



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Security Implications of the Cloud

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Department 09526



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
What Is Cloud...and Why Do We Care?



- A model for “enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction”
- Cloud computing is wildly popular
- Security is still an afterthought
 - Most analysis is on ROI for companies not security

Research Goals

- Create secure storage protocols that are robust to malicious insiders that address the identified problems
- Allow for informed trade-offs between efficiency, performance, and security
- Understand implications of using the “cloud”



Storage Using Algebraic Subspaces

- Treat data as Matrix D
- Generate a random coding matrix A

$$E = A * D$$

- Compute the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)

$$A = U \Sigma V^T$$




Example $\mathbb{R}^3 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^4$:

$$A = (\overrightarrow{u_1} \quad \overrightarrow{u_2} \quad \overrightarrow{u_3} \quad \overrightarrow{u_4}) \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \sigma_3 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \overrightarrow{v_1} \\ \overrightarrow{v_2} \\ \overrightarrow{v_3} \end{pmatrix}$$

Storage Using Algebraic Subspaces (2)

- “Append” linear combinations of the left null space ($N(A^T)$) to $E = A * D$
 - e.g. $E = E | (c * \overrightarrow{u_4})$
- Data is recovered by multiplying by the (pseudo)inverse

$$D = A^+ * E \quad \begin{pmatrix} d & d & d & 0 \\ d & d & d & 0 \\ d & d & d & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$




Visual Results

- Before



(1)

Encoded



(2)

- Decoded




(3)

The image is
not viewable!


W&C Encoding & Decoding Results

- Encoding and decoding have similar performance
 - No efforts in parallelization
- Performance degrades as the file size increases becomes
 - single, large matrix is expensive to manipulate




Improving Encoding Performance

- Large amounts of data can be costly to manipulate (time, memory, processing)
- *Matrix Block Chaining (MBC):* *Intelligently* partition the data into smaller chunks and encode
 - Avoids creating multiple encoding matrices



MBC Results

- Increasing the number of partitions can yield a significant performance boost
 - Too few = large matrices
 - Too many = excess processing overhead
- Optimal processing block size is $\sim 2\text{MB}$




Further Extensions


- Mathematical security proofs
- Multi-provider solution and security proofs
- Chaff obfuscation
- Encoding in finite fields
- Efficient parity verification
- Data resiliency via rateless codes

Storage and Retrieval

Encoding




Decoding



Prototype

- GUI provides easy manipulation of available servers and settings
- Supports multiple “cloud” types: Swift, Dropbox, local storage. Etc.





Other cloud-related work



- Cloud security analysis
 - How to choose and vet a cloud provider
- Secure Distributed Set Membership
 - No single point of failure
 - Query data with decryption/reconstruction

BACKUP


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Protocol Properties

Future Avenues to Improve Cloud Security

- Evaluate maximization functions for cost/security
- Examine multiple providers and multiple user accounts to provide heightened privacy for users
- Evaluate efficient metadata structures
- Optimize parallelism and algebraic calculations
- Optimize chaff placement
- Evaluate security in new paradigms (e.g., quantum)



Pictorial example of data stored at three service provider

Multi-Provider Storage Security

Proof Sketch:

Assume an attacker has access $n-k$ rows of E and all of the encoding matrix A

- Create a set of linear equations

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_{1,1} & \cdots & a_{1,n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ a_{k,1} & \cdots & a_{k,n} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} d_{1,1} \\ \vdots \\ d_{n,1} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} e_{1,1}^* \\ \vdots \\ e_{k,1}^* \end{pmatrix}$$

- Attacker guesses $n-k-1$ valid elements of d , and can rewrite the equations with fewer unknowns

$$\begin{pmatrix} a'_{1,1} & \cdots & a'_{1,k+1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ a'_{k,1} & \cdots & a'_{k,k+1} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} d'_{1,1} \\ \vdots \\ d'_{k+1,1} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} e'_{1,1}^* \\ \vdots \\ e'_{k,1}^* \end{pmatrix}$$

Multi-Provider Storage Security (2)

- Attacker performs Gaussian elimination

$$RREF(\mathbf{A}') = \begin{pmatrix} & s_1 \\ \mathbf{I}_k & \vdots \\ & s_k \end{pmatrix}$$

- Attacker is left with more unconstrained variables than linear equations and infinitely many solutions
 - $RREF(\mathbf{A}')$ is not a one to one mapping

Protocol Overhead

- Computation Complexity
 - $SVD \rightarrow O(4m^2n + 8mn^2 + 9n^3)$ for a m by n matrix
 - Matrix-matrix multiplication $\rightarrow (\leq O(n^{2.807}))$
 - matrix-vector multiplication $\rightarrow (O(n^2))$
- Storage Overhead

$$SO = \frac{(\lceil(\lceil\sqrt{(\text{FSIZE}/\text{PARTS})}\rceil \times (1 + \text{CHAFF}))\rceil)^2}{\text{FSIZE}/\text{PARTS}}$$

- Example: MBC breaks a 1MB file into four partitions, the storage overhead is 4.3% greater than that of the unencoded 1MB file for 2% chaff



Efficient Chaff Verification

- Chaff is derived from the left null space of the encoding matrix
 - Chaff is orthogonal to vectors derived from column space
- Subspaces of the column space can be used to check the chaff present in a file

$$E^{*T} \left(\sum_{x=1}^n (u_x \times r_x) \right) = (v_1, \dots, v_m)^T$$

- Any resulting zeros in the multiplication of the encoded data by the column vector correspond to columns of chaff

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Protocol Extensions

Encoding in Finite Fields

- **Problem:** Floating point arithmetic has rounding error(s)
 - Limits storage capability
 - Can cause issues with data reconstruction
- **Solution:** Perform calculations over finite fields
 - Exact calculations over large, prime fields (no rounding error)
 - Changes security proofs, but does not weaken the security of the system

Parity Through Chaff Scaling


- **Problem:** How do we achieve fine-grained data integrity?
 - Currently, the solution determines if the file is correct or not
- **Solution:** Use chaff columns as data integrity checks
 - Chaff can be freely scaled with no adverse effect on decoding
 - Each column acts as the checksum for preceding data columns

Parity Through Chaff Scaling (2)



- Since each chaff column is in the left null space, they can be independently scaled without affecting recovery
- Scale each of the m columns of chaff by a parity value calculated from n/m columns of original data E
- Parity can be through xor, summation, multiplication, etc.
- After data is recovered, finding correct parity values effectively guarantees correctness in associated data columns

Resiliency via Rateless Coding

- **Problem:** How do we get data back when there are network issues?
- **Solution:** Leverage rateless, locally-encodable codes
 - each file of size has practically infinite encoding possibility
 - encoding blocks can be computed quickly and independently of other blocks
- Allows for reconstruction if networking or providers fail
- Allows for informed trade-offs between cost, resiliency, and information security
- Initial testing is being conducted



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Secure Distributed Set Membership

Secure Distributed Set Membership

- **Problem:** Long-term Encryption is fragile
- **Solution:** Secret Sharing for Provably Secure Systems
- Archives that distribute data with secret sharing can provide information theoretic data protections and a resilience to:
 - malicious insiders,
 - compromised systems, and
 - untrusted components.
- We are developing ways to functionally use secret shares without reassembly