

Sustainable Rainmaking and the Nuclear Umbrella: Assuring our Allies and Telling the Hard Truths of the Complex

Outline:


1. Catch-22
2. IF/THEN
3. Spectrum of impact

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The Catch-22 of a Declining Complex



Health of the Complex



Need to highlight problems with physical and intellectual capital



Need to highlight confidence in nuclear deterrent and its physical and intellectual underpinnings





IF/THEN, over a decade ago...

In the absence of nuclear testing...

- **IF:**
 - Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is supported
- **THEN:**
 - In the near term, can continue to certify
- **BUT:**
 - It's a race against time -- weapons aging, original designers retiring...

Confidence remains high, but...





IF/THEN, today...

(April 2008 Congressional Testimony)

In the absence of nuclear testing...

- **IF:**
 - Recapitalization of intellectual and physical assets*
 - Shift to RRW paradigm
- **THEN:**
 - Can mitigate increasing risks to certification, which include
 - Accumulation of changes in warheads due to aging and remanufacture of legacy, low-margin designs, aging infrastructure, threats to vitality of science, loss of experienced scientists/engineers...

Confidence remains high, but without RRW...



* Includes need for Coherent National Nuclear Policy



IF/THEN for SSP vs. RRW

- Choice perceived differently
 - SSP or...nuclear testing
 - vs.
 - RRW or LEP
- Both fundamentally certification paradigms, but perception:
 - SSP – a certification paradigm
 - RRW – a warhead, a design, a program apart...

RRW=Reliable Replacement Warhead
SSP=Stockpile Stewardship Program
LEP=Life Extension Program





How does the perceived health of the Complex impact the thinking of our allies?

“To contribute to assurance, the US nuclear force needs to be seen as safe, reliable, and effective...I do think that self-denigration of our own nuclear capability probably does more to undermine assurance of allies than any lack of capability...if we are confident, they will be too.”


– Elaine Bunn, 2005

- As long as we can continue to certify *today*, do warnings about *tomorrow* matter?
- Do other variables take precedence unless there is an imminent problem requiring testing to resolve?
 - Perceived security commitment
 - Declaratory policy
 - Credibility
 - Strength of the relationship
 - etc..

Infrastructure—like one’s health—only a thought if compromised...?




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NOTIONAL FIGURE





Closing Thoughts

- Double-edged swords
 - Highlighting problems
 - IF/THEN
- The beauty of extended deterrence – we can ask...
 - Certify Today vs. Risks Tomorrow...
 - Thresholds for “action”...
 - Where on the spectrum...
 - Credibility, once lost...

