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Revision 0

After Action Report: Idaho National Laboratory Annual Exercise August 1, 2014

Scott V. Barnes

September 2014

The INL is a U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory
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Emergency Management

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Idaho National Laboratory Annual Exercise
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September 2014

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9-15-14
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Date

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TABLES

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ACRONYMS

BEA	Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC
BED	building emergency director
CFA	Central Facilities Area
CWI	CH2M-WG Idaho, LLC
DOE	Department of Energy
DOE-HQ	Department of Energy Headquarters
EAL	emergency action level
EAM	emergency action manager
ECC	emergency control center
ED	emergency director
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EMT	emergency medical technician
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
ERO	emergency response organization
FAC	Fire Alarm Center
IC	incident commander
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
INTEC	Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center
JIC	Joint Information Center
MFC	Materials and Fuels Complex
OE	operational emergency
PA	protective action
PID	public information director
WCC	Warning Communications Center

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1. PURPOSE

On August 1, 2014, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in coordination with the State of Idaho, local jurisdictions, Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho Operations Office, and DOE Headquarters (DOE-HQ), conducted the annual emergency exercise to demonstrate the ability to implement the requirements of DOE O 151.1C, "Comprehensive Emergency Management System." The INL contractor, Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA), in coordination with other INL contractors, conducted operations and demonstrated appropriate response measures to mitigate an event and protect the health and safety of personnel, the environment, and property. Offsite response organizations participated to demonstrate appropriate response measures.

Report data were collected from multiple sources, which included documentation generated during exercise response, player critiques conducted immediately after terminating the exercise, personnel observation sheets, and evaluation critiques.

Evaluation of this exercise served as a management assessment of the performance of the INL Emergency Management Program (IAS141618).

2. SCOPE

Exercise participants and their extent of play are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Exercise participants and extent of play.

Participants	Extent of Play
INL/BEA Organizations	
Central Facilities Area (CFA) Emergency Control Center (ECC)	Full participation
INL Bus Operations	Limited participation
INL Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	Full participation
INL Fire Alarm Center (FAC)	Full participation
INL Fire Department	Full participation
INL Joint Information Center (JIC)	Full participation
INL Occupational Medical Program	Full participation
INL Security	Full participation
INL Warning Communications Center (WCC)	Full participation
Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) ECC	Full participation
Other Site Contractors	
Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC)—CH2M-WG Idaho, LLC (CWI)	Limited participation
Naval Reactors Facility—Bechtel Bettis	Limited participation
Contiguous Counties	
Bingham	Notifications only
Bonneville	Notifications only

Table 1. (cont.)

Participants	Extent of Play
Butte	Notifications only
Clark	Notifications only
Jefferson	Notifications only
Federal Agencies	
DOE-HQ Watch Office	Notifications only
DOE Idaho Operations Office	Full participation
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Air Resource Laboratory	Full participation
State of Idaho Agencies	
Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security	Notifications only
Idaho State Communications Center	Notifications only
Idaho State Police	Notifications only
INL Oversight Program	Notifications only
Tribal Authority	
Shoshone/Bannock Tribes	Notifications only

3. SCENARIO SUMMARY

The exercise was conducted in two parts. Both Parts 1 and 2 were conducted on August 1, 2014.

Part 1 was initiated by response to a fire alarm in Building MFC-1729, Irradiated Material Chemistry Laboratory, at MFC. Personnel in the affected building evacuated as a result of fire alarm activation. INL Fire Department personnel entered the building and simulated putting out the fire. The MFC, CFA, JIC, and INL EOC emergency response organizations (EROs) were activated to respond to the emergency. Accountability of personnel was completed. During the fire response activities, an active shooter scenario was initiated that required INL Security personnel to respond, neutralize the shooter, and secure the area. Once INL Security personnel established a safe cordon, INL Security and INL Fire Department personnel established unified command. INL Fire Department Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel responded to the active shooter event area. With INL Security personnel escort, EMS personnel entered the area to triage, treat, and transport the victims (simulated).

Part 2 involved a media briefing on the event and the mitigation status at the time of the briefing.

The full scenario description is provided in Appendix A.

4. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EVALUATION

During the exercise, 15 of the 16 standardized INL objectives were evaluated for INL using the appropriate demonstration criteria. Ten of the objectives were rated fully satisfactory and five of the objectives were rated satisfactory with improvement needed.

The ratings in Table 2 are based on the observations that follow in Section 5. The gray shading within Table 2 represents an area not observed or rated.

Table 2. Evaluation matrix.

Participant	Objectives[1]															
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
MFC ECC	S		S	I	S	I			S	S	S			S	S	S
INL EOC	I	S	I	I	S	I	I		I	S	I	S		S	S	S
CFA ECC	S								S	S	I					S
INL Fire Department											S	S	I			S
INL JIC							I			I	S					S
INL Occupational Medical Program										S	S	S				S
INL Security	S								S	S	S					S
INL WCC/INL FAC				S						S	I					S
Overall	S	S	S	I	S	I	I		S	S	I	S	I	S	S	S

[1] Objectives:
1. ERO response
2. Offsite response interfaces
3. Emergency event categorization and classification
4. Notifications
5. Consequence assessment
6. Protective actions (PAs)
7. Public information
8. Monitoring team activities
9. Security measures
10. Emergency facilities and equipment
11. Communications
12. Medical
13. Fire and rescue
14. Reentry
15. Recovery
16. Drill/exercise conduct

[2] Ratings: S = Satisfactory
I = Satisfactory with improvement needed.

5. EXERCISE ISSUES

The following issues are specific to the evaluation of INL. Each item has been evaluated and entered into the INL issues management program currently referred to as LabWay.

5.1 Emergency Response Organization Response

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO will respond to, monitor, and evaluate the specific indicators of an emergency for mitigation of the consequences and bring the emergency situation under control.

Discussion

The MFC emergency action manager (EAM) activated the MFC ERO using the voice paging system. The MFC EAM then notified the INL WCC of MFC ERO activation. The WCC followed established procedures and practices to activate the INL EOC and CFA EROs and INL JIC. ERO members responded to their respective duty stations in a timely manner and the emergency facilities were declared operational when minimum staffing requirements were met. MFC and CFA ERO members effectively demonstrated their knowledge of response resources and capabilities by using applicable procedures and position-specific checklists throughout the exercise and documented activities in activity logs and using WebEOC. In some cases, EOC ERO members initially reviewed their checklists and then some EOC ERO members did not refer to them again for approximately 1 hour. During that time, several steps in those checklists were applicable, but not followed. Catching up on checklists late in the exercise appeared

to be a common practice in the EOC Command Room. Some EOC ERO members did not maintain their activity logs as up-to-date as they should have. A couple of EOC WebEOC entries were inaccurate. For example, a WebEOC entry at 1137 specified that the EOC was declared operational at 1332 instead of at 1132, which is when the EOC was actually declared operational, but no correction was made.

Appropriate support/technical personnel were identified and used and sufficient data were obtained and analyzed to support the needs of the MFC, INL EOC, and CFA EROs in assessing and mitigating the event. Tasks were identified and assigned and completed by appropriate personnel. MFC ECC personnel completed a consequence assessment form early during the event and submitted it to EOC hazards assessment personnel. EOC hazards assessment specialists successfully evaluated the materials that were in the building where the active shooter event occurred to determine what other hazards might be involved.

The MFC and CFA ECCs effectively demonstrated command and control. The MFC and CFA EAMs effectively briefed their respective ECC personnel at the onset and throughout the exercise. When the fire event moved to an active shooter event, the MFC EAM was proactive in ensuring that MFC ERO members responded as trained. The INL EOC did not effectively demonstrate command and control. In some instances, the EOC support director and assistant support director appeared to make decisions or perform tasks that the INL emergency director (ED) should have made/performed. Prior to declaring the EOC operational, the ED conducted an initial briefing of EOC personnel at 1128; no other briefings occurred until 1242. Individual EOC ERO members briefed the ED and other EOC Command Room personnel but ED briefings of EOC personnel were very limited. Several times, the ED relied on using the open microphone or speaker phone during command bridge briefings so EOC personnel could listen in instead of conducting separate briefings. This caused confusion on several aspects of the event. One item in particular was the identity of the victims. While EOC Command Room personnel were aware that the victims were all BEA personnel, this was not general knowledge of the rest of EOC personnel as evidenced by confusion of the CWI representative.

Overall, INL ERO members demonstrated satisfactory performance of their duties. MFC ECC, INL EOC, and CFA ECC staffing levels were adequate to support the scenario. Priorities were established and emphasis was placed on personnel protection. ERO members successfully demonstrated their competencies, knowledge of response resources, and capabilities by obtaining sufficient information and data from a variety of sources and correctly accessing the information provided during the exercise. They assessed the situation and implemented recommended PAs identified by procedures. Areas for improvement for the EOC are better demonstration of command and control and better attention to detail by more frequently reviewing procedures.

Issues

- No issues identified.

Opportunities for Improvement

- INL EOC procedure use was limited during the exercise. Five EOC ERO positions were evaluated and only the ERO member filling the assessment specialist position reviewed the procedures during the entire exercise. The ERO members filling the remaining four ERO positions only reviewed the procedures initially and then intermittently thereafter. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0553.**
- A single INL ED was not in charge of the overall response. The INL EOC support director and assistant support director occasionally made decisions or performed tasks normally reserved for the ED. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0554.**

5.2 Offsite Response Interfaces

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO will coordinate and interface with response organizations to protect the environment and health and safety of the public.

Discussion

The INL WCC completed all offsite notifications in the appropriate time using established procedures and practices. Emergency facility equipment functioned to allow written and verbal communications among the various agencies. Follow-up notifications were simulated to local and offsite agencies.

For this scenario, effective interface and coordination with applicable agencies responsible for offsite emergency response were successfully demonstrated.

Issues

- No issues identified.

5.3 Emergency Event Categorization and Classification

The ERO will accurately and promptly categorize and classify the operational emergency (OE) in accordance with the facility procedures/plan.

Discussion

The MFC EAM understood the emergency action level (EAL) scheme and used appropriate procedures to correctly categorize the event. The MFC EAM was notified that there was fire and smoke at 1059 and declared an OE using the correct EAL, MFC-ALL-1.OE.1, at 1104, well within the required 15 minutes.

The INL EOC assessment specialist reviewed the event information and compared it to the MFC EALs and concurred that the correct EAL had been identified. The MFC EAM transferred the event categorization/classification function to the INL ED but there was confusion during the transfer. Normally, the notification, categorization/classification, and PA functions are transferred to the ED at the same time. During the exercise, two things attributed to the confusion. First, the established procedures were not used to transfer the categorization/classification function and second, three-point communications, or repeatbacks, were not used during the transfer. The evaluator and controller were both unsure of what functions had been transferred to the ED. The ED continued to receive event information from MFC ECC personnel throughout the event and the EOC assessment specialist evaluated new information against applicable EALs. When the EOC received additional information regarding the active shooter, the ED added the applicable EAL to the notification form and provided the information to offsite agencies.

Issues

- Transfer of the categorization/classification function from the MFC EAM to the INL ED did not follow applicable procedures and conduct of operations principles, namely using repeatbacks to verify that both parties understood the information that was sent and received.

  Recommendation: Address this issue in requalification training or develop a lessons learned using this issue as an example on the importance of using repeatbacks during communications. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0555.**

5.4 Notifications

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO will report emergencies and conduct follow-up notifications to the appropriate organizations within the required time.

Discussion

The MFC EAM categorized the event at 1103 and initial offsite notification was completed at 1114. This is well within the required 30 minutes of categorization of an OE that is not further classified. Follow-up notifications were made in accordance with applicable procedures. When the active shooter portion of the exercise began, the applicable EAL was added to the notification form and submitted to the INL WCC for offsite distribution, which was simulated.

The same problem occurred when the MFC EAM transferred the notification function to the INL ED that occurred when the MFC EAM transferred the categorization/classification function since it is a common practice at INL to transfer the notification, categorization/classification, and PA functions at the same time. The MFC EAM and ED are trained to specify what function is transferred by stating each function individually. Though EPI-9, "Emergency Event Notifications," was not used, the confusion would have been cleared up if three-point communications or repeatbacks had been used.

Next-of-kin notifications were simulated once the INL EOC medical director received victim information. During last year's exercise, it was difficult to get victim identification information from the scene to the EOC medical director. During this exercise, the information was provided from the scene to the EOC medical director using the appropriate communication channels. When INL Fire Department EMS personnel were unable to contact the MFC Dispensary nurse, they followed appropriate protocols and contacted the INL WCC, and the WCC in turn transferred the call directly to the EOC medical director. The EOC medical director then simulated contacting INL Human Resources personnel to make next-of-kin notifications.

Issues

- Transfer of the notification function from the MFC EAM to the INL ED did not follow applicable procedures and conduct of operations principles, namely using repeatbacks to verify that both parties understood the information that was sent and received.

  Recommendation: Address this issue in requalification training or develop a lessons learned using this issue as an example on the importance of using repeatbacks during communications. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0555.**

5.5 Consequence Assessment

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO will assess actual and potential onsite and offsite consequences of an emergency.

Discussion

Initial consequence assessment was successfully demonstrated by using default assessment data. PA distances and identified EALs were verified. MFC ECC personnel gathered applicable event information from the scene and passed it on to the INL EOC assessment specialist using the planning bridge and consequence assessment form. When the fire event changed into an active shooter event and involved an additional building, EOC assessment specialists were proactive in identifying additional hazards that might be involved that could be released to the environment and what the PAs should be.

Meteorological information was available throughout the exercise and used in the consequence assessment process.

Overall, this objective was successfully demonstrated with the performance of the consequence assessment process and updates provided to the appropriate decision-makers.

Issues

- No issues identified.

5.6 Protective Actions

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO will respond to emergency conditions to protect onsite personnel and the public by implementing specific, predetermined actions.

Discussion

PAs were successfully implemented initially and throughout the exercise. Predetermined PAs were identified and available in the EALs. PA recommendations were not applicable to this event. Accountability of personnel was completed within 7 minutes of the first report of smoke and activation of the fire alarm.

Initial PAs were implemented when the fire alarm was activated. All personnel in the affected building evacuated to the designated staging area in accordance with established procedures and practices. The area warden conducted a building sweep and reported the area as clear.

The MFC EAM reviewed the PAs listed in the facility EALs throughout the event. When the fire event changed into an active shooter event, on-scene INL Security personnel quickly escorted all personnel, including INL Fire Department firefighters and EMS personnel, into a safe building. MFC implemented a security take shelter PA and INL Security personnel made periodic announcements to keep MFC personnel apprised of the situation.

The MFC EAM transferred the PA function to the INL ED at the same time as the notification and categorization/classification functions. Thus the same confusion occurred with the transfer of the PA function as with the transfer of the notification and categorization/classification functions. The ED and INL EOC assessment specialist verified the PAs based on facility knowledge and event information and kept MFC ECC personnel apprised of any changes or recommendations to PAs throughout the event.

Issues

- Transfer of the PA function from the MFC EAM to the INL ED did not follow applicable procedures and conduct of operations principles, namely using repeatbacks to verify that both parties understood the information that was sent and received.

  Recommendation: Address this issue in requalification training or develop a lessons learned using this issue as an example on the importance of using repeatbacks during communications. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0555.**

5.7 Public Information

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO will demonstrate an emergency public information program.

Discussion

The INL JIC was activated via text message at 1112 and declared operational at 1133. The JIC was declared operational within 21 minutes from the time it was activated. JIC personnel assembled and organized themselves according to their checklist assignments. They provided information to the INL EOC regarding rumors from the media and public. They provided professional responses to callers with "approved only" information. The JIC successfully demonstrated distribution of two news releases.

The INL JIC developed, obtained approval of, and distributed two news releases and was developing a third news release when Part 1 of the exercise was terminated at the EOC and the JIC stood down. The two approved news releases were used as handouts for mock media at the press conference.

INL JIC feedback indicated a dire need for approved information for news releases during the very early stage of an event, especially one as dramatic as this year's exercise. Actors and actresses calling the JIC media and public inquiry telephone lines described photos and text information that was shared from

the scene via different social media avenues (simulated). In an actual event, information would be posted on social media before INL could distribute an approved news release to personnel, the media, and stakeholders. As the holder and sharer of "official event information," INL must step up the pace on the release of official information.

A mock press conference was conducted in the afternoon with the MFC director, the INL ED, the INL EOC medical director, and an INL public relations representative. A briefing was given on the event and then a question and answer period was conducted. Personnel conducting the briefing answered questions from several actors in the audience in a professional and effective manner.

Issues

- If INL public information director (PID) assistants or other INL Communications and Governmental Affairs personnel must go to Site areas, go to the hospital(s), and staff the INL JIC at the same time, there will not be sufficient personnel to staff the INL EOC and JIC.

  Recommendation: Determine who can be trained and called upon as backup staff to interface with the media at the hospital and Site facilities while INL PID assistants remain in the INL EOC and INL JIC during an event that requires media interface at locations other than the EOC and JIC. **Enterprise LabWay No. CO 2014-4220.**

Opportunities for Improvement

- Develop a series of "preapproved" text (based on existing preapproved news releases) for the INL JIC to release during the very early stage of an emergency. The JIC should maintain the "preapproved" text in the Boltbucket Emergency Public Information network folder and also in hard copy form. During an emergency, the INL PID assistant or JIC manager should talk to the PID and find out which facility is affected and have the preapproved text available for use in INL social media distribution formats (Facebook and Twitter).
- Have printed, preapproved statements available to INL JIC Public and Media Inquiry personnel to share verbally until an initial news release is distributed.
- Post preapproved text to INL's Facebook and Twitter pages early in an event using the same text that appears on the preapproved initial news release. The preapproved text can be on hand in the INL JIC and posted quickly as soon as the location of the incident is determined.
- Have INL JIC leadership functions (INL PID assistants and JIC managers), INL EOC Public Information and Media Monitoring personnel participate in a social media workshop over the next year.
- Determine who will have access to INL's Facebook and Twitter pages to post information during INL emergencies; keep the requisite login information on hand in the INL JIC and INL EOC.

5.8 Monitoring Team Activities

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO provided facility/site monitoring teams in support of consequence assessment activities.

Issues

- Not evaluated.

5.9 Security Measures

Per facility procedures/plan, security will respond to, monitor, and evaluate the specific indicators of an emergency for mitigation of the consequences and to bring the emergency situation under control.

Discussion

INL Security personnel responded to the incident command post and established communications with the incident commander (IC). They quickly established access control to the affected areas and strictly controlled access to MFC throughout the exercise. INL Security personnel quickly moved emergency responders to a safe location when the report of shots fired came across the radio. INL Security personnel effectively responded to the active shooter portion of the exercise and effectively demonstrated command and control. The security captain established incident command for the security response. Once a safety cordon was established and it was determined that INL Fire Department EMS personnel could respond, unified command was established between the security captain and INL Fire Department battalion chief. INL Security personnel then escorted EMS personnel into the active shooter event area so they could effectively triage, treat, and transport the victims.

The MFC and CFA ECC security leaders responded and activated their ERO positions in a timely manner. They monitored security radio communications and kept their respective ERO members up-to-date on the event. They were patient in obtaining event information and demonstrated effective communication techniques.

The INL EOC security director and security specialist effectively monitored the event and updated the INL ED on road blocks and access control at MFC. When the active shooter portion of the exercise was initiated, there was confusion on how to obtain event information. EOC Security personnel contacted on-scene personnel to obtain information instead of relying on pre-established communication pathways. Specific questions should have been relayed to the MFC ECC, and then a response waited for from that same location. Instead, EOC Security personnel went directly to other INL Security sources for information and received conflicting information that caused confusion in the EOC, such as the number or type of victims. The number and type of victims had been provided to the EOC using the appropriate channels but the conflicting information EOC Security personnel provided caused confusion in the EOC and delays for EOC personnel in completing other activities that could have been completed sooner.

Overall, INL Security personnel successfully demonstrated their responsibilities; worked effectively with INL Fire Department, MFC ECC, and CFA ECC personnel; and maintained effective communications with applicable responders during both events. When the fire event changed into an active shooter event, INL Security personnel effectively demonstrated their duties and maintained effective communications with other INL Protective Force personnel and emergency responders to effectively and safely carry out their response activities. The overall security response was well carried out.

Issues

- INL EOC Security personnel tried to resolve issues that were incident command issues by directly contacting on-scene personnel to obtain information instead of relying on pre-established communication pathways. This caused confusion of who to contact for information and what information was really needed in the EOC.

  Recommendations:

  — Review INL ERO communication pathways for INL Security personnel during security events so INL EOC personnel understand what ERO position they should contact during drills, exercises, and actual events. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0557.**

  — Conduct a meeting with INL EOC support directors, security directors, and security specialists and discuss the incident command structure protocol and how it is implemented within the INL ERO during security events in conjunction with EPI-66, “INL Security Events.” Emphasize who to contact and what type of information is needed. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0557.**

5.10 Emergency Facilities and Equipment

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations in accordance with the facility procedures/plan.

Discussion

Facilities and equipment were used effectively during the exercise to support emergency response operations. The public address system used to activate the MFC ERO and status MFC personnel of event conditions worked effectively except for the "all-call" speaker in the MFC ECC. Equipment used in the INL WCC to facilitate response activities, including the use of the Everbridge System to activate the INL ERO elements, functioned properly.

MFC ECC, INL EOC, and CFA ECC personnel used WebEOC to document and track significant events. Procedures and position-specific checklists were on-hand, up-to-date, and available for use by INL ERO members. Web-based maps were used in the EOC to orient EOC personnel with the layout of MFC and location of response elements.

CFA ECC personnel responded and found all equipment operational. However, improvement opportunities were noted. The CFA planning communications specialist had difficulty with the headset and used the handset to send and receive information. A new or updated headset would make the process more efficient as it is easier to hear with a headset and a headset would allow the user to use both hands. The radio console needs a video card. CFA ECC personnel had to search through some of the features in iMaps (a Google Maps based system used during drills, exercises, and actual events, to depict facility and building layouts) to get the displays they wanted. Increased use of iMaps would reduce ECC personnel search time and enhance their efficiency.

All equipment in the INL EOC Planning Room was operational. Web-based maps, WebEOC, and weather were used. Assessment specialists in the EOC Planning Room were not able to print in color when using the Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres software to develop plume plots. This has been corrected.

INL Fire Department equipment was used and functional with no issues identified. Applicable sirens and alarms used during the exercise functioned properly as designed. Vehicles were available for use to evacuate nonessential personnel at MFC. The buses were started and successfully loaded during the exercise.

INL JIC equipment was fully functioning throughout the exercise. Resources were easily accessible and JIC personnel utilized them as appropriate. Facilities and equipment were adequate for response in the INL EOC Public Information area. Responders were able to find the supporting references and materials to support their activities. Sufficient forms and other supplies were available.

Overall, the equipment in the MFC ECC, INL WCC, INL EOC, and CFA ECC worked as designed and provided for a coordinated response to the event. All of the facilities infrastructure equipment, such as lighting and ventilation, functioned properly and adequately supported the response activities. Overall, this objective was successfully demonstrated with opportunities for improvement as noted below.

Issues

- No issues identified.

Opportunities for Improvement

- The "all-call" speaker in the MFC ECC does not work appropriately.

  Recommendation: The MFC ECC is currently being remodeled and upgraded, that when complete, will take care of the problem. The MFC emergency planner will verify the "all-call" speaker works in the MFC ECC when the remodel and upgrades are completed. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0559.**

- INL EOC assessment specialist computers did not print the plume projection information in color when using the Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres software.

  Recommendation: This issue has been corrected and the INL EOC assessment specialist computers are now printing in color. This issue is considered closed. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0560.**

- The software used to record television news casts on the Media Monitoring main computer is not working.

  Recommendation: Evaluate and determine the software needs for monitoring and recording television news casts. If new software is needed, purchase and install the new recording software and train Media Monitoring personnel on how to use it. **Enterprise LabWay No. CO 2014-4221.**

5.11 Communications

Given an OE, communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations to ensure prompt and appropriate flow of accurate information in accordance with facility procedures/plan.

Discussion

Communications among responders in the field were effective with incident command providing direction to the responders in an effective manner. The individual participating as the MFC building emergency director (BED) greatly assisted in communications between the IC and MFC ECC. The phonetic alphabet was used to identify buildings and the location of the event. Repeatbacks were used during the exercise, except as previously noted, to ensure understanding of the communications sent and received. When the fire event changed into an active shooter event, the BED took shelter with the general MFC population and was no longer used to communicate information from the scene to the MFC ECC.

Communications among the MFC ECC, INL EOC, and CFA ECC were effective. The planning bridge, command bridge, and phones were effectively used to establish and maintain communications. The MFC EAM periodically established communications with the INTEC EAM to keep CWI personnel apprised of the event status.

The INL Fire Department, CFA Medical Clinic, the INL WCC, and INL EOC medical director used the appropriate communication paths and protocols to relay victim information for next-of-kin notifications.

When INL Security and INL Fire Department personnel established unified command, they effectively shared information that enabled INL Fire Department EMS personnel to effectively triage victims and remove them from the event area. There was confusion in reporting the number or type of victims to the MFC ECC and INL EOC. The INL Fire Department battalion chief reported the correct information through the applicable channels to the EOC medical director. INL Security personnel at MFC did not have the correct information when the initial reports were sent in to the MFC ECC. Initially, this lead to confusion in the EOC and caused some decision-makers in the EOC to contact on-scene personnel instead of relying on established communication pathways while ascertaining the correct information as noted in Subsection 5.9. This activity forced ERO members to question the information and spend time trying to obtain the correct information. It was eventually rectified once the MFC ECC security leader

spoke with the IC directly to get the correct information. It was identified in the "hot wash" critiques after the exercise that the confusion was caused by use of terms like victim, casualty, and neutralized. Though this is listed here as a problem, it is noted that in actual events it takes time to verify information on victims and for this exercise, MFC ECC and EOC personnel continued to ask questions until they got the correct information.

Communications within the MFC and CFA ECCs were effectively demonstrated. The MFC and CFA EAMs used repeatbacks extensively during command bridge briefings to verify information. INL EOC Command Room communications were marginally effective with room for improvement. While EOC communications systems worked, sometimes the use of the communications systems detracted from the overall effectiveness of the response. First, not all applicable EOC personnel logged on to the command bridge briefings at the scheduled time leaving other bridge participants on hold waiting for them to join the bridge. While on hold, the EAMs were not able to effectively manage their events. This practice has been identified several times in past drills and other exercises. Second, confusion on the number or type of victims was prevalent during the event. Despite repeated attempts to determine the correct number or type of victims, inaccuracies remained. While some of the confusion is attributed to early termination of play by INL Security, the problem remains with who is responsible for determining this type of information and how it is shared. The method demonstrated in the exercise was ineffective. Definitive lines of communication need identified and proceduralized, training needs provided, and then the communication method needs tested. Third, the INL ED and other EOC Command Room personnel did not use repeatbacks as frequently as they should have. EOC Planning Room communication systems worked as designed to provide prompt and reliable communications for responders and decision-makers. Communications among and between responders and decision-makers were clear, concise, and accurate. The only area for improvement noted was the lack of sharing information that came across the planning bridge with personnel in the EOC Command Room. The planning director shared the information with the ED, but it was not passed along to other Command Room personnel. For example, the CWI senior management advisor in the EOC Command Room was not aware that all of the victims were BEA personnel and none were CWI personnel until almost the very end of the exercise.

INL WCC and INL FAC emergency reporting equipment worked as designed. WCC and FAC personnel effectively handled calls and alarms per applicable procedures and protocols. Limitations exist for the FAC in the number of calls that FAC dispatchers are capable of answering. FAC dispatchers can only answer two calls at a time; any other calls received while the dispatchers are on the phone will ring continuously. Callers eventually hang up. FAC dispatchers performed protocols as expected. When only one FAC dispatcher is on duty a delay may occur in notifying INL Security personnel of an active shooter and the ability to handle multiple phone calls may not exist.

Within the Public Affairs area, the INL PID assistant consistently communicated with INL JIC personnel and the INL PID. Relevant information was shared between the INL EOC and JIC. JIC team members are trained and prepared to use emergency communications protocols during drills, exercises, and actual events.

Communication systems in the INL EOC Public Information Room worked to provide prompt and reliable communications inside the INL EOC and with the INL JIC. All of the equipment, including speakers to hear briefings, and all other systems worked well. Responders communicated well with the JIC on the telephone.

Issues

- Use of terms such as victim, casualty, and neutralized caused confusion during the exercise. During the exercise, the number or type of victims constantly changed. Most of the changes were due to confusion with the use of terms. Use of the term "victims" sometimes included deceased personnel, sometimes it did not. The term "neutralized" was not universally understood by ERO members.

Sometimes the number of victims included the shooter, sometimes it did not. This added to the confusion of who was considered a victim.

Recommendation: Coordinate training involving all Emergency Services personnel and the INL Protective Force on how to correct unclear or misunderstood information. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0561.**

- The INL FAC does not have the capability to monitor nonrepeated channels on the emergency scene. This leads to the potential for missed emergency signals such as "man down" and the inability to monitor the emergency channel. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0562.**
- Communications in the INL EOC Command Room were marginally effective.

  Recommendation: INL Emergency Management Training personnel will develop a lessons learned from this exercise that addresses communication problems. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0561.**
- Information passed across the planning bridge in the INL EOC Planning Room is not readily shared with all EOC Command Room personnel.

  Recommendation: Evaluate the need to have an INL EOC Command Room ERO member on the planning bridge to relay important information to EOC Command Room personnel. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0563.**

5.12 Medical

Given the facility procedures/plan, the medical response personnel will respond to, monitor, and evaluate the specific indicators of an emergency for mitigation of the consequences and bring the emergency situation under control.

Discussion

INL Fire Department EMS personnel carried out their response activities in a safe manner. The initial event information dispatched them to what they thought was a manual fire alarm. During their initial response, it was also reported that there was a ventilation heat detector alarm. When they arrived on scene firefighting activities commenced.

When reports of shots fired were received, emergency response personnel were directed to take shelter until given permission from INL Security personnel to report to the event area. Upon arrival at the event area, INL Security personnel escorted INL Fire Department EMS personnel into the building where the active shooter scenario had been played out. EMS personnel effectively coordinated with INL Security personnel and executed triage, treatment, and transport activities in a timely manner.

This effective coordination effort enabled INL Fire Department EMS personnel to expedite patient contact and removal/evacuation from the "warm zone." In doing so, EMS personnel were able to appropriately manage patient injuries outside the "warm zone" near the ambulances. Once they had the victims outside the event area, the MFC Dispensary nurse was brought to the treatment area to assist with treating the victims. All four victims were effectively treated and it was determined where to and how to transport each one. It was simulated that Life Flight transported one victim and ambulances transported the remaining three victims.

INL Fire Department EMS personnel followed proper communication channels to provide the INL EOC medical director the information on patient status to complete next-of-kin notifications.

Overall, this objective was successfully demonstrated.

Issues

- No issues identified.

5.13 Fire and Rescue

Per procedures/plan, the fire and rescue responders will respond to an event involving fire or hazardous material, mitigate the consequences, and bring the situation under control.

Discussion

The initial event information dispatched INL Fire Department personnel to a manual fire alarm. During their initial response, it was also reported that there was a ventilation heat detector alarm. When INL Fire Department personnel arrived on scene, they established incident command and commenced firefighting activities. It was noted during the exercise that INL Fire Department personnel lacked a sense of urgency in making their initial fire attack. This may have been a result of them thinking it's only an exercise, making their initial response actions more methodical and less urgent. INL Fire Department personnel did use appropriate tactics, strategies, and hose lines that mitigated the event conditions. Response crews were effective in addressing the life safety hazards and established tactics to reduce risk to the responders and public.

The initial IC worked effectively with INL Security personnel to aid in isolating the emergency scene and controlling access. A backup engine company from INL Fire Department Station 1 arrived on scene to assist with response activities.

Effective communications were used throughout the exercise. Response teams effectively kept the IC briefed on event conditions and patient status. Incident command was established and effective throughout the event. The INL Fire Department captain established incident command on arrival at the scene and demonstrated effective leadership to all responders. When the INL Fire Department battalion chief arrived from Station 1, the captain effectively transferred incident command.

When the fire event changed into an active shooter event, the INL Fire Department battalion chief from Station 1 worked effectively with the INL security captain to establish unified command to maintain effective control over the event.

During rescue operations, two casualty collection points were established. This resulted in splitting resources and potentially confusing patient transport priorities.

Overall, this objective was successfully demonstrated with two opportunities for improvement as identified below.

Issues

- No issues identified.

Opportunities for Improvement

- INL Fire Department personnel lacked a sense of urgency in making their initial fire attack.

  Recommendation: Develop standard hose evolutions that will assist in expediting actions while also communicating expectations. Standard hose evolutions will provide the tool for the INL Fire Department to provide direction to personnel and communicate expectations. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0564.**

- Two casualty collection points were established during rescue operations, which resulted in splitting resources and potentially confusing patient transport priorities.

  Recommendation: Evaluate the INL Fire Department standard operating procedure and mass casualty incident plan to ensure communications to INL Fire Department personnel are adequate to ensure they are notified of the location of the (single casualty) collection point. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0565.**

5.14 Reentry

The ERO will demonstrate development and implementation of a reentry plan to include debriefing of the reentry team and proper recordkeeping in accordance with the facility procedures/plan.

Discussion

The need for a reentry plan was discussed among the MFC EAM, MFC ERO members, MFC senior management, and INL EOC ERO members. It was determined that a reentry would not be made during the event as there were not any benefits that would be gained by conducting a reentry. It was determined that any issues from the event would be addressed during the recovery phase. This would enable the recovery team to use applicable plans and procedures for planning and conducting work activities. It was simulated that access control was established for each of the affected areas.

An excellent discussion occurred on how many recovery managers should be utilized since this event impacted two buildings at MFC. One of the determining factors to name two recovery managers was the fact that the length of time that would be involved could be considerably different for the security event area than the building where the fire occurred.

Overall, this objective was successfully demonstrated.

Issues

- No issues identified.

5.15 Recovery

Given the facility procedures/plan, the ERO will demonstrate recovery planning for an emergency at the affected facility.

Discussion

At 1033, the MFC EAM, in conjunction with MFC management, identified a recovery manager. The recovery manager was in the MFC ECC during much of the exercise. This was very positive, as the recovery manager had a good knowledge of event-specific information. A discussion was held in the MFC ECC to determine the members of the recovery organization. Recovery planning was conducted at MFC and included items such as a structural damage assessment by a structural engineer, cleanup of material, absorption of material in a sump pump, and sampling of both the pump pit area and pond that the pump pit sump might have been discharged to.

The MFC EAM conducted an excellent discussion with the INL ED and CFA EAM regarding the assessment of damage to MFC and recovery items. The MFC ECC planning team was persistent in identifying recovery issues throughout the exercise. The INL EOC planning director accumulated the issues and was actively involved in the recovery planning session during the command bridge call. It is noted the some of the recovery discussion was abbreviated in conjunction with the exercise scenario. The identified recovery manager was in attendance during the command bridge call when the event was terminated and simulated as going into the “recovery” phase.

Overall, this objective was successfully demonstrated.

Issues

- No issues identified.

5.16 Drill/Exercise Conduct

Write, conduct, and evaluate a drill/exercise that will emphasize facility-specific emergency events and response activities and minimize the use of generic, nonspecific simulations in accordance with the facility procedures/plan.

Discussion

A facility-specific emergency event and response were emphasized throughout the exercise. The exercise was very well organized with a well-developed scenario that provided very good visual/practical aids to make the scenario more realistic. The event emphasized facility-specific emergency events and response and controllers were utilized to facilitate performance of the players and ensure safe and effective conduct of the exercise. Independent evaluators were utilized to observe, evaluate, and critique performance of the exercise. Event data and information presented during the exercise were accurate, provided the sequence of the events in a realistic manner, and was representative of actual facility conditions. Cue cards were well written, provided applicable relevant information on the initiating event and follow-up event to keep the exercise moving in the right direction and at the correct times, and kept to a minimum. Exercise critiques were held and items were identified for corrective action.

The event was clearly defined and focused on key objectives. The exercise scenario was clearly written and easy to evaluate because of measurable objectives.

Exercise controllers and evaluators were briefed and instructed on their assignments prior to the exercise. Exercise conduct evidenced much preparation and training. Controllers and evaluators were jointly involved in all pre-exercise briefings. There was a sufficient number of controllers and evaluators to provide coverage for all the participating areas except as noted below.

The exercise was effectively controlled and evaluated in the INL EOC. Midway through the exercise a DOE evaluator changed to a different color vest (from an evaluator vest to a controller vest). There were a couple of instances where better control would have cleared up confusion as discussed below.

The exercise was conducted on a Friday, which is a day off for MFC ERO members. The player briefing stated that the exercise would be simulated as occurring during a normal workweek dayshift. One of the personnel accountability leaders forgot and reported the total number of personnel inside the MFC fenced area at a significantly smaller number than the projected 650 for a dayshift. This caused momentary confusion between MFC and CFA ECCs when determining how many evacuation buses were needed. A controller quickly corrected the misinformation. One more controller in the MFC ECC may have prevented the misinformation from being disseminated to CFA ECC personnel.

There could have been a better understanding of the security requirements of the ambulance egress requirements. The exercise package indicated that the ambulances would leave the MFC fenced area and go to the MFC parking lot outside of the facility fence. During the security briefing conducted just prior to the exercise, it was communicated that ambulances would not leave the MFC fenced area. This caused confusion during the exercise for accountability purposes and in knowing when the ambulances would be simulated as leaving the facility to estimate the simulated estimated times of arrival at the local hospitals.

The exercise director requested permission to allow INL Security exercise participants to terminate their play once their response objectives had been met. The exercise director contacted the lead controllers and they indicated that all objectives had been attempted or met. INL Security personnel were allowed to terminate their play. As part of the decision to allow INL Security personnel to terminate play, it was verified that the IC and INL Fire Department battalion chief had the same information on the number and type of victims and that the battalion chief had reported victim information to the INL EOC medical director. When the exercise director returned to the MFC ECC, there was still confusion on the number or type of victims. Early termination of INL Security personnel participation detracted from the play of the MFC ECC, CFA ECC, and INL EOC. Participation to the full extent identified by the scenario should be required. In addition to the above, the EOC medical director had not informed the INL ED that he had received the correct information from the battalion chief, which is the preferred communication pathway for determining the number and type of victims. Keeping INL Security personnel on scene a little longer would have made the security IC available for the MFC ECC to communicate with.

Exercise controllers and evaluators were instructed to have players simulate outside communication by looking up the phone number of the person or agency they wanted to call and then provide the controller with the information they wanted to communicate as if making the call. A better way to simulate these calls would be to have more control cells representing the various outside agencies, such as the Idaho State Police, DOE-HQ, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, and persons that players would have to actually call to demonstrate that they could identify who to contact, how to locate the phone number, and actually provide event information to the control cell representing the agencies. Use of control cells would help decrease the number of simulations and enhance player abilities.

There was a lack of controllers at the casualty collection point for medical response. Ideally, there should be one controller for each patient. Since the responders established two casualty collection points, the three controllers for the area were split between the two collection points. If there had been only one casualty collection point, the number of controllers may have been adequate until the patients were loaded for transport.

Emergency medical technicians (EMTs) were confused as to whether they could start intravenous solution although the INL medical director and patient players had given approval for them to do so. Not all EMTs were notified of the approval prior to exercise. Also, without an additional controller, it was difficult to provide the information to the EMTs during the exercise.

"Hot wash" critiques were conducted with all exercise participants immediately following termination of the exercise at each of the evaluated areas. An evaluator/controller critique was also conducted to discuss exercise performance.

Issues

- No issues identified.

Opportunities for Improvement

- Verify that all players have been adequately briefed on exercise simulations. It was evident that not all players were adequately briefed on the simulations for this exercise as confirmed by the confusion of one of the MFC ECC personnel accountability leaders when reporting the number of personnel inside the MFC facility and in the fact that not all EMTs had been briefed that approval was received to start intravenous solution. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0566.**
- Exercise directors and controllers must be aware of security egress requirements during exercises**. Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0566.**
- Even though the exercise director had checked with all lead controllers to determine if all objectives had been met, INL Security personnel/players should not have been allowed to terminate play until the exercise had been terminated. Conduct lessons learned training or issue lessons learned to drill and exercise directors on the issue. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0566.**
- During controller and evaluator briefings, ensure that the expectations of the extent to which simulations are to be carried out are addressed. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0566.**
- Identify organizations/agencies that could be better represented by control cells rather than simulating calls. This would help decrease the number of simulations and enhance player proficiency by having the player actually provide information to someone on the phone and answer questions about the event. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0566.**
- Drill and exercise directors need to ensure that other organizations and contractors have enough controllers for the planned activities. **Laboratory Protection LabWay No. CO 2014-0566.**

6. CONCLUSIONS

A successful evaluated exercise was conducted at INL. The event initiated at MFC and involved MFC, CFA, and INL EOC ERO members; INL JIC; INL Security personnel; INL Fire Department personnel; and INL Occupational Medical Program personnel. The Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) EAM monitored the event for protection of INTEC personnel located in the vicinity of MFC. Though initially invited to participate, Naval Reactors Facility ERO members had to withdraw from participation for operational and work schedule conflict reasons.

The exercise was initiated by a manual pull fire alarm. The MFC EAM monitored INL Fire Department response and when informed that there was smoke and flames, activated the MFC ERO, which led to activation of the INL EOC ERO, CFA ERO, and INL JIC. The MFC EAM established and maintained communication with the IC through the MFC BED. Initial PAs were implemented and accountability was quickly completed and reported to the MFC ECC and IC. The MFC and CFA ECCs, INL EOC, and INL JIC were activated and declared operational in a timely manner. The applicable EAL was identified and an OE declared well within the required 15 minutes. Notifications to offsite agencies were completed within the required 30 minutes for an unclassified OE. PAs were reviewed throughout the event and adjusted as the event evolved.

INL Fire Department Station 2 personnel responded, sized up the event, and deployed the necessary personnel and equipment to effectively mitigate the emergency. Security personnel established access control around the event area and maintained contact with the INL Fire Department captain.

Backup personnel from INL Fire Department Station 1 arrived on scene at about the time the fire was reported out and overhaul activities began. At that time, a report of shots fired was received. Emergency responders took shelter while INL Security personnel effectively and efficiently responded to the active shooter event area and performed their responsibilities. Once the response area was made safe, unified command was established and INL Security personnel escorted INL Fire Department EMS personnel into the event area to triage, treat, and transport the victims. The victims were treated and loaded on ambulances and simulated as being transported to local hospitals.

Effective communications were established using the appropriate communication protocols. Voice announcements were made at MFC reminding personnel that they were in a take shelter situation and warning all nonessential personnel to stay inside their buildings. MFC and CFA EAMs periodically briefed their respective ECC personnel.

The transfer of the notification, categorization/classification, and PA functions was completed but as noted, this activity should have been a cleaner process by using repeatbacks or three-way communications during the command bridge call when the request was made.

Emergency facilities and equipment were available and operated as designed or backup equipment and processes were used as needed. When there were problems with equipment, ERO members effectively followed procedures and used available alternative methods to complete the task. For example, when a telephone headset stopped functioning, the handset was used without any interruptions in activities. Communications between the INL ERO and other facilities/agencies were effective using phone bridges, phones, and radios.

A discussion occurred on the need for reentry and it was determined not to conduct a reentry. Separate recovery managers were appointed for each event area and recovery issues were discussed.

The MFC and CFA EAMs demonstrated effective command and control skills; however, the INL ED appeared to either rely on or allow the INL EOC support director and/or assistant support director to occasionally make decisions or complete several tasks reserved for the ED. All other personnel functioning in leadership roles where command and control was an essential function demonstrated satisfactory performance.

Throughout the exercise, briefings were held within the various ECCs and provided timely updates on event conditions. The ED only conducted a few INL EOC briefings, and relied heavily on EOC personnel being updated by having the command bridge briefings broadcast over an open speaker system available in the EOC for that purpose.

INL Fire Department, INL Security, and INL Occupational Medical Program personnel satisfactorily demonstrated proficiency in their response during the active shooter activities. They were able to respond with INL Security escorts and effectively work together to triage, retrieve, initiate treatment for, and transport injured personnel. Though difficulties occurred in identifying victims, which is expected initially in an actual event, it did not impact the response of the emergency responders or EROs to effectively perform their duties, including the initiation of the next-of-kin notification process by providing victim names to the INL EOC medical director to simulate contacting INL Human Resources.

The INL JIC was activated and press releases were developed. JIC personnel professionally handled the questions that they were asked through phone calls. They were able to effectively manage the rumors that were heard through the simulated news agencies.

A successful briefing occurred on event termination that included the MFC EAM, INL ED, CFA EAM, and INTEC EAM. At the conclusion of the briefing, the DOE management duty officer was asked for concurrence on event termination. Once concurrence was obtained, the exercise was terminated.

A successful press briefing was conducted in the afternoon with INL personnel successfully demonstrating their ability to answer questions pertaining to the event, the facility involved, INL response, and the safety of INL personnel and the general population.

Overall, the exercise scenario was well written, conducted, and evaluated. Ten objectives were rated as satisfactory with five rated as satisfactory with improvement needed. The overall performance of INL ERO members was satisfactory.

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Appendix A

Exercise Scenario

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Appendix A

Exercise Scenario

Background

The Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) is located in the southeastern portion of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site, 10 miles from the eastern Site boundary and approximately 3 miles north of United States Highway 20. MFC is dedicated to developing sound solutions to nuclear energy problems of global significance through integrated nuclear energy and environmental research and development. The focus is on development and demonstration of technologies for disposition of spent nuclear fuels; characterization of nuclear fuels and materials; development of the processes needed and disposition of remote-handled nuclear wastes; safeguarding nuclear materials and reducing the threat of proliferation training of special force units in Homeland Security response efforts; reducing international nuclear safety and environmental concerns; and development and demonstration of nuclear facility deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning technologies. MFC is also equipped to conduct assembly and testing of radioisotope power systems used in space exploration.

MFC-1729, Irradiated Material Chemistry Laboratory, is an 8,000-foot-building. It was designed as a multipurpose nuclear research facility able to support many missions over its projected 40-year life. It provides a flexible, state-of-the-art space with acoustic, vibration, environmental and radiological isolation needed to support world-class post-irradiation examination capabilities at INL. The building is isolated from vibration, electromagnetic interference and temperature swings in order to support the highest possible quality of research for the Department of Energy (DOE) and other programs using MFC-1729.

The following is simulated as happening: Operators are in MFC-1729. One of the operators notices a burning smell. The operator looks at the heater unit on the north wall and sees smoke pouring from the housing.

Part 1

Upon seeing smoke, the operator pulls a manual fire alarm in MFC-1729. Personnel in MFC-1729 evacuate the building and report to the designated staging area for accountability. A recorded building-wide voice announcement follows.

INL Fire Department Station 2, located at MFC, and INL Fire Department Station 1, located at the Central Facilities Area (CFA), are dispatched to the scene with the appropriate equipment and personnel. The INL Fire Department establishes an incident command post, assesses the event, and enters the area using the necessary equipment. INL Security establishes applicable access controls around the event area.

The MFC emergency action manager (EAM) monitors the event and activates the MFC Emergency Response Organization (ERO) using applicable methods. The MFC EAM notifies the INL Warning Communications Center (WCC) of the event and activation of the MFC ERO. The WCC notifies the INL emergency director (ED) of the event and MFC ERO activation. The ED, in coordination with the INL Emergency Operations Center (EOC) support director, determines to activate the EOC and INL Joint Information Center (JIC) along with the CFA ERO to support the MFC ERO. Other INL Site facilities and Site contractors are notified of the event through the notifications process. Some Site facilities monitor the event on the planning bridge and participate in command bridge briefings.

The MFC Emergency Control Center (ECC) is declared operational. Protective actions are reviewed and implemented, and the event is categorized as an operational emergency. Applicable initial offsite and onsite notifications are completed. CH2M-WG Idaho, LLC, management is notified of the event.

The INL EOC, INL JIC, and CFA ECC are declared operational. Facility personnel begin monitoring applicable instrumentation for hazardous material releases. Applicable facility operations and event information is provided to the EOC consequence assessment team to conduct ongoing assessments during the event.

CFA ECC personnel make simulated field worker notifications. The MFC EAM briefs the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center EAM on the event.

During the event, the MFC EAM conducts applicable briefings with MFC ECC personnel and uses the command bridge to brief other responding ERO elements.

As the INL Fire Department is conducting response activities, a "777" call reports shots fired in an MFC building. INL Security personnel respond to the reported area and begin response activities. Additional protective actions for MFC are determined and implemented. INL Security personnel locate the active aggressor and secured the area. Victims are located and INL Security personnel request support from INL Fire Department Emergency Medical Services personnel. INL Security personnel establish communications with INL Fire Department personnel and develop and implement an action plan to enable INL Fire Department Emergency Medical Services personnel to enter the event area and triage, treat, and transport the victims. Victims are transported to offsite facilities (simulated).

Command bridge briefings are held as needed during the event. The MFC EAM transfers the notification, categorization/classification, and protective action functions to the INL ED.

INL EOC Public Information personnel develop press releases and applicable EOC personnel approve them.

MFC prepares for an evacuation in case it is requested (evacuation and deployment of evacuation buses would be simulated). MFC ECC personnel provide applicable information to CFA ECC personnel to determine the number of evacuation buses needed and where to relocate MFC personnel.

The INL EOC support director requests the INL WCC to make periodic radio announcements about the status of the event.

The INL WCC receives follow-up emergency notification forms throughout the event. Initial notifications to offsite agencies are completed; transmittal of follow-up notification forms to offsite agencies is simulated.

Reentry and recovery discussions are held with the recovery manager(s) identified.

When INL Fire Department personnel have determined the fire is out, victims have been treated and transported, it is determined that no release had occurred, and access control has been established as applicable, the buildings are turned back to MFC facility management.

Event termination is discussed and concurrence from the INL ED and DOE Idaho Operations Office management duty officer is requested and given.

Exercise controllers verify that the identified objectives are met and/or have been attempted. When concurrence is made, Part 1 of the exercise is terminated.

The INL WCC receives a termination notification form from the INL EOC support director.

At the conclusion of Part 1 of the exercise, "hot wash" critiques are conducted at each ECC and the INL EOC.

Part 2

The INL JIC prepares to conduct a press conference later in the afternoon at the JIC. The JIC prepares and conducts the press conference with media (mock) in attendance. Spokespersons from Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC; the DOE Idaho Operations Office; and the State of Idaho participate in the press conference. At the conclusion of the press conference, the JIC conducts and documents a "hot wash" critique.