

Quality of Name Resolution in the Domain Name System

ICNP '09

Oct 15, 2009

**Casey T. Deccio
Sandia National Laboratories**

**Chao-Chih Chen
Prasant Mohapatra
UC Davis**


**Jeff Sedayao
Krishna Kant
Intel Corporation**

This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under the grant CNS-0716741.

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company,
for the United States Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.


Objectives

- Understand the network of dependencies for a domain name
- Quantify the impact of domain name dependencies
- Identify the namespace *within* and *without* administrative control of a domain



Overview


- **Background**
 - DNS fundamentals
 - Name dependencies
- **DNS dependency model**
 - Domain name influence
 - Metrics for analysis
- **Survey of DNS namespace**
 - Data collection
 - Analysis and results




Name resolution in DNS

- **Resolver:**
 - has questions
- **Authoritative server:**
 - has answers/referrals
- Resolvers begin queries at the top of the hierarchy
- Authoritative servers refer to delegated subdomain namespace

Referrals




Resolving www.foo.com




Resolver needs server addresses

- **Names** used to designate servers authoritative for zone:
foo.com. NS ns.foo.com.
- Resolver needs **address** to query server:
ns.foo.com → 10.1.55.1
- Authoritative servers may provide addresses (i.e., *glue records*) for names in-bailiwick (subdomains):
com. provides address for *ns.bar.com.*
- Other names must be resolved by resolver:
com. provides only name for *foo.baz.net*; resolver must look up address




Name resolution example



Name dependency graph


- Nodes = domain names
- Edges = dependencies
 - Child to parent
 - **Alias to target**
 - **Zone to NS targets**
- D. J. Bernstein, “Notes on the Domain Name System”
 - Dependencies in DNS
- Ramasubramanian, et al., “Perils of Transitive Trust ...”
 - Size of dependency graph
- Pappas, et al., “Impact of Configuration Errors on DNS Robustness”



Robustness is determined by graph


- Graph properties affect:
 - ~~Potential attack~~
~~target: authenticity~~
 - Availability
 - Performance

What about DNSSEC?




How much influence does a name have?

- **Influence = probability that name is used in resolving another name**
- **Direct influence measured using edge weights**
- **Edge weight values:**
 - **Child always dependent on parent**
 - **Alias always dependent on target**




Which server is selected for query?

- **Zones generally advertise more than one authoritative server**
- **Resolvers “learn” to use server with best history**
- **From diverse locations, each server is selected with equal probability**




NS dependency edge weights

- Addresses provided by ancestor zones (*glue records*) eliminate name dependencies
- Such edges excluded from graph



Caching of NS targets

- Resolvers cache *answer* and its *source*
- Resolver will “trust” an address from an authoritative source, over one from glue
- Dependency based on probability that name is cached



Calculating level of influence

- **Level of influence:**

$$I_d(v) = P(d, \dots, v)$$


- **Path probability:**

$$P(u, j, \dots, v) = \begin{cases} w(u, j) & \text{if } j = v \text{ (direct dep)} \\ 0 & \text{if } j = r \text{ (root)} \\ w(u, j)P(j, \dots, v) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- **Aggregating influence:**


$$P(u, [NS \text{ dep}], \dots, v) = \sum_{j \in NS_u} w(u, j)P(j, \dots, v)$$

$$P(u, \dots, v) = 1 - \left(1 - P(u, \text{Parent}(u), \dots, v) \right) \left(1 - P(u, \text{Cname}(u), \dots, v) \right) \left(1 - P(u, [NS \text{ dep}], \dots, v) \right)$$




Which names really matter?

- **Non-trivial zones:**
 - Zones with non-zone direct dependents
 - Implies explicit configuration
- **First-order zones:**
 - Non-trivial zones explicitly configured by zone in question
- **Third-party influence:**
 - Probability of being influenced by third-party names




Data collection


- **Extracted ~3 million names from Open Directory Project (dmoz.org)**
- **Collected additional 100,000 names from SC08**
- **Crawled dependencies of each name**
- **Resulting graph:**
 - 8.4 million nodes
 - 22.3 million edges



Trusted computing base (zones)



Third-party influence



Summary

- DNS dependency model
 - Quantifies influence of domain names
 - Defines metrics for analysis
 - Caching of NS target names increases:
 - Number of zones in graph
 - Third-party influence
- Future work
 - Theoretical analysis of DNS misconfigurations
 - DNS availability study

