (sensor nodes)
- Multilevel sensor fusion
 - Reduce nuisance alarms and track adversaries
- Wireless video (cluster nodes)
- Sandia's empirically based simulation capabilities



Questions?

Mr. Brad Norman, bnorma@sandia.gov, 505-284-1762





Backup slides

Security Risk

Frequency of Event

Probability of Adversary Success

Impact of Event

$$R = P_A * [1 - P_E] * C$$

Probability of Interruption

Probability of Neutralization

“Options to Mitigate” will Prevent Event

Detailed description: The diagram illustrates the Security Risk (R) formula. It features the equation $R = P_A * [1 - P_E] * C$ with various annotations. A blue arrow points from the text 'Frequency of Event' to the variable P_A . A black bracket above the term $[1 - P_E]$ is labeled 'Probability of Adversary Success'. A red arrow points from the text 'Impact of Event' to the variable C . Below the equation, a green bracket under the term $[1 - P_E]$ is labeled '“Options to Mitigate” will Prevent Event'. This green bracket is further divided into two parts: P_I (labeled 'Probability of Interruption') and P_N (labeled 'Probability of Neutralization'), with green arrows pointing from the labels to their respective variables.



Assessed Detection

$$(p_{sensed} \times p_{imagery}) \times p_{correct\ assessment} = p_{assessed\ detection}$$