

Electric Power Systems Resilience

Ross Guttromson, Senior Member IEEE

And Many Other Major Contributors at Sandia National Laboratories

Sandia National Laboratories

IEEE ISGT Meeting, Washington DC

February, 2015

Today's Discussion

- Introduction
- Defining Resilience
- Resilience Metrics
- Resilience Analysis and Improvements
- Microgrid Designs for Resilience

Where Is New Mexico?

- 5th largest state in the US
- Population: 2.1 million
- New Mexico is known for its beautiful landscape, rich culture, high tech industry, plentiful wind and solar resources



Defining Resilience



Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21


1. “[preserve] infrastructure that are vital to the **public confidence** and the Nation's **safety, prosperity, and well-being.**”
2. “[prevent] debilitating impact on the national **security, economic** stability, **public health** and **safety**, or any combination thereof”
3. “...analyze threats to, vulnerabilities of, and potential consequences from all hazards on critical infrastructures”.

-PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience

“without some numerical basis for assessing resilience, it would be impossible to monitor changes or show that community resilience has improved. At present, no consistent basis for such measurement exists...”

-Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, National Academy of Sciences

Resilience: A Risk-Based Approach



Probability of Consequences =
 $f(\text{vulnerability, threat})$

Resilience Metrics and Their Gaps

- **Attribute based metrics** are primarily used today (e.g. number of critical spare transformers)
 - They don't quantify resilience
 - They don't indicate certainty about effectiveness
- **Performance based metrics:**
 - Are quantitative and denote uncertainty
 - Allow optimal allocation of resources in system planning and operations
 - Provide an ability to differentiate resilience among systems
 - Inform development of policy goals and the assessment of their effectiveness
 - Achieve **utility** in exchange for **complexity**

Resilience versus Reliability

Differentiating reliability and resilience is important


- Reliability is compulsory
- Reliability is related to rate recovery
- Adoption of resilience metrics will be easier if reliability definitions remain as-is

Reliability	Resilience
High Probability, Low Consequence (SAIDI/SAIFI exclude storm data)	Low Probability, High Consequence
Not risk based	Risk Based, includes: Threat (you are resilient to something) System Vulnerability (~reliability) Consequence (beyond the system)
Operationally, You are reliable, or you are not [0 1]. Confidence is unspecified	Resilience is a continuum, confidence is specified
Focus is on the measuring impact to the system	Focus is on measuring impact to humans

Reliability versus Resilience

- Is it possible to have two systems with identical reliability but different resilience?
 - Yes
- Why? Because reliability focuses on the system and resilience focuses on the social impact (via the system).

Moving Forward with Resilience Analysis




Resilience Metrics


Probability of Consequence X, Given Threat Y

- Category 5 Hurricane
- Flood, Ice Storm
- Geo-Magnetic Disturbance
- Combined Physical/Cyber Attack
- Threat Vector


- Financial Loss
- Lives at Risk
- Environmental Loss



Evaluating System Improvements




Ex: How Should We Invest \$100M?




Baseline
mean was
\$990M

Invest the same \$100M in both
flood walls and burying cables


\$100M of generator flood
walls only




\$100M of burying lines
only




\$100M of burying lines
and generator flood walls



Change the Dispatch Objective



VS




In our IEEE 118 bus resiliency example, it is possible to mitigate nearly all economic consequences of the posited hurricane

Designing Microgrids for Resilience

- Engage stakeholders
- **Establish a design basis** Define performance metrics
- Define system boundaries
- Collect system and operations info and data
- Generate feasible designs
 - **measure performance against the design basis**
 - improve the design
 - repeat

Pareto Optimality Using Genetic Algorithms




Topology

Performance

Event
Driven
Simulation

Monte
Carlo
Analysis





Each dot is a different
microgrid layout

NJ TransitGrid

Utility Grid

- Central Power Plant
- Microgrid Distribution Network
- Efficient Distributed Resources





COOPR

Mixed Integer Optimization

Early Solution Subset:
Steiner Tree Problem

Objective: minimize cost

Constraints:

Serve all loads

\$300/linear foot

\$20K for a junction

Solution: \$6.7M for
Trenching – with an
optimality gap of 5%.

Least cost topology for a single
large microgrid



Ross Guttromson

Manager, Electric Power Systems Research

Sandia National Laboratories

rguttro@sandia.gov

505-284-6096