SAND2015-2533C

Sensor Fusion for Intrusion Detection Under False Alarm Constraints

Matthew Pugh[1]
Jerry Brewer[1]
Jacques Kvam[2]

[1]Sandia National Laboratories [1]

[2]Verdigris Technologies

SAS 2015

[1]Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

Table of Contents

Introduction

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Why is this important?

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Why is this important?

- Mostly focused on detectability
- False alarms cost money

Motivational Questions

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Assumption: Components function properly

Test Bed

Sensor Module

- Tri-axis accelerometer
- Photo-detector
- Passive infrared sensor

Instrumented Room

- Placed 8 sensor modules along walls
- Modules connected via CAN bus

Objective

- Collect background data
- Collected data during entry
- Develop algorithm to detect entry given a false alarm rate
  - **Binary decision problem**



Unknown Everything?

Binary Decision Problem: Intrusion?

- What are the null and alternative hypotheses?
- What is the distribution of the background noise data?
- What is the structure/distribution of the signal?

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Unclear how to model PIR Sensors



Classic Example: Detection Theory

Deciding whether or not a DC signal is present in AWGN

- H_0: noise only
- H_1: Known DC signal + noise
- **Note**: Signal and noise models are known!

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



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



Classic Example: ROC Curves

Error probabilities depend on Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)

- Signal power
- Signal length
- Noise variance





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

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

Approach

- Model background "noise"
- Declare an event when signal deviates from the background by a specified amount
- Threshold determined by false alarm constraint
- Theoretical ROC curves not possible

Matching the Noise Distribution

Statistical Model of Noise Distribution $\rightarrow$ Problem Solved

- Compute threshold to meet false alarm requirement
- Declare an event when signal metric exceeds threshold

Example

- H_0: Noise only
- H_1: Not noise



- Selected threshold s.t. probability of false alarm is 5%
- Threshold computed from distribution of noise metric
- What is the distribution of the noise metric?

Time Domain Approach



Looks "close" to a Gaussian marginal distribution

- Need to be confident otherwise false alarm constraint is meaningless
- How to have confidence?
  - Match data to theoretical model
  - Gather large amounts of data for empirical estimates

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

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

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Analyze distribution of frequency components











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









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









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









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

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- Mahalanobis distance
- Easily computable
- Known distribution given Gaussian frequency components
- χ^2 distribution for Mahalanobis distance
- Closed-form threshold

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

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Combined Results

- 8 PIR sensors
- False Alarm Constraint: $P_{FA} = 10^{-3}$ per year





Event Data





Scaled Event Data

Future Directions

Adapting Statistical Parameters

- Continuously update estimates of mean and covariance

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Optimization of Design Parameters

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- Combine PIR with photo-detectors and accelerometers

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Sensor Failure Detection

- Current algorithm declares an event when threshold is exceeded
  - Sensor failure could cause algorithm to exceed threshold
- Need to disambiguate between failures and events

Conclusion

Focused on development of detection algorithms with false alarm constraints

- Found metric on background data that matches known closed-form distribution
  - Frequency components
  - Subset Selection: Principal Component Analysis
  - Mahalanobis Distance: χ^2 distributed
    - Combine all PIR sensors into a single metric
- Determine threshold to meet false alarm constraint
- Algorithm performs well on collected data

Still a lot of work to be done

Conclusion

Thank You!

Special Thanks:
Jacques Kvam
Jerry Brewer

Any Questions?