Appliance Efficiency Standards and Price Discrimination
- Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)
I explore the effects of two simultaneous changes in minimum energy efficiency and ENERGY STAR standards for clothes washers. Adapting the Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Ronnen (1991) second-degree price discrimination model, I demonstrate that clothes washer prices and menus adjusted to the new standards in patterns consistent with a market in which firms had been price discriminating. In particular, I show evidence of discontinuous price drops at the time the standards were imposed, driven largely by mid-low efficiency segments of the market. The price discrimination model predicts this result. On the other hand, in a perfectly competition market, prices should increase for these market segments. Additionally, new models proliferated in the highest efficiency market segment following the standard changes. Finally, I show that firms appeared to use different adaptation strategies at the two instances of the standards changing.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Science (SC)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC02-05CH11231
- OSTI ID:
- 1171529
- Report Number(s):
- LBNL-6283E
- Resource Relation:
- Related Information: Designation of Academic Dissertation: Essays in Energy Economics; Academic Degree: Doctoral; Name of Academic Institution: University California, Berkeley; Location of Academic Institution: Berkeley, California, USA
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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