

Risk-informed Decision Making for Homeland Security

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What kind of “problem” is Homeland Security anyway?

Political Posturing Should Not Trump Real National Security Issues

War on Terrorism: Security costs weigh heavily at local level

“Homeland Security” Threatens Constitution

Exposed by Katrina, FEMA's flaws were years in making

Problems Plague 'No-Fly' List, TSA Considers Changes

Port Problems Said To Dwarf New Fears

GAO cites lingering problems with student visa system

Border Security: Different Names, Same Problems

The Bird Flu Game: Who's on First?

Easy Targets: infrastructure

Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems

Electricity Grids Left Wide Open to Hackers



What is a “wicked” problem? (Not tame)


- Every one is essentially unique.
- No definitive formulation – no “point” solution.
- No exhaustively describable set of potential solutions.
- No immediate and no ultimate test of a solution.
- Every one is a symptom of another problem.
- Development of a “solution” itself changes the conditions of the problem

The term “wicked problems” characterizes the types of problems that we often must work on: highly complex, highly dynamic, and involving not only technology but political, social, and economic considerations. The opposite of “wicked” is “tame” (not “easy”).

Rittel and Weber, 1973

Advanced Concepts Group approach to “wicked” problems

- *Formulate the mess*: understand the context and essence.
- Derive *system solutions* within the economic, social, and political constraints.
- Identify needed *advances in science and technology*.
- Catalyze solutions by focusing on *goals*



What are the concerns?

When will the attack occur?



What should be protected and how?

What is the method of attack?



What is needed to respond and recover?

What is the target?



Who is planning the attack and why?



WHO WILL CARRY OUT THE ATTACK?

What is the wicked problem?

We must help the nation understand the risks from terrorism, develop actionable intelligence about the threats, make true risk-based investment decisions, and dynamically manage those risks.



There is a clear need for tools and environments for analysis and decision making in high-consequence situations.

What are some of the elements of the “solution”?



Full context understanding of the problems:


- Facts and science-based understanding
- Threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences
- Scientific risk-assessment & management
- Uncertainties
- Effective understanding of the social and political systems

Real decision / action support:

- Capability to prioritize
- Methodologies for rolling out decisions that manage the “wickedness” of the problem
- The ability to make decisions be understood, accepted, acted upon, ...




What are some specific approaches for the “solution”?




Analyze Threats

Assess & Manage Risks

Enhance
Decision
Making




We need a systems approach that leverages the strengths of both people and machines in tight collaboration




Appropriate Methods for Analyzing Risk are Goal and Problem Dependent

- **Goal**
 - Prioritization
 - Assessment
 - Management
- **Problem Characteristics**
 - Size
 - Heterogeneity
 - Availability and Quality of Data
 - Nature and Level of Uncertainty
 - Threat source
 - Nature
 - Adversary




$$\text{Risk} = T \times V \times C$$



Risk-Informed Decision Making

**Deliberation
(environment):
qualitative
factors and
processes**

- politics
- ethical
- legal
- social

Threats

Vulnerabilities

RISKS


Consequences

**Risk Management:
costs & benefits
ACTION - DECISION**

**Analysis
(tools):
quantitative
factors and
processes**

- facts
- statistics
- calculations
- simulations

Risk-Informed Decision Making





Implications

- **This formulation means that one cannot arrive at a definition of threat, vulnerability, OR consequence without both analysis and deliberation**
- **This has huge organizational implications**
- **The seam between analysis and deliberation is currently very rocky**
- **There may be opportunities for technology to leverage the deliberative portion**




Threat Perspective


The Problem Of Finding Terrorists Is Akin To Finding Waldo In A World Of Everyday Activity




TRAINS



AIRPORTS



SEAWAYS



PUBLIC PLACES



Sparse real data among much noise



We Make Risk-Based Assessments and Decisions Every Day, Using Existing Capabilities

- ...based primarily on available knowledge/judgment.
- The threat, vulnerability and consequence risk elements are not fully integrated.
- Formal risk models exist that can be applied today to integrate all risk elements.
- Computer-based analysis tools need to play a larger role.
- We can benefit from early application of such models.

What's the threat level? How should we respond?

Is the Risk Acceptable?

What's the target? What R&D investments?

Humans Make Risk
Acceptance Decisions Based
on Available Information



Applying Risk Equation To Parse/Quantify The Terrorist Threat Results In Identified Actionable Risk Factors

Risk = Probability of attack x Consequence

Risk = function (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence)

Risk = fn [(Source, Who, Motivation/Intent, Capability, Imminence), (Hardness), (damage)]

Risk = fn [(Credibility, Person/Group ID, (doctrine, actions/tactics, location, target), weapon, urgency), (security/response), (overall impact)]

An integrated risk assessment is much greater than the sum of the pieces.



Terrorist Threat Attack Risk Equation, Including Risk Factor Scoring Scheme

$$\text{Total Risk (R)} = R_{SC} \times R_{IG} \times R_D \times R_{AT} \times R_L \times R_T \times R_W \times R_U \times R_{TSR} \times R_C$$

Where:

Risk from **Source Credibility** (R_{SC})

Risk from **Individual or Group** (R_{IG})

Risk from **Doctrine** (R_D)

Risk from observed **Actions/Tactics** (R_{AT})

Risk from **Location** (R_L)

Risk from **Target** (R_T)

Risk from **Weapon** (R_W)

Risk from assessed **Urgency** (R_U)

Risk from possible **Target/Security Response** (R_{TSR})

Risk from **Consequence** of a successful attack (R_C)

Scoring Scheme

<u>Score</u>	<u>Threat level</u>
10	Likely a serious threat
1	Moderate threat or neutral
.1	Likely not a threat
0	False positive—NOT a threat

Each **Risk Factor** Is Evaluated and Scored Using a Separate Lexicon;
The Absence of Information Results in a Neutral Score... NOT 0 risk!



Vulnerability Perspective



Engineered Security: Risk Equation

- Process for risk and resource management using a suite of tools and information
- Based on the risk equation:

$$\text{System Risk } R = P_A * [1 - P_E] * C$$

Probability of Attack (red text, arrow pointing to P_A)

Probability of Adversary Success (blue text, bracket under $[1 - P_E]$)

Consequences (green text, arrow pointing to C)

P_I (blue text, arrow pointing to P_I)


P_N (blue text, arrow pointing to P_N)

Probability of Interruption (blue text, under P_I)

Probability of Neutralization (blue text, under P_N)


- Integrates many components into a single, consistent, approach for determining risk and making decisions

Risk Management Process





RAM Timeline Factors




Return to Pre-Incident Based on C



Consequence Perspective


Methodology for Asset Prioritization



$$R = \sum_T P(T) \times P(V|T) \times \int_C P(C|T,V) U(C)$$

What are the consequences of infrastructure disruptions in the Gulf Coast region?

Crude Oil Pipeline Disruptions



- Fuel Price Increases (vary by region)
- Refinery Crude Oil Shortages (vary by region)
 - Increased Imports



- Depletion of Fuel Stores (limited to 3 regions)
- Fuel Price increases in all regions
 - more than doubles in 1 region

Refined Product Pipeline Disruption




- Depletion of Fuel Stores (limited to 2 regions)
- Retail Fuel Shortage in 1 region
- Prices double in 2 regions
- Prices increase in all regions

Regional Power Outage




- Short-term disruptions in multiple infrastructures within the outage area:
 - Water Supply
 - Refining
 - Banking
- National Economic Impacts


Telecommunication Assets Disruption



Economic Impacts Distribution





Probability of Retail Payment System Working



Regional Analysis performed using
 Petroleum System Model,
 N-SMART, Port Simulators,
 CIP/DSS National Interdependency Model

Hazardous Shipments Policy Analyses


- Consider a policy to alter chlorine shipments
- Intra-and inter-firm economic impacts to 3,300 chlorine-related firms were simulated.
- Disruption impacts and consequence mitigation options were evaluated for effects on:
 - inorganic chemical, PVC, pulp and paper, and organic chemical firms production and revenue
 - water systems chlorine supplies
 - public health
 - national economy (GDP)



Days

What do we need to know when a hurricane is coming?


- Damage areas, severity, duration, restoration maps
- Projected economic damage
 - Sectors, dollars
 - Direct, indirect, insured, uninsured
 - Economic restoration costs
- Affected population
- Affected critical infrastructures





MANAGING RISK

Risk-Informed Decision Making





Conclusions

- Homeland Security is a “wicked” problem
- Risk = $T \times V \times C$
- Risk-informed decision making is essential
- Need integrated analysis and deliberation
- Risk management:
 - Communication is a key element
 - Prevent, protect, respond, recover
 - Resilience (and robustness) for critical US infrastructure