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Historical Insights for the Safe Launch of Radioactive Materials

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Outline


- Safety Threats to Radioactive Materials
- Evolution of Safety Philosophy
- Managing Risks for Radioactive Materials
- Summary



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Typical Insult Environments




Pluto New Horizons Spacecraft
(Launch Vehicle is Below)



- Energy that can threaten the radioactive material is called an “insult environment”
 - Overpressure
 - Burning liquid propellants
 - Thermal
 - Burning liquid propellants
 - Burning solid propellants on ground
 - Heat of atmospheric reentry
 - Impacts and Accelerations
 - Launch vehicle fragments in air or on ground
 - Impact of material with ground
 - Deceleration of atmospheric reentry
- Mission-specific characteristics can yield new insult environments


Early Safety Philosophy: ***Delay, Decay and Disperse***

- Delay materials' return to the biosphere
 - Allow adequate time in orbit for radioactive decay
 - Minimum altitudes ~1100 km (650 mi)
- Disperse materials broadly on reentry
 - Ensures individual doses are small
 - Residual radioactive material is highly diluted in the atmosphere
- Problems:
 - Spacecraft failure in orbit
 - SNAP-10A (failed, but in 4000-year orbit)
 - Failure to achieve orbit
 - Transit-5BN-3, Nimbus-B1




Above: Artist's concept of Transit-4A satellite in orbit.


Below: SNAP-10A.



Evolved Safety Philosophy: **Strive to Survive the Accident**



Above: Alan Bean placing SNAP-27 during Apollo 12.



Below: Nimbus-B Satellite, which used RTGs

- Minimize both individual and *population doses*
 - ICRP: any exposure to radiation, no matter how small, causes increased cancer likelihood
 - $(\text{Tiny dose}) \times (\text{Many people}) = (\text{Some cancers})$
- Materials & protective structures designed to withstand accident & reentry environments
 - Changes in radioactive materials
 - Metals replaced with highly stable ceramics
 - High-integrity protective structures
 - High-strength and high-temperature cladding materials
 - Protective structures or “casks” made from graphite or reentry heat shield materials
- Successes:
 - Apollo 13 RTG assessed to have survived reentry
 - Nimbus-B1 RTGs survived launch destruct & recovered



Managing Radiological Risks

- 1. Prevent the Accident**
- 2. Prevent the Energetic Insult**
- 3. Prevent the Release**
- 4. Mitigate the Consequences**




Managing Radiological Risks:

1. Prevent the Accident

- Reliable launch vehicles

- Current vehicles much more reliable than early vehicles
 - One part of a comprehensive risk management approach, as a “completely reliable” vehicle is likely unattainable.
 - Vehicle reliability requires a multifaceted effort
 - Design assurance, manufacturing methods, human reliability, quality assurance, ...



4. Mitigate the Consequences

- Effective emergency response

- Real-time prediction of weather, transport & deposition
 - Detect and manage contamination, e.g.:
 - Land: access controls, cleanup, crop interdiction...
 - People: information, sheltering and evacuation orders, decontamination, medical and psychological aid...



Managing Radiological Risks: 2. Prevent the Energetic Insult



Above: ESA illustration of space debris

Below: Burning solid rocket propellant simulant



- Prevent the insult completely
 - Eliminate the source of the insult through design
 - Example: eliminate solid propellant upper stage
 - Must have a *complete* inventory of possible energy sources that may lead to insults
- Reduce insult likelihood
 - Ensure more benign outcomes are favored
 - Example: high-reliability vehicle destruct system
 - “High reliability” must encompass concept of operations & human actions, not just electromechanical system
- Reduce insult magnitude or duration
 - Manage insult characteristics to make sure design properties of protective structures not violated
 - Insult characteristics: fragment size, velocity, line-of-sight...
 - Example: small propellant fragments → short fires
 - Engineered barriers may be necessary



Managing Radiological Risks:

3. Prevent the Release

- Reduce release likelihood
 - Use materials & protective structures designed to withstand accident & reentry environments
- Reduce expected release magnitude
 - Robust structures also help contain materials to minimize release magnitude even if a release occurs
- Manage release characteristics
 - Particle size distribution
 - Favor larger particles – suppress fine particles and aerosols that can travel large distances
 - Reduce the likelihood of phenomena that can create fines and aerosols (e.g., propellant fires near released materials)
 - Potential for lofting of radioactive plume
 - Can the radioactive material be separated from the fire environment so releases are not entrained in its lofting plume?



Scanning for radioactive contamination.





Summary

- **Philosophy: *Survive the accident.***
 - Minimize individual and population doses
- **Manage radiological risks**
 - **Prevent the Accident**
 - Launch vehicle reliability is important
 - **Prevent the Energetic Insult**
 - Eliminate the source of the insult through design
 - Reduce insult likelihood, magnitude and duration
 - **Prevent the Release**
 - Use materials & protective structures designed to withstand accident & reentry environments
 - **Manage release characteristics:**
 - Minimize magnitude → less potential exposure
 - Fewer fines & aerosols → less transport in biosphere
 - **Mitigate the Consequences**
 - Effective emergency response


BACKUP MATERIAL



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The Pluto – New Horizons Mission



Mars Science Laboratory

