

Used Fuel Disposition Campaign

Deep Borehole Emplacement Mode Hazard Analysis (DBEMHA)

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Outline

- Purpose and approach
- Treatment of consequences
- Categories of failures/errors
- Choice of hazard analysis method
- Combined Event Tree/Fault Tree example from YMP PCSA*
- Preliminary Event Tree/Fault Trees for wireline emplacement
 - Drop-in-hole hazard
 - Stuck-in-hole hazard
- Component failure databases (probabilities, frequencies)
- Future work, including drill string emplacement hazards
- References

Purpose and Approach

■ Discriminate between emplacement mode options (*drill string vs. wireline*), according to

- What accidents could occur and how likely are they during deep-borehole emplacement of waste packages

■ Primary steps/aspects of hazard/risk analysis:


1. Hazard identification and event sequence construction (*what can happen?* – “causes”)
2. Consequence analysis (*what are the consequences if it happens?*)
3. Frequency/probability analysis (*how likely is it to happen?*, including uncertainty ranges)
4. Risk calculation (*how bad is it?* – product of frequency and consequence)
5. Decision analysis (*how should we proceed in light of the risk?*)



Level of Consequences

- Cause \Rightarrow Event \Rightarrow Consequence
- Prevention & Mitigation \Rightarrow Safety Functions/Barriers in the Design

**“Bow-tie”
Diagram***



Often used for
risk analysis in
the oil industry

■ Level of Consequence in DBEMHA:

- Loss of operational capability: “yes/no”
- Potential waste package breach condition exists: “yes/no”
 - Similar to consequences in Level 1 NPP PRA: “core damage yes/no”


Some Assumptions & Simplifications

- Accident analysis begins subsequent to bolting of shipping cask to wellhead (including nothing prior to reaching the site)
- Only internal events for now (i.e., omit seismic, weather-related, etc.)
- No malevolent acts
- No simultaneous initiating events (standard PRA practice because of low probability and because either event ceases operations)
- Typical risk consequences not considered at this point, such as
 - Personnel risk (e.g., injury or fatality)
 - Environmental risks (e.g., groundwater contamination; biota damage)

Wireline Emplacement in Deep Borehole



← Attach cable head to waste package



Lower waste package
through BOP and downhole

Three categories for failures/errors*

- Hazardous events can result from either actions (e.g., human acts) or component failures (e.g. battery, sensor) or a combination—three major categories....
- Passive component failures (usually towards the top of a fault tree)
 - Includes components such as the waste package, casing, tubing, and passive BOP components
 - Conditional failure probability (i.e., following a structural or thermal challenge) requires an engineering calculation (fragility and damage analysis) using process models, e.g., probability of damage/failure from mechanical stress (dropping, bumping), probability of damage/failure from thermal stresses (fire)
- Active component failures:
 - Includes components such as electric cable head release, wireline winch, wireline sheave wheels, interlock systems, cranes, active BOP components (rams), UPS, batteries, diesel generators, wireline (fatigue), etc.
 - Failure probability (“demand”-based) or failure frequency (time-based) come from industry and governmental reliability databases for electro-mechanical equipment
- Human errors/failures

* Also used to classify the “criticality” of minimal cut sets, by Rausand and Hoyland 2004, Table 3.2

Choosing a Hazard Evaluation (HE) Method

- From: CCPS (*Center for Chemical Process Safety*) 1992, *Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2nd Edition*, AIChE:

- “Selecting an appropriate HE technique is more an art than a science”
- Detailed flow charts and criteria for choosing the best HE method (seven pages)

- After DOE 1997: *DOE Standard: Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports*. DOE-STD-1027-92:

- For a Nuclear Hazard Category 2 Facility (facility with a potential for “significant on-site consequences”):

Type/Complexity of Facility	Recommended Hazard Evaluation Method
Low-Complexity	Checklist Analysis or other simple “Hazard Analysis”
Single-Failure Electro-Mechanical Systems	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Systems with Redundant Barriers or Requiring Multiple Failures	Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Large, Moderately Complex Processes	Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Complex Fluid Processes	Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
High Complexity Facilities	Integrated Event Tree and Fault Tree Techniques (ETAs/FTAs)

← YMP PCSA*







Figure 5.3 (continued)

- Combines ETA and FTA:
 - Each “pivotal event” (i.e., intermediate event) in the PCSA event sequences was decomposed using a *fault tree* to define its probability of occurrence
- PCSA used a well-established methodology codified in various NUREGs of the U.S. NRC (e.g., see NRC 1983)
- Example hazardous events associated with Canister Transfer Machine (CTM) operations inside the Canister Receipt and Closure Facility (CRCF):

CTM: Transfers waste canister from transportation cask to waste package



Example Event Tree/Fault Tree Combination for Canister Transfer Machine (CTM)



End states

1. OK
2. Direct exposure, shielding loss
3. Radionuclide release, filtered by HVAC
4. Radionuclide release, filtered by HVAC, also important to criticality
5. Radionuclide release, unfiltered by HVAC
6. Radionuclide release, unfiltered by HVAC, also important to criticality




- Generated with SAPHIRE v8.1.24
- Top and intermediate events in fault tree shown in **blue**; basic events shown in **purple**
- Probabilities are just placeholders

Structural Challenge to Waste Package	Waste Package Not Breached	#	End State (Phase -)
INIT-STRUCTURAL	LOSS-BREACH		


1	OK-CONTINUE
2	ABANDON-SEAL

**Example
End States**





- Generated with SAPHIRE v8.1.24
- Top and intermediate events in fault tree shown in blue; basic events shown in purple
- Probabilities are just placeholders



1. Component failure event databases, e.g.,

- GIDEP (Government Industry Data Exchange Program) in the U.S.

2. Accident and incident databases, e.g.,

- WOAD (World Offshore Accident Databank), by DNV (Det Norske Veritas)
- Oil and Gas UK (co-sponsored by the UK Health and Safety Executive)
- PSID (Process Safety Incident Database), by AIChE

3. Component reliability databases, e.g.,

- OREDA (Offshore Reliability Database), by DNV
- NRPD (Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Database), by RAIC, a DoD center
- PERD (Process Equipment Reliability Database), by AIChE

4. Common cause failure databases

- CCFDB (Common-Cause Failure Database), by the U.S. NRC

5. Various databases cited in YMP PCSA

* First four major categories of “hardware” reliability databases are according to Rausand and Hoyland (2004), Sec. 14.2. Also, see Vinnem (2007), Sec. 5.9.

Future Work


- Generate a more detailed wireline fault tree
- Generate a detailed fault tree for drill string emplacement (see next slide)
- Refine consequence terminology and detail
- Determine available accident frequencies and failure probabilities that might be applicable to either wireline or drill string emplacement operations
- Convene an expert panel to review fault trees, accident frequencies, and failure probabilities

A wide-angle photograph of a sunset. The sky is filled with large, billowing clouds that are heavily backlit, appearing in shades of orange, red, and yellow. The horizon line is visible in the distance, where the warm colors of the sunset meet a dark, silhouetted landscape. On the right side of the frame, the dark silhouette of an industrial facility is visible, featuring tall towers and what appears to be a chimney emitting a small plume of smoke. The overall mood is one of a serene yet industrial landscape.

Thanks for your attention!

Back-up Slides

Preliminary Fault Tree for *Drill String* Emplacement



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Problems Encountered During Wireline and CT Operations

Activity	% failure on first run	% failure on second run	Comments
WL run to EOT in 2-3/8" tubing	14%		improve if cool water circulated ⁴
WL run to EOT in larger tubing	<2%		
WL Plug setting	5%		Assumes low scale, low paraffin environment
WL Plug pulling	20%	15%	Debris over plug is major problem
CT Plug Setting	10 to 15%		Problems in sensitivity and depth control
CT plug pulling	10 to 15%		
WL Perforating	2% to 3%	<1%	detonator/conductivity problems, assumes tubing is open to TD ³²
CT Perforating	5% to 8%	3%	detonator/gun-to-gun failure, assumes tubing is open to TD ³²
Tubing Puncher Charge	5%		Depends on magnetic decentralizer operation ³³
Tube cut off, below packer	75%	75%	Incomplete cut without tension ²⁹
Tube cut off, above packer	20%	20%	Insufficient overpull, coatings & heavy or alloy pipe ^{29,30}
Sliding Sleeve Operation	10 to 50%		depends on age, corrosion and debris, improve with CT impact tool on CT


Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

■ Major steps in an event tree analysis (e.g., after Rausand and Hoyland 2004; CCPS 1992), an *inductive* technique:

1. Identification of an *initiating event* (*hazard*) causing the accident or failure
2. Identification/design of *safety functions* /barriers/procedures to mitigate the initiating event—failure of a barrier results in an “*intermediate*” event
3. Construction of the *event tree**
4. Description of the resulting accident *event sequences*
5. Calculation of *frequencies/probabilities*:
frequency of end state(s) =
frequency of initiating event
× probability of each
intermediate event

*Convention: Upper branches represents success (“true”), while lower branches represent failure (“false”).

Example event tree*



* Taken from Rausand, M. and A. Hoyland 2004. *System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical Methods, and Applications*, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ.

■ Five major steps in an fault tree analysis (e.g., after Rausand and Hoyland 2004), a *deductive* technique:

1. Definition of the problem and the **boundary conditions**, including definition of “**top event**”
2. **Construction of the fault tree**, backwards from “immediate cause events” (just below top event) to a level of “**basic events**” or causes
3. Identification of minimal “**cut sets**”**
4. **Qualitative analysis** of the fault tree
5. **Quantitative analysis** of the fault tree

** Minimal “cut set” = *smallest combination of basic events (e.g., component failures) which, if they all occur or exist, will cause the top event to occur*

Fault tree for one of the *initiating events* that might compromise a canister in the YMP Canister Transfer Machine (CTM)




Figure 1.7-8. Example of Fault Tree of the Preclosure Safety Analysis (Sheet 9 of 12)

Strengths of Fault Tree Analysis

- Easily combines **human** and **equipment** failure (both of which are expected to be possible in DBH emplacement)
- Can be used to derive the probability of complex intermediate (“pivotal”) events in an event sequence




Figure 1.7-8. Example of Fault Tree of the Preclosure Safety Analysis (Sheet 1 of 12)

NOTE: CTM = canister transfer machine.

Source: [BSC 2008 \[DIRS 180095\], Attachment B, Section B4.4.1.8.](#)

Potential “Internal” Hazardous Events for *Wireline Emplacement*—based on emplacement steps

Event Identifier	Description of Potential Hazardous Event (based on sequential emplacement steps)	Risk Mitigation Measures, Assumptions, and Other Notes	Screening decision (include/exclude)
TOP EVENT	Loss of control of waste package		include
Immediate-cause event	Drop waste package during surface operations	Risk prevention measure: Cask/wellhead-safety-door/blind-ram interlock system	include
Immediate-cause event	Drop waste package during trip into hole		include
Immediate-cause event	Waste package sticks in guidance casing or hanger during trip into hole		include
Basic event	Prior to attachment of cable head, the operator mistakenly opens the lower door on the shipping cask instead of the upper one, dropping package onto the “safety door” in the wellhead below	Risk prevention measure: Door/ram/wireline hoist interlock system, including a “deadman” lock out (in case of loss of power or inadvertent energization). This event is not considered to be “loss of control”.	exclude
Basic event	Upper cask door closes accidentally after cable head is attached but while lower cask door is still closed.	Risk prevention measure: A restraint to prevent upper door closing is set prior to cable head attachment. Furthermore, the package has “no where to go” at this point, so no loss of control	exclude
Basic event	Cable head pulls loose, dropping the package on the lower cask door, because operator accidentally tried to spool the cable upward beyond the range-limiting pin	Risk prevention assumption: Such a drop within the cask would be small and not cause damage to the package, the cask, or the lower door.	exclude
Basic event	Lower cask door closes inadvertently on the wireline		include
Basic event	Lower cask door closes inadvertently on the waste package	Risk prevention assumption: Waste package is strong enough to be structurally unaffected.	exclude
Basic event	Upper cask door closes inadvertently on the wireline		include
Basic event	Wellhead safety door closes inadvertently on the wireline		include

Potential “Internal” Hazardous Events for *Wireline Emplacement*—based on emplacement steps (cont.)

Event Identifier	Description of Potential Hazardous Event (based on sequential emplacement steps)	Risk Mitigation Measures, Assumptions, and Other Notes	Screening decision (include/exclude)
Basic event	Wellhead safety door closes inadvertently on the waste package	<u>Risk prevention assumption:</u> Waste package is strong enough to be structurally unaffected.	exclude
Basic event	BOP closes inadvertently on the wireline		include
Basic event	BOP (blind ram) closes inadvertently on the waste package	<u>Risk prevention assumption:</u> Waste package is strong enough to be structurally unaffected.	exclude
Basic event	Bird cage of wireline	<u>Risk prevention measure:</u> Automated speed and tension control on wireline winch	include
Basic event	Wireline fatigue failure	<u>Risk prevention measure:</u> Schlumberger TuffLINE cable	include
Basic event	Wireline winch failure		include
Basic human event	Operator spools waste package “past TD” or “past previous waste package”	<u>Risk prevention measure:</u> Procedural and software controls; “crush box” on bottom of waste package	include
Basic human event	Operator pushes cable head release button prematurely		include
Basic event	Electrical-mechanical fail-safe in cable head malfunctions and releases waste package early		include
Basic event	Undetected narrowing of guidance or tieback casing or associated hangers	<u>Risk prevention measure:</u> Caliper log run prior to waste package emplacement trip	include
Basic event	Site-wide power failure	<u>Risk prevention measure:</u> UPS battery backup	include
Basic event	Cable head fails to release while package is at TD	May not result in a loss of control	exclude
Basic event	Cable head releases on trip out with waste package still attached, releasing package to free fall to the bottom	Requires a joint underlying event with a very low probability, i.e., cable head failed to actuate at TD and tension guage does not indicate this extra weight on the trip out	exclude