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Lessons in Nuclear Safety, Panel on Integration of People and Programs

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Lessons in Nuclear Safety – Panel on Integration of People and Programs

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Nuclear Safety Historical Perspective

History

- Successive waves of change
 - Golden age of funding and production, becomes...
 - Consolidation age around surviving complex, becomes...
 - Reduction age, shrinking both capability & funding footprint
- Current conditions
 - Staff reductions at all sites
 - Increasing workload due to increasing requirements
 - Audit and review expectations continually escalate
- People and programs are no longer aligned

Nuclear Safety – Systemic Misalignment

- Available resources do not match expectations
 - Cascade of work too often perceived as simply something to be critiqued
 - Accelerates staff moving on to other jobs or retiring
 - “One man deep” concerns cited by both DOE and contractors
- Demographic cliff developing
- Promulgation of increased expectations and new requirements proceeds unabated

Nuclear Safety – Needs

- Financial stability
 - Management theory and commitments to excellence have become the Band-Aid for this
 - They can't cover the gap
- Operational stability
 - Attributes of operation (e.g., procedures, training, safety basis) are elevated in significance above the actual operation itself
 - Constant change becomes the norm
 - Drives off staff & detrimental to actual worker safety
- Succession planning
 - Young people are sensitive to perceived funding issues
 - Overloaded staff limits mentoring opportunities
 - Opportunities to retain select senior staff close off with each audit

Nuclear Safety – “The System”

- The current universe of requirements is too large for the resource pool available
- The current universe of requirements has too many different sources of interpretation
- So many indicators it's hard to know what is leading (or important)
- The net result can come to defy integrated comprehension at the worker level

**If “The System” was a SAC
It Would Fail Human Factors Analysis**

