

# **Sustainable Rainmaking and the Nuclear Umbrella:**

## **Assuring our Allies and Telling the Hard Truths of the Complex**

### Outline:

1. Catch-22
2. IF/THEN
3. Spectrum of impact

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
June 19, 2008





# The Catch-22 of a Declining Complex

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Health of the Complex ↓

Need to highlight  
problems with physical  
and intellectual capital ↑

Need to highlight confidence in  
nuclear deterrent and its physical  
and intellectual underpinnings ↑





# IF/THEN, over a decade ago...

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## In the absence of nuclear testing...

- IF:
  - Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is supported
- THEN:
  - In the near term, can continue to certify
- BUT:
  - It's a race against time -- weapons aging, original designers retiring...

**Confidence remains high, but...**



# IF/THEN, today...

(April 2008 Congressional Testimony)

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## In the absence of nuclear testing...

- IF:
  - Recapitalization of intellectual and physical assets\*
  - Shift to RRW paradigm
- THEN:
  - Can mitigate increasing risks to certification, which include
    - ▣ Accumulation of changes in warheads due to aging and remanufacture of legacy, low-margin designs, aging infrastructure, threats to vitality of science, loss of experienced scientists/engineers...

**Confidence remains high, but without RRW...**



\* Includes need for Coherent National Nuclear Policy



# IF/THEN for SSP vs. RRW

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- Choice perceived differently
  - SSP or...nuclear testing
  - vs.
  - RRW or LEP
- Both fundamentally certification paradigms, but perception:
  - SSP – a certification paradigm
  - RRW – a warhead, a design, a program apart...

RRW=Reliable Replacement Warhead  
SSP=Stockpile Stewardship Program  
LEP=Life Extension Program



# How does the perceived health of the Complex impact the thinking of our allies?


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“To contribute to assurance, the US nuclear force needs to be seen as safe, reliable, and effective...I do think that self-denigration of our own nuclear capability probably does more to undermine assurance of allies than any lack of capability...if we are confident, they will be too.”  
– Elaine Bunn, 2005

- As long as we can continue to certify *today*, do warnings about *tomorrow* matter?
- Do other variables take precedence unless there is an imminent problem requiring testing to resolve?
  - Perceived security commitment
  - Declaratory policy
  - Credibility
  - Strength of the relationship
  - etc..


**Infrastructure—like one's health—only a thought if compromised...?**

# How does the perceived health of the Complex impact the thinking of our allies?



# How does the perceived health of the Complex impact the thinking of our allies?

NOTIONAL FIGURE





# Closing Thoughts

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- Double-edged swords
  - Highlighting problems
  - IF/THEN
- The beauty of extended deterrence – we can ask...
  - Certify Today vs. Risks Tomorrow...
  - Thresholds for “action”...
  - Where on the spectrum...
  - Credibility, once lost...



...window vs. mirror...

